United States v. Henry Martin Steiger
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
United States v. Henry Martin Steiger, 83 F.4th 932 (11th Cir. 2023)
United States v. Henry Martin Steiger
Opinion
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[PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10742
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
HENRY MARTIN STEIGER,
a.k.a. Henry Matthew Steiger,
a.k.a. H M Steiger,
a.k.a. Robert Woods,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10742
D.C. Docket No. 3:17-cr-00043-RV-2
____________________
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge, and
COOGLER,* Chief District Judge.
COOGLER, Chief District Judge:
Henry Steiger appeals his sentence of 20 years of imprison-
ment following the revocation of his probation pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3565. Steiger argues that, where the Sentencing Guidelines
recommended a sentence of 12 to 18 months of imprisonment, his
sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. One of
his arguments is that the district court failed to give a specific rea-
son for imposing an upward variance to the statutory maximum,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2). Based upon this Court’s prec-
edents, we vacate and remand for resentencing.
I. BACKGROUND
In September 2017, Steiger pleaded guilty to one count of
conspiracy to commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343
and 1349, and three counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1343 and 2. Steiger’s presentence investigation report (“PSI”)
noted that the statutory imprisonment range on each count was 20
years, for a total maximum of 80 years. The PSI calculated a guide-
line imprisonment range of zero to six months. Further, the PSI
* Honorable L. Scott Coogler, Chief United States District Judge for the North-
ern District of Alabama, sitting by designation.
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22-10742 Opinion of the Court 3
noted that because all four counts were Class C Felonies, Steiger
was eligible for one to five years of probation under 18 U.S.C. §
3561(c)(1). In December 2017, the district court sentenced Steiger
to three years of probation.
In September 2019, the United States Probation Office filed
a petition for revocation of Steiger’s probation, alleging that Steiger
had committed nine violations. At the revocation proceeding con-
ducted in February 2022, the government explained that it would
proceed only on the eighth violation, which was premised on the
fact that Steiger had been convicted in Florida state court in June
2019 of one count of second-degree murder.
At the revocation proceeding, United States Probation Of-
ficer Kailey Minnick testified that Steiger began his probation sen-
tence in December 2017 and was under Minnick’s supervision
when he was charged by the State of Florida with committing a
murder in February 2018. After Steiger’s arrest, he pleaded not
guilty, and after a trial, was found guilty of one count of second-
degree murder in August 2019. The court sentenced Steiger to life
in prison. Steiger appealed his conviction. The Florida First District
Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction.
In the revocation proceeding, Minnick read the following
summary of the facts of the crime from the Florida appellate
court’s opinion. Steiger and the mother of his child, Cassandra
Robinson, had a disagreement on February 1, 2018, and Robinson’s
family later reported her missing as of that date. Steiger’s business
associate, Julian Mesure, told law enforcement officers that Steiger
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had implied to Mesure that Steiger had killed Robinson and that he
helped Steiger move items, including a 55-gallon drum, to Steiger’s
trailer and helped dispose of Robinson’s iPad and iPod. In July 2018,
investigators located Robinson’s decomposing body inside the 55-
gallon drum, inside Steiger’s trailer. The medical examiner con-
cluded that her manner of death was homicide. The date of the
killing was February 1, 2018, which was Steiger and Robinson’s
daughter’s first birthday. When Mesure had been questioned by law
enforcement, he said Steiger talked to him about the plan to kill
Robinson and just needed to decide the “‘when and where.’” Once
he had decided, Steiger asked Mesure to climb into the 55-gallon
drum to see if he would fit. Steiger had also demonstrated to
Mesure a motion of choking with his hands and indicated the vic-
tim was holding the baby when this happened.
Minnick continued with the following facts from the Florida
appellate court’s opinion. Steiger testified at his trial that on the day
of the birthday, Steiger found Robinson in the laundry room with
a bag over her head and rope around her neck and believed she had
committed suicide. He testified that he attempted to revive her but
was unsuccessful and admitted that he did not call 911 or seek any
medical assistance. He also admitted that his conduct afterwards of
placing her inside the barrel was in an effort to “‘cover my tracks
more like a guilty person.’” He denied making comments about
the “when and where” and demonstrating the choking motion to
Mesure. He testified that he did not come forward about the death
because he wanted to maintain custody of his daughter.
