Antonio Hall v. SAC Wireless, LLC
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Antonio Hall v. SAC Wireless, LLC
Opinion
USCA11 Case: 23-13272 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 07/24/2024 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-13272
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
ANTONIO HALL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SAC WIRELESS, LLC,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-05241-JPB
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-13272
Before WILSON, BRASHER, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-Appellant Antonio Hall appeals the district court’s
order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee
SAC Wireless, LLC, on Hall’s negligence claim. The district court
found that SAC Wireless was Hall’s statutory employer under
Georgia Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) and thus was im-
mune from tort liability. After careful review, we affirm.
I.
SAC Wireless, a subsidiary of Nokia, is often the general
contractor who works on cellphone towers. In August 2020, SAC
Wireless installed and removed antennas on a cell phone tower
benefiting a customer. But SAC Wireless does not own any cranes
to help bring materials to the cell phone tower. SAC Wireless con-
tracted with Maxim Crane Works, L.P., to provide the crane and
employees to perform the necessary crane work for this project.
Maxim provided the use of a crane, a crane operator, and a
crane oiler, the person who helps set up and break down the crane.
In the contract, Hall was designated as the crane oiler. When
Maxim provided the crane and its employees to SAC Wireless, they
were under SAC Wireless’s “exclusive jurisdiction, possession, su-
pervision and control.” SAC Wireless told the crane operator
where the equipment needed to be set up and then to lift and lower
necessary equipment. SAC Wireless would not have been able to
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23-13272 Opinion of the Court 3
complete the job had it not been for the Maxim’s contract to pro-
vide the crane, crane operator, and crane oiler.
After SAC Wireless completed moving the antennas off the
cell phone tower, Hall, as the crane oiler, had to disassemble the
crane to prepare it for transport. During the disassembling process,
Hall placed his left hand on the crane to balance himself just as the
crane operator caused the crane to touch energized power lines.
As a result, Hall was electrocuted and was significantly injured.
Hall sought and received workers’ compensation benefits from
Maxim.
Hall sued SAC Wireless for negligence and punitive dam-
ages. SAC Wireless moved for summary judgment,1 arguing that
it is entitled to tort immunity under the “statutory employer” doc-
trine, codified at O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8(a), such that Hall’s exclusive
remedy is under the WCA. The district court agreed. Hall timely
appealed.
II.
“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, viewing all the evidence, and drawing all reasonable factual
inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party.” Guevara v. NCL (Ba-
hamas) Ltd., 920 F.3d 710, 720 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks
omitted). A grant of summary judgment is proper “if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
1 Hall also moved for partial summary judgment, which the district court de-
nied.
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the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a).
First, Hall argues that he was not an employee of a subcon-
tractor under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8(a). Second, Hall argues that even
if Maxim was a subcontractor of SAC Wireless, he was not engaged
in the subject matter of the contract under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8(a).
We find that both arguments fail and address each in turn.
The WCA “is designed to provide for relief to injured em-
ployees, while also protecting employers from excessive recoveries
of damages.” Savannah Hosp. Servs., LLC v. Scriven, 828 S.E.2d 423,
425 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). The WCA has an exclusive remedy provi-
sion. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a). “Therefore, where the Act applies, it
provides the employee’s exclusive remedy against his employer
and precludes recovery on a tort claim by an injured employee
against his employer.” Teasley v. Freeman, 699 S.E.2d 39, 41 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).
The statutory employer provision of the WCA states: “A
principal, intermediate, or subcontractor shall be liable for com-
pensation to any employee injured while in the employ of any of
his subcontractors engaged upon the subject matter of the contract
to the same extent as the immediate employer.” O.C.G.A. § 34-9-
8(a). This provision “applies only where the principal has con-
tracted to perform certain work for another and has subcontracted
some or all of that work.” Carr v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc.,
733 S.E.2d 1, 5 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012). “[T]he statutory employer doc-
trine permits liability for workers’ compensation benefits to attach
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23-13272 Opinion of the Court 5
vicariously against someone other than an injured employee’s em-
ployer. In return, the vicariously liable party is immune from tort
liability for the injury suffered.” Manning v. Ga. Power Co., 314
S.E.2d 432, 433 (Ga. 1984).
The contract between SAC Wireless and Maxim shows that
SAC Wireless retained Maxim to provide a crane to assist with SAC
Wireless’s work on the cell phone towers. Further, like the district
court correctly noted, SAC Wireless could not have completed the
work for its customer because it did not have its own cranes or
those to operate the cranes. 2 Thus, SAC Wireless subcontracted
with Maxim to complete its contract with its customers. As a re-
sult, the district court properly found that SAC Wireless was the
principal contractor and Maxim was the subcontractor with Hall
being an employee of Maxim.
Next, Hall asserts that because he was disassembling the
crane, he was not “engaged upon the subject matter of the con-
tract,” O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8(a), insisting that the breaking down of the
crane was not part of the contract. This is illogical. SAC Wireless
did not have cranes that Hall was coming to solely remove; instead,
Maxim brought the cranes to the job site, stayed and assisted in
SAC Wireless’s job, and then had to remove the cranes. We agree
with the district court that “erecting the crane, tending to the needs
of the crane and disassembling the crane were as much a part of the
2 Hall also argues that Maxim only provided tools. But that argument lacks
merit because if SAC Wireless only need the crane, there would not be a con-
tract for personnel to help use the crane.
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contract as the hoisting activities.” Hall v. SAC Wireless, No. 1:21-
cv-05241-JPB, 2023 WL 5918920, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 11, 2023).
Thus, Hall’s duties in breaking down the crane were part of the
subject matter of the contract.
Accordingly, the district court properly found that SAC
Wireless was Hall’s statutory employer and entitled to immunity
from suit.
AFFIRMED.
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished