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[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 23-11282 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus DE ANNA MARIE STINSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cr-00343-SDM-AAS-1 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 23-11282 Document: 19-1 Date Filed: 12/29/2023 Page: 2 of 5

Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: De Anna Marie Stinson, proceeding pro se, appeals the dis- trict court’s denial of her motion for compassionate release. She argues that the district court erred in denying her motion because she presented extraordinary and compelling reasons for compas- sionate release based on her asthma and poor living conditions and that the district court abused its discretion in determining that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors did not favor her release. 1 Before the First Step Act of 2018 (“First Step Act”), 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) allowed the district court to reduce a prisoner’s term of imprisonment upon motion of the Director of the BOP, after considering the factors set forth in § 3553(a), if it found that ex- traordinary and compelling reasons warranted such a reduction. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (effective November 2, 2002, to Decem- ber 20, 2018). The First Step Act amended § 3582(c)(1)(A) to allow the court to reduce a defendant’s term of imprisonment also upon motion of the defendant, after the defendant has fully exhausted all

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23-11282 Opinion of the Court 3 administrative rights to appeal a failure of the BOP to bring a mo- tion on the defendant’s behalf, or the lapse of 30 days from the re- ceipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier. 2 See First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239; 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

A district court may grant compassionate release if: (1) an extraordinary and compelling reason exists; (2) a sentencing reduc- tion would be consistent with U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13; and (3) the § 3553(a) factors weigh in favor of compassionate release. United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237–38 (11th Cir. 2021). When the district court finds that one of these three prongs is not met, it need not examine the other prongs. Giron, 15 F.4th at 1348.

Factors under § 3553(a) that the district court may consider include the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the seriousness of the crime, the promotion of respect for the law, just punishment, protecting the public from the defendant’s crimes, and adequate deterrence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The district court need not address each of the We have held that § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement is not jurisdic- tional but rather is a claim-processing rule. United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021). But we left open the question of whether the ex- haustion requirement is mandatory in the sense that the court must enforce the requirement if the government raises it. See id. We decline to address that open question here because Stinson and the state dispute whether she ex- hausted her administrative remedies, and there is no need to resolve that dis- pute because we may affirm a district court “on any ground supported by the record.” PDVSA US Litig. Trust v. LukOil Pan Americas LLC, 65 F.4th 556, 562 (11th Cir. 2023).

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In its order denying Stinson’s motion for compassionate re- lease, the district court held that “the Section 3553(a) sentencing factors weigh against her release.” It then went on to discuss how months of imprisonment for “a crime fundamentally incompat- ible with civilized society” would not properly address the various factors. It acknowledged Stinson’s contrition but still held that the factors “weigh[ed] decisively against her release.”

The court did not abuse its discretion in finding that an 18-month sentence for Stinson’s murder-for-hire offense did not re- flect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, and protect the public from further USCA11 Case: 23-11282 Document: 19-1 Date Filed: 12/29/2023 Page: 5 of 5

23-11282 Opinion of the Court 5 crimes despite her personal history and rehabilitation. Accord- ingly, we affirm.3 AFFIRMED.