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22-10742 Opinion of the Court 5
Minnick further testified that Steiger had argued to the Flor-
ida appellate court, and subsequently to the Supreme Court of
Florida, that his attorneys were ineffective in their representation
at his trial, but that the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the ap-
pellate court’s refusal to consider the claim because Steiger had not
preserved it for appeal.
After the probation officer’s testimony concluded, Steiger’s
counsel informed the district court that Steiger was working with
retained counsel on a post-conviction motion to raise an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim and that he maintained his innocence
to the murder charge.
The district court found that Steiger violated the conditions
of his probation by committing the new crime as charged in the
violation. The court revoked Steiger’s probation and heard argu-
ment from the parties as to the sentence. Noting that Steiger had
been trusted to be on probation for a term of three years, the gov-
ernment argued that Steiger then committed the most egregious
of offenses while on probation. The government noted that while
the guideline range was 12 to 18 months, that range greatly under-
stated the seriousness of the new law violation, and it noted that
the court, in its discretion, could impose a sentence of 20 years of
imprisonment for each of the four offenses with a maximum of 80
years. In response, Steiger’s counsel argued that the district court
should sentence him to time served because Steiger’s criminal his-
tory category was a I when he was originally sentenced, which
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meant that his original guideline range was zero to six months, and
he had already been in prison for over three years.
The court gave Steiger the opportunity to allocute, at which
time Steiger argued that his trial counsel was constitutionally inef-
fective, that he was confident that he would receive a new trial, and
that the Florida appellate court’s opinion contained an inaccurate
summary of the facts of the case, which could be clarified with the
trial record.
In reply, the government reminded the district court that the
Florida First District Court of Appeal was able to review the entire
transcript and record and noted that Steiger did not dispute that he
put Robinson’s body in a barrel for months.
The district court then stated the following:
In determining an appropriate sentence, I have
carefully considered not only the evidence that I’ve
heard here today but also the matters presented dur-
ing the course of the trial in the underlying case.
There was a lot of question about determining
who was telling the truth in that case. And the real
unusual thing about that case is that it ended up with
the object of the alleged fraud, the app itself being
destroyed and therefore having no value, which re-
sulted in a very low offense level for you and your
codefendants in that case, and a probation sentence
for you in response to a substantial assistance motion
filed by the government as well.
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22-10742 Opinion of the Court 7
I do know, Mr. Steiger, you’re a very smart
man, and it’s sad that you have ended up standing be-
fore me as you are currently.
But I have fully considered all of the factors set
out in Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a),
as well as the applicable guidelines and policy state-
ments from the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion and the decisions of the courts about sentencing
under these circumstances, including decisions by the
Supreme Court of the United States.
So, under the authority of the Sentencing Re-
form Act of 1984 and its amendments, it is the judg-
ment of the Court that you’re hereby committed to
the custody of the Bureau of Prisons to be impris-
oned for a term of 20 years on each count, each of the
four counts, to be served concurrently one with the
other. And this sentence of 20 years shall be served
concurrently with the sentence imposed by the State
of Florida in your murder trial case, that’s Case No.
2018CF004365A.
The district court then asked whether either counsel had
“any objections to any of my findings or conclusions of law or an-
ything that needs to be amplified on the record with regard to the
sentence I’ve imposed?” Neither counsel objected on any ground.
Steiger appealed.
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-10742
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
If a defendant fails to specifically object at the time of sen-
tencing to the procedural reasonableness of the sentence imposed
by the district court, this Court reviews for plain error. United States
v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014). However, this
Court reviews de novo whether the district court stated a specific
reason for imposing a sentence outside the guideline range as re-
quired by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2), even when the defendant did not
object on this ground before the district court, because the claim
can be evaluated on a silent record. United States v. Parks, 823 F.3d
990, 996 (11th Cir. 2016).
