U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 2024

United States v. Tony Saunders

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Decided September 30, 2024

Opinion

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[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 23-12243 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiﬀ-Appellee, versus TONY JAY SAUNDERS,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 2:05-cr-14026-DLG-1 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 23-12243 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 09/30/2024 Page: 2 of 10

2 Opinion of the Court 23-12243

Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: Tony Saunders appeals his sentence of 48 months’ super- vised release 1 imposed upon revocation of supervised release.

Saunders asserts the district court plainly erred by failing to sen- tence him as if the revised penalties implemented by the Fair Sen- tencing Act of 2010 (Fair Sentencing Act), Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010), 2 were in eﬀect at the time he committed the un- derlying oﬀense for which he was serving a term of supervised re- lease. Saunders also contends the district court’s imposition of a 48-month term of supervised release is substantively unreasonable because the district court gave improper weight to Saunders’s crim- inal history and the nature of his revocation oﬀense and failed to give adequate weight to several mitigating factors. After review, we aﬃrm the district court.

1 The district court sentenced Saunders to 13 months’ incarceration, followed by a 48-month term of supervised release. Saunders completed his term of incarceration prior to this appeal and appeals only his term of supervised re- lease.

2 In 2010, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act to address disparities in sentences between offenses involving crack cocaine and those involving pow- der cocaine. See Fair Sentencing Act; United States v. Russell, 994 F.3d 1230, 1234 (11th Cir. 2021). However, the Fair Sentencing Act’s reduced penalties applied only to defendants who were sentenced on or after the Fair Sentencing Act’s effective date. Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 264 (2012).

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23-12243 Opinion of the Court 3 I. FAIR SENTENCING ACT When a term of supervised release is revoked and the de- fendant is required to serve a term of imprisonment, the court may impose a term of supervised release after imprisonment. United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933, 936 (11th Cir. 2016); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h). The length of such a term of supervised release shall not exceed the maximum term authorized for the oﬀense that re- sulted in the original term of supervised release, less any term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation. Id. But a new term of supervised release is not bound by the length of the previously im- posed term of supervised release and may be longer than the initial term that was imposed. United States v. Pla, 345 F.3d 1312, 1314-15 (11th Cir. 2003). The aggregate of pre-revocation and post-revoca- tion supervised release terms may exceed the maximum length of supervised release imposable for the underlying oﬀense. United States v. Mazarky, 499 F.3d 1246, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 2007).

In United States v. Gonzalez, we held that because a period of supervised release is a part of the sentence for the underlying con- viction, a sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release is “eligible” for a reduction under the First Step Act 3 when the In 2018, Congress enacted the First Step Act, which permits courts to reduce the sentences of defendants who were sentenced for covered offenses before the adoption of the Fair Sentencing Act. First Step Act of 2018 (First Step Act), Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018). A court that imposed a sentence for a covered offense may impose a reduced sentence as if sections and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed. First Step Act § 404(b).

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4 Opinion of the Court 23-12243 original oﬀense was a covered oﬀense under the Act. 71 F.4th 881, 884-85 (11th Cir. 2023). But even if a defendant is eligible for a re- duction under the First Step Act, district courts are not required to impose a reduction. Id. at 885. Even where a defendant’s original sentence exceeds the revised statutory maximum under the Fair Sentencing Act, the sentence was not made retroactively illegal by the Fair Sentencing Act, and the First Step Act does not require a district court to lower the defendant’s sentence. United States v. Wil- liams, 63 F.4th 908, 911-12 (11th Cir. 2023). When a defendant re- quests a First Step Act reduction from the district court, the district court is not automatically required to calculate what the new sen- tencing range would be before denying the reduction, and the fail- ure to do so does not constitute per se error. Gonzalez, 71 F.4th at 886.

