Bay Point Capital Partners II, LP v. Thomas Switch Holding, Llc

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Bay Point Capital Partners II, LP v. Thomas Switch Holding, Llc, 113 F.4th 1304 (11th Cir. 2024)

Bay Point Capital Partners II, LP v. Thomas Switch Holding, Llc

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 23-11432    Document: 35-1      Date Filed: 08/26/2024   Page: 1 of 14




                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-11432
                           ____________________

        In re: VIRTUAL CITADEL, INC., et al.,
                                                                  Debtor.
        _________________________________________
        BAY POINT CAPITAL PARTNERS II, LP,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellant,
        versus
        THOMAS SWITCH HOLDING, LLC,
                                                     Defendant-Appellee.
                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-00074-SEG
                           ____________________
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        2                     Opinion of the Court                23-11432




        Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and JILL PRYOR, and BRASHER,
        Circuit Judges.
        BRASHER, Circuit Judge:
               This appeal requires us to decide whether a bankruptcy
        court erred in valuing a bitcoin mining property. In so doing, we
        must answer three questions: First, did the bankruptcy court
        clearly err in finding that the property was a special purpose prop-
        erty with mining bitcoin as its highest and best use? Second, con-
        sidering those findings, did the bankruptcy court choose the correct
        method to value the property as a matter of law? And third, did the
        bankruptcy court clearly err in giving the tax stamp value of the
        property some weight in its valuation? We answer “no” to each of
        those questions. Accordingly, we affirm.
                                         I.

                                        A.

               Michael Oken owned and operated two related businesses
        in College Park and Atlanta, Georgia. The businesses were located
        on two adjacent properties, one that housed a bitcoin mining oper-
        ation and the other that housed a data storage center. The bitcoin
        mining operation is at issue in this appeal. Oken bought the nearly
        one-acre mining property for $50,000 and invested millions in in-
        frastructure upgrades to mine bitcoin on the property.
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        23-11432               Opinion of the Court                        3

               Bitcoin mining requires enormous amounts of power. So,
        important to the operation was a Power Sales Agreement Oken en-
        tered with the City of College Park, Georgia, to receive fifteen
        megawatts of low-cost power for five years at the mining property.
        That agreement resulted in electrical savings of up to $4 million per
        year. It also required Oken to pay around $885,000 for infrastruc-
        ture upgrades to the property, including six transformers, to ac-
        commodate the increased electrical capacity. Although Oken paid
        for those improvements, the city owned the transformers and
        could hypothetically remove them if it chose to do so. Oken also
        completed around $3 million in other improvements to the prop-
        erty to prepare it to mine bitcoin and built a 3,000 square feet
        metal-sided “butler building” on the property to house electrical
        equipment, including “antboxes”—the containers storing the ma-
        chines that do the bitcoin mining.
               Oken died in 2019, which led his businesses to file for Chap-
        ter 11 bankruptcy in 2020. The bankruptcy estate sold the data cen-
        ter business and bitcoin mining operation together for $4.9 million.
        The deeds transferring the properties to the purchaser contained a
        stamp showing $2,450 in transfer taxes paid for each property. Be-
        cause Georgia law imposes a 0.1% tax on transfers of real property,
        a $2,450 “tax stamp” value indicates a $2.45 million purchase price
        for each property.
              The purchaser of the operation bought the mining property
        because of its existing bitcoin mining infrastructure and planned to
        expand and continue to use the property to mine bitcoin.
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        4                       Opinion of the Court                  23-11432

        Specifically, the purchaser bought the property to “bring in as
        many bitcoin mining machines as they could and run a bitcoin min-
        ing operation.” The purchaser negotiated a new power sales agree-
        ment with the city and continued to use the property as a bitcoin
        mining facility.
                After the sale, two creditors sought to recover on liens on
        the businesses’ property. Thomas Switch Holding had loaned
        $545,000 that was secured by a perfected first-priority lien on the
        mining property. Bay Point Capital loaned money to the debtors
        after they filed for bankruptcy and held a perfected first-priority lien
        on all the other assets of the mining operation, including the data
        center property. The order approving the sale of the mining oper-
        ation required $700,000 of the proceeds to be put in escrow pend-
        ing the determination of the amount of Switch’s lien, which at-
        tached up to $700,000 of the value of the mining property. Thus, if
        the mining property was valued at $700,000 or higher, Switch
        would receive the full $700,000. If the mining property was valued
        at less than $700,000, Switch would receive that amount and Bay
        Point would receive the difference.
                                          B.

