USCA11 Case: 23-13772    Document: 40-1     Date Filed: 07/25/2024   Page: 1 of 4




                                               [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-13772
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiff-Appellee,
       versus
       MARCUS ALBERT RAMBO,


                                                  Defendant-Appellant.


                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cr-20149-CMA-1
                          ____________________
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       2                          Opinion of the Court                        23-13772


       Before GRANT, BRASHER, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Marcus Rambo appeals his conviction for possession of a
       firearm and ammunition in violation of 

(g)(1). He
       argues that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Commerce
       Clause and the Second Amendment, both facially and as applied to
       his conduct. The government, in turn, moves for summary affir-
       mance.
              We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. United
       States v. Wright, 

 (11th Cir. 2010). Summary dis-
       position is appropriate when “the position of one of the parties is
       clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial
       question as to the outcome of the case.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v.
       Davis, 

, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). 1
               Our binding precedent holds that 

(g) is con-
       stitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Second Amend-
       ment. In United States v. McAllister, we held that Ҥ 922(g)(1) is not
       an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s power under the Com-
       merce Clause,” explaining that the statute’s requirement of a con-
       nection to interstate commerce was sufficient to satisfy the “mini-
       mal nexus” requirement of the Commerce Clause. 

,
       389‑90, 391 (11th Cir. 1996). The government proves a “minimal


       1 Groendyke Transportation is binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit under

       Bonner v. City of Prichard, 

 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
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       23-13772               Opinion of the Court                          3

       nexus” to interstate commerce if it demonstrates—as Rambo con-
       cedes it did here—that the firearm was manufactured outside of
       the state where the offense took place and, thus, necessarily trav-
       eled in interstate commerce. Wright, 607 F.3d at 715–16. And in
       United States v. Dubois, we reaffirmed our earlier precedent holding
       that under District of Columbia v. Heller, 

 (2008),
       “statutes disqualifying felons from possessing a firearm under any
       and all circumstances do not offend the Second Amendment.” 

 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Rozier, 

 (11th Cir. 2010)).
              The prior precedent rule requires us to follow a prior bind-
       ing precedent unless and until it is overruled by the Supreme Court
       or by this Court sitting en banc. United States v. White, 

 (11th Cir. 2016). “To constitute an overruling for the
       purposes of this prior panel precedent rule, the Supreme Court de-
       cision must be clearly on point,” and it must “actually abrogate or
       directly conflict with, as opposed to merely weaken, the holding of
       the prior panel.” United States v. Kaley, 

 (11th
       Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). And to do that, “the later Supreme
       Court decision must ‘demolish’ and ‘eviscerate’” each of the prior
       precedent’s “fundamental props.” Dubois, 

 (quota-
       tion omitted). So, for example, our precedent relying on Heller for
       the proposition that “felons are categorically ‘disqualified’ from ex-
       ercising their Second Amendment right” was not abrogated by a
       later Supreme Court decision (New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v.
       Bruen, 

 (2022)) that “repeatedly stated that its decision was
       faithful to Heller.” 

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       4                      Opinion of the Court                23-13772

               The same principle applies here. Rambo concedes that his
       Commerce Clause arguments are currently foreclosed by this
       Court’s binding precedents. And our binding precedents in Dubois
       and Rozier similarly foreclose his Second Amendment arguments.
       The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Rahimi did not ab-
       rogate Dubois or Rozier because it did not “demolish” or “eviscer-
       ate” the “fundamental props” of those precedents. Rahimi did not
       discuss § 922(g)(1) at all, nor did it undermine our previous inter-
       pretation of Heller. To the contrary, Rahimi reiterated that prohi-
       bitions “like those on the possession of firearms by ‘felons and the
       mentally ill,’ are ‘presumptively lawful.’” United States v. Rahimi,
       

, No. 22-915, slip op., at 15 (June 21, 2024) (quoting
       Heller, 

).
             Because the government is “clearly correct as a matter of
       law” that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause
       and the Second Amendment facially and as applied to Rambo, we
       GRANT its motion for summary affirmance. See Groendyke
       Transp., 406 F.2d at 1162.
             AFFIRMED.