Because Saunders did not raise this issue before the district court at sentencing, we review only for plain error. See United States v. Owens, 96 F.4th 1316, 1320 (11th Cir. 2024) (stating if a defendant fails to raise a procedural objection at sentencing and then raises that objection for the ﬁrst time on appeal, we review only for plain error). First, neither the Fair Sentencing Act nor the First Step Act retroactively changed the maximum supervised release penalties applicable to Saunders’ underlying oﬀense. See Williams, 63 F.4th at 911-12. One of Saunders’ original oﬀenses, possession with in- tent to distribute ﬁve grams or more of cocaine base, was a covered oﬀense under the First Step Act. For a sentence imposed in 2006, the statutory minimum for a defendant convicted for possession with intent to distribute ﬁve grams or more of cocaine base for a USCA11 Case: 23-12243 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 09/30/2024 Page: 5 of 10

23-12243 Opinion of the Court 5 defendant with a prior felony drug conviction was ten years’ im- prisonment, with a maximum of life imprisonment, followed by a minimum term of eight years’ supervised release. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2006). The revised statutory penalty for that oﬀense after passage of the Fair Sentencing Act is a maximum of 30 years’ imprisonment, followed by a minimum of 6 years’ supervised re- lease. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (2018). Neither the previous nor revised version of the statute provide a maximum sentence for su- pervised release, and we have held that a statute that does not have a maximum term of imprisonment authorizes a term up to life. See United States v. Brame, 997 F.2d 1426, 1428 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) authorizes life imprisonment even though the statute does not expressly state a maximum). While the First Step Act gives the district court discretion to sentence Saunders as if the Fair Sentencing Act’s revised penalties were in eﬀect at the time he committed his underlying oﬀense, neither the Fair Sentencing Act nor the First Step Act retroactively lowered his statutory maximum of a lifetime sentence of supervised release. 4 See Williams, 63 F.4th at 911-12.

4 Saunders incorrectly asserts the statutory maximum penalty applicable to his underlying offense under current law is six years of supervised release. The minimum terms of supervised release mandated by § 841(b)(1)(C) are not max- imum terms and are not limited by the terms set out in 21 U.S.C. § 3583(b).

See United States v. Sanchez, 269 F.3d 1250, 1287 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc), abro- gated in part on other grounds by United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297, 1308 (11th Cir. 2005).

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6 Opinion of the Court 23-12243 Second, Saunders has not pointed to, and research has not discovered, any binding authority that requires a district court to sua sponte consider whether a defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act when imposing a sentence upon revocation of supervised release that was imposed for a covered of- fense. See United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining where the explicit language of a statute or rule does not speciﬁcally resolve an issue, there can be no plain er- ror if there is no precedent from either the Supreme Court or this Court that directly resolves the issue). The First Step Act gives courts discretion to reduce a sentence for a covered oﬀense upon motion from a defendant, but the Act’s text emphasizes a district court is not required to modify a sentence for any reason. While Gonzalez held the defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction pur- suant to the First Step Act where a defendant is serving a revocation sentence and the underlying term of supervised release was im- posed for a covered oﬀense under the Fair Sentencing Act, Gonzalez does not require a district court to consider any revised penalties for the underlying oﬀense when calculating an appropriate sen- tence. See Gonzalez, 71 F.4th at 884-86. Even where a defendant requests a reduction under the First Step Act at sentencing, this Court has rejected the argument the district court’s failure to cal- culate a new sentencing range before denying the motion consti- tutes per se error. Id. at 886. If it is not per se error for a district court to abstain from calculating the potential impact of a sentence reduction even where the defense has requested such a reduction, then it is not plain error for a district court to abstain from making USCA11 Case: 23-12243 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 09/30/2024 Page: 7 of 10