              After a bench trial, the bankruptcy court found that the
        value of the mining property was over $700,000 and thus Switch
        was due the entire amount held in escrow. In valuing the property,
        the bankruptcy court considered two common valuation meth-
        ods—the sales comparison approach (which considers the value at
        sale of comparable properties) and the cost approach (which
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        23-11432                Opinion of the Court                          5

        considers the cost to replace the property). The parties did not ar-
        gue for, and the bankruptcy court did not consider the income ap-
        proach, another commonly used valuation method.
                At the bench trial, Switch’s appraiser, Michael Easterwood,
        testified that the mining property’s highest and best use was as a
        bitcoin mining operation, it was a special purpose property, and
        there were no comparable properties with access to fifteen mega-
        watts of power available on the market. Thus, Easterwood opined
        that the cost approach was the most appropriate method to value
        the property and that the mining property should be valued at
        $830,000. He based his opinion on the value of the land at $60,000,
        the butler building at $100,000, and the cost of the improvements
        necessary to use fifteen megawatts of power on the property at
        $885,000. He also added engineering costs, applied discount fac-
        tors, and depreciated the property. But he did not include the value
        of the antboxes, other equipment on the property, or any personal
        property. He also did not consider the $3 million Oken invested in
        electrical distribution improvements because he was unaware of
        those improvements at the time of his appraisal. And he did not
        consider the tax stamp value of the property.
               Bay Point’s appraiser, Jeff Miller, testified that the sales com-
        parison approach was the most appropriate method to value the
        mining property and that the value of the mining property was
        $48,000. To support his conclusion, he considered the mining prop-
        erty being landlocked with the only road access being through the
        data center property. Although he could not identify any similar
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        6                     Opinion of the Court                 23-11432

        properties that could be used to mine bitcoin that could be used for
        a comparison, he compared the property to other properties of a
        comparable size that could be put to “light industrial” use. He did
        not consider the infrastructure upgrades to bring power to the
        property.
               The bankruptcy court largely agreed with Easterwood’s tes-
        timony, adopted the cost approach to value the mining property,
        and held that the property was worth more than $700,000. It first
        concluded that, although the tax stamp value was not deserving of
        much weight, a tax stamp value of $2.45 million weighed in favor
        of a total valuation greater than $700,000. It next explained that
        Easterwood’s calculation was the most reliable because he was the
        only expert to account for the property’s infrastructure improve-
        ments and electrical capacity that allowed the property to be used
        to mine bitcoin. The bankruptcy court thus accepted Easterwood’s
        conclusion that the highest and best use for the property was as a
        bitcoin mining operation and that the property was a special pur-
        pose property. The bankruptcy court also noted that the purchaser
        bought the property to use for bitcoin mining and used it for that
        purpose. Applying the cost approach, the bankruptcy court found
        that, given the significant upgrades to the property that would be
        required to recreate a comparable bitcoin mining property, the
        value of the mining property was over $700,000.
                Bay Point appealed the bankruptcy court’s decision to the
        district court, which rejected its arguments and affirmed the bank-
        ruptcy court. This appeal followed.
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        23-11432                Opinion of the Court                          7

                                        II.

                Because the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s
        order, we independently review the “factual and legal determina-
        tions of the bankruptcy court and employ the same standards of
        review as the district court.” In re Int’l Admin. Servs., Inc., 
408 F.3d 689, 698
 (11th Cir. 2005). We review the bankruptcy court’s legal
        conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. 
Id.
 Fac-
        tual findings are clearly erroneous only if we are “left with the def-
        inite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” 
Id.
        (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
                                          III.

               Bay Point makes three arguments against the bankruptcy
        court’s decision to value the property at over $700,000. First, Bay
        Point argues that the bankruptcy court erred in determining that
        the property is a special purpose property with the highest and best
        use of bitcoin mining. We review that determination as a factual
        finding for clear error. Second, it argues that the bankruptcy court
        erred as a matter of law when it selected the cost approach, instead
        of the sales comparison approach, to value the mining property.
        See In re Seaside Eng’g & Surveying, Inc., 
780 F.3d 1070, 1075
 (11th
        Cir. 2015) (holding that this choice is a legal determination). Fi-
        nally, Bay Point argues that the bankruptcy court clearly erred
        when, as part of its valuation, it considered the tax stamp value of
        the property. We address each argument in turn.
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                  23-11432

                                          A.