III. DISCUSSION
Upon finding that a defendant violated a condition of proba-
tion, a district court may revoke the term of probation and impose
a term of imprisonment, as long as the court considers the factors
set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), such as the need for the sentence
imposed to reflect the “seriousness of the offense” and “afford ad-
equate deterrence,” among others. 18 U.S.C. § 3565. 1 The district
1 In sentencing a probation violator, a district court is not restricted to the
Sentencing Guidelines range applicable at the time of the initial sentencing
hearing. United States v. Cook, 291 F.3d 1297, 1300 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam)
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a)(2)). For revocations, the Sentencing Commission
has promulgated policy statements that include a table with terms of impris-
onment for defendants whose probation periods have been revoked based
upon the grade of the probation violation and the defendant’s criminal history
at the time of the original sentencing hearing. Id. at 1301 (citing U.S.S.G. §
7B1.4). And while the sentencing judge may choose a specific penalty from the
guideline range, he also has the authority to impose a sentence outside the
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22-10742 Opinion of the Court 9
court commits a “significant procedural error” in imposing a sen-
tence if it calculates the guidelines incorrectly, fails to consider the
§ 3553(a) factors, bases the sentence on clearly erroneous facts, or,
of particular relevance here, “fail[s] to adequately explain the cho-
sen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the
Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
Section 3553(c)(2) also provides that if the district court im-
poses a sentence outside of the guideline range, it must state in
open court the specific reason for imposing that sentence. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(c)(2). To satisfy § 3553(c)(2), “[t]he district court’s reasons
must be sufficiently specific so that an appellate court can engage
in the meaningful review envisioned by the Sentencing Guide-
lines.” Parks, 823 F.3d at 997 (quotation omitted). The requirement
that a court explain a non-guideline sentence is also important for
the defendant and the public to understand why the defendant re-
ceived the sentence. Id. & n.30. If the district court does not state a
specific reason, remand for resentencing is required. Id. at 997.
Steiger does not cite § 3553(c)(2) or this Court’s opinion in
Parks in his appellate brief. However, because one of Steiger’s argu-
ments is that his sentence should be vacated and remanded because
the district court did not state a reason for the upward variance to
the statutory maximum, the issue is properly before this Court.
And pursuant to Parks, we must review this claim de novo, even
guideline range because he chooses to “vary” from the guidelines by not ap-
plying them. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258–65 (2005) (holding
the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory).
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though Steiger’s counsel did not object on this ground at the con-
clusion of the revocation proceeding. See Parks, 823 F.3d at 996.
The record reflects that the district court did not give any
reason for why it was imposing an above-guideline sentence. The
government urges that we can look to the context and record from
the entire revocation proceeding to glean the reasoning for the sen-
tence imposed. According to the government, because the facts
surrounding the murder, which formed the basis of the probation
violation, were so heinous, the district court didn’t have to say
much. In support, the government primarily relies upon Rita v.
United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007), and Chavez-Meza v. United States,
138 S. Ct. 1959 (2018). In Rita, the Supreme Court held that an ex-
tensive explanation is not required when a case is “conceptually
simple” and the record reveals that the court considered the evi-
dence and arguments. 551 U.S. at 359. In Chavez-Meza, the Court
reiterated that “[j]ust how much of an explanation” is required “de-
pends . . . upon the circumstances of the particular case” and that
sometimes it is enough “that the judge simply relied upon the rec-
ord, while making clear that he or she has considered the parties’
arguments and taken account of the § 3553(a) factors, among oth-
ers.” 138 S. Ct. at 1965. However, this case differs from Rita and
Chavez-Meza in the significant respect that the district courts in
those cases imposed within-guidelines sentences. See Rita, 551 U.S.
at 345; Chavez-Meza,138 S. Ct. at 1965
. 2 The Court in Rita explained
2 The defendant in Rita, convicted of perjury, making false statements, and
obstructing justice, sought a sentence lower than the recommended guideline
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22-10742 Opinion of the Court 11
that a district court need not give a lengthy explanation for a guide-
lines sentence because “[c]ircumstances may well make clear that
the judge rests his decision upon the Commission’s own reasoning
that the Guidelines sentence is a proper sentence . . . in the typical
case, and that the judge has found that the case before him is typi-
cal.” 551 U.S. at 356–57.
Meanwhile, this Court’s precedents establish that when a
district court imposes an above-guideline sentence, as the court did
here, a specific statement of explanation is required. Parks, 823 F.3d
at 997 (“The burdens facing a busy district court are real, but the
text of § 3553(c)(2) imposes a mandatory obligation.”). Further, this
Court has “adopted a per se rule of reversal for § 3553(c)(2) errors.”