23-12243 Opinion of the Court 7 such a calculation sua sponte when no statute, rule, or precedent requires the court to do so. Neither the Fair Sentencing Act nor the First Step Act render Saunders’ sentence illegal, despite the changed penalties under the Fair Sentencing Act. Williams, 63 F.4th at 911-12. And because nothing in the First Step Act or binding precedent requires a district court to sua sponte exercise its discretion under the First Step Act to sentence a defendant at revocation as if the revised penalties in the Fair Sentencing Act were in eﬀect at the time he committed his un- derlying oﬀense, the district court did not commit plain error by not doing so. II. REASONABLENESS We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence im- posed upon revocation of supervised release under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. United States v. King, 57 F.4th 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2023). The party challenging the sentence must show that it is unreasonable considering the record and the sen- tencing factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id. A district court abuses its discretion if it “(1) fails to aﬀord consideration to relevant factors that were due signiﬁcant weight, (2) gives signiﬁcant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.” United States v. Moore, 22 F.4th 1258, 1269 (11th Cir. 2022).

We will only vacate a sentence based on substantive unreasonable- ness if left with the deﬁnite and ﬁrm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the USCA11 Case: 23-12243 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 09/30/2024 Page: 8 of 10

8 Opinion of the Court 23-12243 § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case. Trailer, 827 F.3d at 936.

The district court must impose a sentence that is suﬃcient, but not greater than necessary, and the court must consider, inter alia, the nature and circumstances of the oﬀense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the need to aﬀord adequate deter- rence to criminal conduct, and the need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), § 3583(e). A district court’s weighing of the relevant § 3553(a) factors is entitled to due deference. King, 57 F.4th at 1338. When weighing the fac- tors, a district court is within its discretion to give weight to a de- fendant’s criminal history and threat to the public. United States v. Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105, 1107 (11th Cir. 2006). A district court is also permitted to give greater weight to the nature and frequency of a defendant’s violations of supervised release than to whether the defendant was near completion of the term of release. King, 57 F.4th at 1339.

The district court’s sentence of 48 months of supervised re- lease is not substantively unreasonable. The district court acknowl- edged it carefully considered the parties’ arguments and stated on the record it considered the § 3553(a) factors. The court explained it was placing emphasis on Saunders’ criminal history, repeated vi- olations of supervised release, and the nature of the current revo- cation oﬀense. The weight of these factors was within the district court’s discretion, and the fact the district court weighed them USCA11 Case: 23-12243 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 09/30/2024 Page: 9 of 10

23-12243 Opinion of the Court 9 diﬀerently than Saunders desired is insuﬃcient to show an abuse of discretion. See King, 57 F.4th at 1338-39; Sweeting, 437 F.3d at 1107.

Saunders faced a statutory maximum of a lifetime of super- vised release, minus any terms of imprisonment served upon revo- cation of supervised release. Saunders was not entitled to credit for his prior terms of supervised release. See Pla, 345 F.3d at 1314- 15. The maximum length of his new term of supervised release was bound only by the statutory maximum applicable to his origi- nal oﬀense less any time of imprisonment served upon revocation; it was not bound by the length of his previously imposed term of supervised release. See id.; Mazarky, 499 F.3d at 1250-51. The dis- trict court was within its discretion to give greater weight to the frequency and violent nature of Saunders’ violations than to the fact that Saunders was near completion of his supervised release at the time of the violation. See King, 57 F.4th at 1339.

As it was permissible for the district court to place more weight on Saunders’ criminal history, repeated violations of super- vised release, and the nature of his revocation oﬀense than on po- tential mitigating factors, and because Saunders was not entitled to credit for his prior terms of supervised release, regardless of how close he was to completing those terms, the district court did not USCA11 Case: 23-12243 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 09/30/2024 Page: 10 of 10

10 Opinion of the Court 23-12243 abuse its discretion in sentencing Saunders to a term of 48 months’ supervised release. 5 AFFIRMED. 5 Saunders’ passing reference to the fact he was also punished by the State for the conduct that gave rise to his violations is undeveloped and cites no author- ity, and thus is not properly raised on appeal. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins., 739 F.3d 678, 681-82 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating if a party makes only a per- functory passing reference to an issue without citation to any authority and without supporting arguments, that issue is not properly briefed for appeal and is considered abandoned).

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.