                We first consider the bankruptcy court’s finding that the
        mining property is a special purpose property with the highest and
        best use of mining bitcoin. A property’s highest and best use is the
        most profitable and likely use for the property. See TOT Prop. Hold-
        ings, LLC v. Comm’r, 
1 F.4th 1354
, 1369–70 (11th Cir. 2021). A special
        purpose property is defined by three primary characteristics: a
        physical design built for a specific use or purpose; a lack of financial
        viability for any other use or purpose; and a lack of comparable
        properties on the market. See J.D. Eaton, Real Estate Valuation in
        Litigation 242 (2d Ed. 1995); United Techs. Corp. v. Town of East
        Windsor, 
807 A.2d 955
, 965 n.22 (Conn. 2002). See also Johnston Coca-
        Cola Bottling Co. v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Revision, 
73 N.E.3d 503, 508
        (Ohio 2017) (defining a “special purpose” property as one that is
        “built for a unique purpose, is in good condition, and is being used
        for that purpose—both presently and for the foreseeable future”).
               The bankruptcy court accepted Easterwood’s opinion that
        the highest and best use of the mining property was as a bitcoin
        mining operation and that this use made it a special purpose prop-
        erty. As to the property’s highest and best use, the bankruptcy
        court noted that Oken had improved the property so that it could
        be used as a bitcoin mine, that the purchaser was interested in the
        property because these improvements allowed it to be used to
        mine bitcoin, and that the property continued to be used as a
        bitcoin mine after the sale. As to whether the property was a special
        purpose property, the bankruptcy court noted that Oken spent
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        23-11432              Opinion of the Court                        9

        around $3 million to improve the property to allow it to use fifteen
        megawatts of power—an infrastructure investment that would be
        wasted if it was used for a purpose other than bitcoin mining. The
        bankruptcy court also accepted Easterwood’s opinion that there
        were no comparable properties on the market that could be used
        for the same purpose.
                We are not “left with the definite and firm conviction” that
        the bankruptcy court clearly erred. Int’l Admin. Servs., 
408 F.3d at 698
 (quoting Lykes Bros., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 
64 F.3d 630, 634
 (11th Cir. 1995)). In fact, many of its findings are undis-
        puted. There is no dispute that Oken benefited from low-cost elec-
        tricity rates for the property in College Park, Georgia. There is no
        dispute that, to use that electricity to mine bitcoin, Oken spent
        around $3 million on infrastructure improvements to the property.
        It is undisputed that the purchaser bought the property to use as a
        bitcoin mine and continued to use it for that purpose. And it is un-
        disputed that there was no comparable property for sale on the
        market that would allow a similar use with similar access to elec-
        tricity because of similar improvements.
              Despite the lack of any meaningful dispute on this record,
        Bay Point says the bankruptcy court’s factual findings are clearly
        erroneous. It makes three arguments in this regard, but none is per-
        suasive.
              First, Bay Point says the bankruptcy court’s valuation of the
        property incorrectly incorporated the value of the Power Sales
        Agreement, which was not transferrable, and the installed
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 23-11432

        equipment that Oken paid for, but that the city continued to own.
        We disagree. True, the Power Sales Agreement did not run with
        the property, and the property could not be used to mine bitcoin
        without a similar agreement. Likewise, it is true that College Park
        retained ownership of the transformers that Oken installed on the
        property. But these arguments miss the point. The bankruptcy
        court reasoned that the property was valuable because of the infra-
        structure upgrades that allowed its owner to use electricity that the
        city was willing to sell. That reasoning was borne out by the pur-
        chaser’s actions. By the time of the bankruptcy court’s valuation,
        the purchaser had entered into its own agreement with the city to
        buy low-cost electricity for mining bitcoin. And there was no rea-
        son for the city to remove the transformers that Oken had paid to
        install.
               Second, Bay Point argues that there is insufficient evidence
        that bitcoin mining is the highest and best use of the property be-
        cause Switch introduced no evidence that bitcoin mining was prof-
        itable on the property at the time of the valuation. Again, we disa-
        gree. For starters, we note that the original business filed for bank-
        ruptcy because of Oken’s death, not because the business failed.
        More importantly, Bay Point again ignores the fact that the pur-
        chaser bought the property to use for bitcoin mining and, in fact,
        continued to use it for that purpose. As our predecessor court ex-
        plained, “[o]rdinarily, the highest and best use for property” is its
        actual use “because economic demands normally result in an
        owner’s putting his land to the most advantageous use.” United
        States v. Buhler, 
305 F.2d 319, 328
 (5th Cir. 1962). Even in the
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        23-11432               Opinion of the Court                         11

        absence of evidence about the profitability of bitcoin mining, we
        cannot say the bankruptcy court committed clear error in finding
        that the property could feasibly be used for bitcoin mining when it
        had been used that way in the past and was continuing to be used
        for that purpose at the time of the valuation.
                Third, Bay Point argues the bankruptcy court erred in des-
        ignating the property a special purpose property because the im-
        provements to the property do not prevent it from being used for
        purposes other than bitcoin mining. Again, we disagree. The ques-
        tion in assessing whether a property is a special purpose property
        is whether there is another viable use in light of the capital invested
        in the property. Of course, with enough additional investment or a
        willingness to forego money already invested, this property could
        be used for some other industrial purpose. But valuing the property
        as a general one-acre “light industrial” property would put to waste
        all of Oken’s investments to allow bitcoin mining. And, yet again,
        Bay Point would ignore the fact that the purchaser bought the
        property to mine bitcoin and used it for that purpose.
               For these reasons, the bankruptcy court did not clearly err
        in classifying the property as a special purpose property with the
        highest and best use as a bitcoin mine.
                                          B.

