USCA11 Case: 24-10753 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 10/10/2024 Page: 1 of 5

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-10753 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ ELENA DVOINIK, BORIS ZAVADOVSKY, Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus MARIO RABL, SUSANNE HOEFLINGER,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida USCA11 Case: 24-10753 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 10/10/2024 Page: 2 of 5

2 Opinion of the Court 24-10753 D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-24226-JEM ____________________ Before LAGOA, ABUDU, and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: Appellants Elena Dvoinik and Boris Zavadovsky appeal pro se the district court’s order dismissing, for lack of personal jurisdic- tion, their complaint alleging defamation by defendants Mario Rabl and Susanne Hoeflinger. Dvoinik and Zavadovsky argue that the district court erred in finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction be- cause Dvoinik and Zavadovsky provided competent proof in sup- port of jurisdiction under Florida’s long-arm statute. They also ar- gue that the district court improperly denied several of their mo- tions as moot. Having reviewed the record and read the parties’ briefs, we affirm the district court’s order dismissing the complaint.

I.

We construe briefs filed by pro se litigants liberally. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). “We review de novo whether the district court had personal jurisdiction over a nonresi- dent defendant.” Savoia-McHugh v. Glass, 95 F.4th 1337, 1342 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1350 (11th Cir., 2013)).

II.

In determining whether personal jurisdiction exists, a federal court sitting in diversity conducts a two-step inquiry: “the exercise of jurisdiction must (1) be appropriate under the state long-arm USCA11 Case: 24-10753 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 10/10/2024 Page: 3 of 5

24-10753 Opinion of the Court 3 statute and (2) not violate the Due Process Clause of the Four- teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” AcryliCon USA, LLC v. Silikal GmbH, 985 F.3d 1350, 1363-64 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers Intern., Inc., 593 F.3d 1249, 1257 (11th Cir. 2010)). The reach of Florida’s long-arm statute is a question of Florida law, and federal courts are required to construe the long-arm statute as the Florida Supreme Court would. United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009). Absent an indication that the Florida Supreme court would hold otherwise, federal courts are also bound to adhere to decisions from Florida’s intermediate courts interpreting the long-arm stat- ute. Id. The long-arm statute provides jurisdiction over any cause of action arising from “[o]perating, conducting, engaging in, or carry- ing on a business or business venture” in Florida or “having an of- fice or agency” in Florida. Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(1). For a court to exercise jurisdiction under this provision, the defendant must have engaged in a “general course of business activity in the state for pecuniary benefit.” Fraser v. Smith, 594 F.3d 842, 848 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Addition- ally, a nonresident defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction for any cause of action that arises from a tortious act committed in Florida. Del Valle v. Trivago GMBH, 56 F.4th 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 144 S. Ct. 90 (2023). Florida law is “well settled” that a defendant is subject to the long-arm statute if he makes “telephonic, electronic, or written communications” into Florida and the communications give rise to a tort. Strober v. Harris, USCA11 Case: 24-10753 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 10/10/2024 Page: 4 of 5

4 Opinion of the Court 24-10753 332 So. 3d 1079, 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2022). But the fact that a tortious act causes an injury in Florida, standing alone, “is insuffi- cient to support jurisdiction over an out-of-state tortfeasor.”

Kountze v. Kountze, 996 So. 2d 246, 252 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).

When a plaintiff seeks personal jurisdiction over a nonresi- dent defendant, the plaintiff bears the burden of alleging sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case of jurisdiction. Mazer, 556 F.3d at 1274. If a defendant then challenges jurisdiction by submitting affidavit evidence in support of its position, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to provide evidence supporting jurisdiction. Id. The defendant’s affidavit evidence must contain “specific factual decla- rations within the affiant’s personal knowledge.” Posner v. Essex Ins.

Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1215 (11th Cir. 1999). Once the burden has shifted back to the plaintiff, the plaintiff “is required to substantiate the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint by affidavits or other competent proof,” and may not “merely reiterate the factual alle- gations in the complaint.” Polski Linie Oceaniczne v. Seasafe Transp.

A/S, 795 F.2d 968, 972 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting Electro Eng’g Prod- ucts Co. v. Lewis, 352 So.2d 862 (Fla. 1977)). “A court without per- sonal jurisdiction is powerless to take further action.” Posner, 178 F.3d at 1214 n.6.

III.

A review of the record demonstrates that the district court did not err because Rabl and Hoeflinger’s affidavits rebutted any allegations that would support jurisdiction under Florida’s long- arm statute, and Dvoinik and Zavadovsky did not respond with USCA11 Case: 24-10753 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 10/10/2024 Page: 5 of 5

24-10753 Opinion of the Court 5 competent proof in support of jurisdiction. And contrary to Dvoinik and Zavadovsky’s contentions, the Florida long-arm stat- ute must be satisfied for the district court to exercise personal juris- diction over nonresident defendants. AcryliCon, 985 F.3d at 1363- 64. The district court also correctly denied Dvoinik and Zava- dovsky’s motions as moot, as it was powerless to take further ac- tion after finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Rabl and Hoeflinger. Posner, 178 F.3d at 1214 n.6. Accordingly, based on the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the district court’s order dis- missing Dvoinik and Zavadovsky’s complaint.

AFFIRMED.