range of 33 to 41 months based on his physical condition, military experience,
and vulnerability in prison. 551 U.S. at 342, 344–45. The district court listened
to his arguments but concluded that a sentence of 33 months was “‘appropri-
ate,’” which the Supreme Court held was a legally sufficient explanation in
those circumstances. Id. at 344–45. The defendant in Chavez-Meza was con-
victed of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and origi-
nally sentenced to 135 months of imprisonment, the bottom of the guideline
range (135 to 168 months). 138 S. Ct. at 1964. After the Sentencing Commis-
sion reduced the guidelines range for certain drug offenses, he filed a motion
for a sentence modification. Id. The district court ordered that the defendant’s
sentence be reduced to 114 months on a form issued by the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts. Id. at 1965. Because the new sentence was
not at the bottom end of the new guideline range—which would have been
108 months—the defendant appealed, arguing that he should have received a
greater reduction and that the district court did not adequately explain the
sentence. See id. at 1963, 1966. The Supreme Court rejected this argument,
noting the “simplicity” of the case and the fact that the same judge had sen-
tenced the defendant originally and was aware of his arguments. Id. at 1967.
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Id. If the district court does not fulfill its “obligation . . . to explain
deviations from the guideline sentencing range, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(c)(2), so that [this C]ourt can determine whether the depar-
ture was justified,” the case “must be remanded for resentencing.”
Id. & n.31(quotation omitted) (citing United States v. Williams,438 F.3d 1272, 1274
(11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (stating that it is the
“duty of this Court” to vacate and remand when the district court
does not comply with § 3553(c))).
The district court’s statements at the conclusion of the rev-
ocation proceeding, quoted above, are not sufficiently specific to
allow this Court to understand why the district court imposed an
above-guideline sentence. Although the district court likely consid-
ered the heinous nature of Steiger’s conduct as a reason for the up-
ward variance, and we thus feel certain that we know what the dis-
trict court will say on remand, we must nonetheless hold that, in
light of this Court’s precedents, the district court failed to comply
with § 3553(c)(2), which requires vacatur and remand.3
3 Because we vacate and remand for resentencing, we need not reach the mer-
its of Steiger’s other procedural unreasonableness claim or consider whether
Steiger’s sentence is also substantively unreasonable. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51
(“Assuming that the district court’s sentencing decision is procedurally sound,
the appellate court should then consider the substantive reasonableness of the
sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.”).
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22-10742 Opinion of the Court 13
IV. CONCLUSION
We VACATE Steiger’s sentence and REMAND for resen-
tencing.
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22-10742 PRYOR, C.J., Concurring 1
WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, Concurring:
I join the panel opinion in full because it correctly applies
our precedent. I write separately because we should rehear this ap-
peal en banc to reconsider United States v. Parks, which requires a
“per se rule of reversal for [section] 3553(c)(2) errors” even when
the defendant never objected to the explanation of his sentence in
the district court. 823 F.3d 990, 996–97 (11th Cir. 2016). We should
treat section 3553(c) challenges like all other procedural sentencing
challenges, which we review for plain error when the defendant
never objects in the district court. See United States v. Vandergrift,
754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014).
Ordinarily, “[i]f a litigant believes that an error has occurred
(to his detriment) during a federal judicial proceeding, he must ob-
ject in order to preserve the issue.” Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S.
129, 134 (2009); see FED. R. CRIM P. 51(b). If a defendant fails to do
so, we review his objection on appeal for plain error only. Puckett,
556 U.S. at 134–35; FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). This rule, which “strictly
circumscribe[s]” our review of unpreserved objections, Puckett, 556
U.S. at 134, “is founded upon considerations of fairness to the court
and to the parties and of the public interest in bringing litigation to
an end after fair opportunity has been afforded to present all issues
of law and fact,” United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 159 (1936).
The rule applies across the board except with respect to the narrow
class of “structural errors undermining the fairness of a criminal
proceeding as a whole.” United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S.
74, 81 (2004). The rule is especially crucial with respect to
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2 PRYOR, C.J., Concurring 22-10742
procedural errors because “the district court can often correct or
avoid the mistake [if the litigant raises it] so that it cannot possibly
affect the ultimate outcome” and require correction on appeal.
Puckett, 556 U.S. at 134. And we apply the rule to most procedural
sentencing challenges, such as the consideration of improper sen-
tencing factors. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d at 1307.
The plain-error rule should apply also to an allegation on
appeal that the district court did not “state in open court the rea-
sons for its imposition of [a] particular sentence” or the “specific
reason” for a sentence that varies from the guideline range. 18
U.S.C. § 3553(c). Nothing in the text of the Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure suggests that an objection based on this statute is
different from any other “claim of error.” See FED. R. CRIM. P. 51(b)
(“A party may preserve a claim of error by informing the court” of
the objection or requested action “when the court ruling or order
is made or sought.”). No one suggests that a failure to explain a
sentence is a structural error not susceptible of harmlessness re-
view. And there is nothing unique about a section 3553(c) objection
that suggests an exception from the plain-error rule. As the Second
Circuit has explained, the “long-standing requirements [of section
3553(c)] present no novel or complex issues” that are not apparent
in the moment. United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 211 (2d Cir.
2007).
The district court is “better positioned to articulate its rea-
sons during the first sentencing hearing rather than long after the
fact.” Id. Contemporaneous objection develops the record that we
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22-10742 PRYOR, C.J., Concurring 3
need to evaluate the reasonableness of a sentence. See Parks, 823
F.3d at 996. And encouraging contemporaneous objection also
avoids the wasteful exercise that we see in this appeal.
Today we vacate a sentence of a defendant who will almost
certainly receive the same sentence—with an explanation we can
all guess—years after the fact. But every other court of appeals to
have spoken on the subject would apply plain-error review and
likely affirm the district court because Steiger’s substantial rights
were not violated. See United States v. Gilman, 478 F.3d 440, 448 (1st
Cir. 2007); Villafuerte, 502 F.3d at 211; United States v. Parker,462 F.3d 273
, 278–79 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Lynn,592 F.3d 572
, 576–
77 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Gore, 298 F.3d 322, 324–25 (5th Cir.
2002); United States v. Eversole, 487 F.3d 1024, 1035 (6th Cir. 2007);
United States v. Phelps, 536 F.3d 862, 866 (8th Cir. 2008); United States
v. Vences, 169 F.3d 611, 613 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Romero,
491 F.3d 1173, 1175–77 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Ransom,756 F.3d 770, 773
(D.C. Cir. 2014). We should join their ranks.
Parks established a different rule only because the panel was
bound by United States v. Bonilla, 463 F.3d 1176, 1181 & n.3 (11th
Cir. 2006), which itself relied on United States v. Williams, 438 F.3d
1272, 1274(11th Cir. 2006). See Parks,823 F.3d at 995
& n.22. “Be-
cause [section] 3553(c)(2) affirmatively requires the district court to
provide a specific reason for a non-guideline sentence,” Bonilla and
Williams reasoned that a “silent record” would “reflect that the sen-
tence is illegal for want of a required statement,” so no objection is
necessary for record development. See Parks, 823 F.3d at 996. The
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4 PRYOR, C.J., Concurring 22-10742
Parks panel found this distinction “plausible” as a “possible” way to
reconcile Bonilla and Williams with our general rule for procedural
reasonableness challenges. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
That distinction does not hold water outside the context of a
panel’s obligation to reconcile conflicting panel precedents. See
United States v. Hogan, 986 F.2d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1993).
Bonilla and Williams are wrong. We routinely apply plain-er-
ror review even when a silent record would reveal that the district
court committed an error of omission. For example, plain-error re-
view applies to an objection that the district court failed its affirm-
ative obligation to “‘advise the defendant that the defendant has no
right to withdraw [a] plea’” if the district court declines to apply
the prosecution’s sentencing recommendation. Dominguez Benitez,
542 U.S. at 80–83 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(B)); see also
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1999) (plain-error rule applies
to a failure to instruct the jury on an element of the offense). And
we review for plain error an unpreserved objection to a “fail[ure]
to articulate any specific findings regarding the need to seal [an] or-
der” in a criminal trial, United States v. Cordero, 7 F.4th 1058, 1066 n.8
(11th Cir. 2021), even though the court “must articulate” those find-
ings on the record, United States v. Ochoa-Vasquez, 428 F.3d 1015,
1030 (11th Cir. 2005).
This appeal shows why we should reconsider Parks and the
decisions on which it relied. As the panel opinion recounts, the dis-
trict court revoked Steiger’s probation because he was convicted of
brutally murdering the mother of his child and concealing her
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22-10742 PRYOR, C.J., Concurring 5
remains. We have no doubt that the district court on remand will
say what we all know is true—that Steiger received a long federal
sentence for his breach of probation terms because he committed
what his own counsel conceded was the most egregious sort of
breach of the trust that probation implies. But because of our “per
se rule of reversal,” Parks, 823 F.3d at 997, this panel is forced to
remand for a new sentencing hearing. We should abolish our idio-
syncratic and unprincipled treatment of section 3553(c) errors.
Reference
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