               In light of these findings, we next ask whether the bank-
        ruptcy court correctly selected the cost approach to value the min-
        ing property. We conclude it did. The bankruptcy code provides
        that a property valuation should be made “in light of the purpose
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11432

        of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such
        property, and in conjunction with any hearing on [that] disposition
        or use.” 
11 U.S.C. § 506
(a)(1). Rather than command a specific
        method to value collateral, the bankruptcy code “gives a bank-
        ruptcy court flexibility in choosing among the possible standards of
        valuation to fit the particular circumstances of each case.” 8B C.J.S.
        Bankruptcy § 977.
               There are three commonly used valuation methods bank-
        ruptcy courts use to value property: the sales comparison ap-
        proach, the cost approach, and the income approach. See, e.g., In re
        Mocco, 
222 B.R. 440, 457
 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998). The sales comparison
        approach values a property using data from recent sales of compa-
        rable properties in the market. See. e.g., In re 150 N. St. Assocs., 
184 B.R. 1, 6
 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995). This approach “is disfavored for
        unique assets for which recent comparable sales are limited or do
        not exist.” In re Motors Liquidation Co., 
576 B.R. 325, 427
 (Bankr.
        S.D.N.Y. 2017). The cost approach, on the other hand, is used to
        value “special-purpose properties, and other properties that are not
        frequently exchanged in the market.” Waranch v. Comm’r, 
58 T.C.M. (CCH) 584
 (1989). It considers “the cost to build a replace-
        ment, minus accrued depreciation, or the cost to purchase an exist-
        ing structure and make any necessary modifications.” 
Id.
 And it is
        most appropriate when “comparable sales are not available.” 
Id.
 Fi-
        nally, the income approach values a property by capitalizing the
        anticipated future income from owning the property. See, e.g., In re
        Cool, 
81 B.R. 614, 618
 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987).
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        23-11432              Opinion of the Court                       13

               In light of the bankruptcy court’s determination that the
        mining property is a special purpose property with the highest and
        best use of bitcoin mining, we think the bankruptcy court correctly
        selected the cost approach. Bay Point argues the bankruptcy court
        should have selected the sales comparison approach instead of the
        cost approach. But no expert identified a comparable property that
        could be used to mine bitcoin. And neither party argues the income
        approach is a proper way to value the property. In bankruptcy, “the
        ‘proposed disposition or use’ of the collateral is of paramount im-
        portance to the valuation question.” Assocs. Com. Corp. v. Rash, 
520 U.S. 953, 962
 (1997) (quoting 
11 U.S.C. § 506
(a)(1)). The cost ap-
        proach was the only approach that allowed the bankruptcy court
        to give some weight to the improvements that allowed the prop-
        erty to handle the electricity needed for bitcoin mining.
                                        C.

               Finally, Bay Point argues the bankruptcy court clearly erred
        by considering the tax stamp as additional evidence that the value
        of the property was greater than $700,000. The bankruptcy court
        noted that the transfer tax stamp value of $2,450 for the mining
        property reflected a value of $2.45 million. But the bankruptcy
        court also recognized that this value was likely attributed to the
        property out of convenience—i.e., it is half the total sales price.
        Nonetheless, the bankruptcy court reasoned that, even if the tax
        stamp value were set mostly out of convenience, it suggested that
        the property was worth at least $700,000 because “it is hard to
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        14                       Opinion of the Court                 23-11432

        rationalize a decision to indicate a purchase price over 3.5 times the
        real value.”
               We cannot say the bankruptcy court clearly erred in how it
        weighed this piece of evidence. First, it was reasonable for the
        bankruptcy court to give some weight to the property’s tax stamp
        value. Indeed, “all relevant factors to property value must be con-
        sidered to arrive at a just valuation of a property,” and the assigned
        value of a property for tax purposes is at least one of the factors that
        a court may consider. In re Seaside, 
780 F.3d at 1075
 (quoting In re
        Webb MTN, LLC, 
420 B.R. 418, 435
 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2009)). Sec-
        ond, the bankruptcy court did not assign the tax stamp an unrea-
        sonable or inordinate weight. The bankruptcy court made clear
        that the tax stamp value of $2.45 million supported, but did not
        compel, the proposition that the property was worth more than
        $700,000.
                             *             *             *
                We cannot say the bankruptcy court erred. The record sup-
        ports the bankruptcy court’s determination that the mining prop-
        erty was worth more than $700,000. And Bay Point has not estab-
        lished that the bankruptcy court committed an error of law or fact
        in its assessment of the property’s value.
                                        IV.

               We AFFIRM the judgment of the lower courts.


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