United States v. Anthony Sanchez

USCA11 Case: 23-13421 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 07/22/2024 Page: 1 of 4

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________

No. 23-13421 Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, versus ANTHONY SANCHEZ,

Defendant-Appellant. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 8:17-cr-00356-SCB-JSS-1

____________________ 2 Opinion of the Court 23-13421 Before JORDAN, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Anthony Sanchez, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of his pro se motion to compel the government to file a substantial-assistance motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b). In response, the government moves for summary affirmance, arguing that the district court correctly denied Sanchez’s motion because the government had the sole discretion to determine whether to file a substantial-assistance motion and Sanchez did not allege that the government had unconstitutional motives for deciding not to file such a motion.

Summary disposition is appropriate where “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the appeal is frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). 1 We review de novo whether the district court may compel the gov- ernment to make a substantial assistance motion. United States v. Forney, 9 F.3d 1492, 1498 (11th Cir. 1993). Pro se pleadings are liber- ally construed. United States v. Webb, 565 F.3d 789, 792 (11th Cir. 2009).

1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this Court adopted as precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit issued prior to October 1, 1981.

23-13421 Opinion of the Court 3

Rule 35(b) allows the court to reduce the defendant’s sen- tence after sentencing, pursuant to the government’s motion stat- ing that the defendant provided substantial assistance in investigat- ing or prosecuting another person. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b). The government has the power, but not a duty, to file a substantial-as- sistance motion. United States v. Dorsey, 554 F.3d 958, 960–61 (11th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. McNeese, 547 F.3d 1307, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The Supreme Court and this Court long have recog- nized that the government discretion to seek a substantial-assis- tance reduction is vast.”). And absent a motion from the govern- ment requesting a departure, the district court may not depart from the guidelines based on the defendant’s substantial assistance. Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185 (1992); McNeese, 547 F.3d at 1309 (extending Wade to Rule 35(b) motions).

The prosecutorial discretion to refuse to file a substantial- assistance motion is subject to judicial review only if it is based on an unconstitutional motive, such as the defendant’s race or reli- gion, or is not rationally related to any legitimate government end. Wade, 504 U.S. at 185-86; McNeese, 547 F.3d at 1309. Consequently, when a defendant merely claims he provided substantial assistance or makes generalized allegations of improper motive, he is not en- titled to a remedy or even to an evidentiary hearing. Wade, 504 U.S. at 185–86.

When the government fails to comply with the specific terms of a plea agreement, including a promise to file a substantial- assistance motion, we review according to contract principles. See 4 Opinion of the Court 23-13421 Forney, 9 F.3d at 1499 n.2. When the government has promised only to consider the defendant’s cooperation, as opposed to a promise to file a motion for reduction, we review the government’s refusal to file a motion for a constitutionally impermissible motive, unless the evidence shows that the government failed to consider the defendant’s assistance at all. Id.

Here, we summarily affirm the denial of Sanchez’s pro se mo- tion to compel the government to file a substantial assistance mo- tion under Rule 35(b). Nothing in Sanchez’s plea agreement re- quired the government to file a Rule 35(b) motion. It is, therefore, clear as a matter of law that the district court correctly denied Sanchez’s motion because the government had the sole discretion to decide whether to file a substantial-assistance motion and Sanchez did not allege that the government had unconstitutional motives for not filing the motion. See McNeese, 547 F.3d at 1309.

AFFIRMED.