Aishly Foy v. Sheriff of Jefferson County, Alabama
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Aishly Foy v. Sheriff of Jefferson County, Alabama
Opinion
USCA11 Case: 23-11302 Document: 26-2 Date Filed: 10/24/2024 Page: 1 of 7
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-11302
____________________
AISHLY FOY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
SHERIFF OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, ALABAMA,
ADAM ENNIS,
KATELYN PAYNE,
DAVID AGEE,
TERRY SCOTT,
Defendants-Appellants,
NURSE FLETCHER, et al.,
Defendants.
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2 Order of the Court 23-11302
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 2:19-cv-01887-JHE
____________________
Before JORDAN and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
BY THE COURT:
David Agee, Adam Ennis, Katelyn Payne, Mark Pettway,
and Terry Scott (collectively, the “Pettway Defendants”) appeal
from the district court’s March 20, 2023 order partially granting and
partially denying their motion for summary judgment, specifically
challenging the court’s partial denial of their request for qualified
immunity. That order was entered by a magistrate judge after
Plaintiff Aishly Foy and multiple defendants filed forms indicating
their consent to a magistrate judge conducting the proceedings un-
der 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
On appeal, we issued jurisdictional questions asking the par-
ties to address whether (1) the denial of qualified immunity was
immediately appealable; (2) Agee and Scott had appellate standing;
and (3) all parties consented under § 636(c). The Pettway Defend-
ants responded, in part, that all proper defendants had consented,
arguing that several individuals identified as defendants in the
amended complaint (the “Maddox Defendants”) were not parties
and that their consent was not required. We concluded that those
individuals were parties and that there was a factual question as to
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23-11302 Order of the Court 3
whether they had consented, so we remanded the case to the dis-
trict court for a factual determination as to whether all defendants
consented.
On remand, the district court held a hearing and concluded
that the Maddox Defendants had implicitly consented. Upon re-
view of the record, including the proceedings on remand, and the
Pettway Defendants’ appellate filings, we conclude that (1) all par-
ties consented under § 636(c); and (2) the partial denial of qualified
immunity is immediately appealable; but (3) Agee and Scott lack
appellate standing, and the Pettway Defendants lack standing to
raise arguments on behalf of non-appealing defendants.
I.
First, we conclude that all parties consented under § 636(c).
We remanded for the district court to determine whether Deputies
Maddox, Martin, McCants, T Russell, and Simpson (collectively,
“Maddox Defendants”) consented. Although counsel for the
Pettway Defendants represented the Maddox Defendants and filed
a signed written consent form, counsel listed only the Pettway De-
fendants’ names on the form and asserted on appeal that the Mad-
dox Defendants had not consented. However, we agree with the
district court’s conclusion on remand that the Maddox Defendants
implicitly consented.
We generally lack jurisdiction to hear appeals directly from
magistrate judge orders. United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353,
1359 (11th Cir. 2009). However, under § 636(c), a magistrate judge
can conduct all proceedings in a civil matter and ultimately enter
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4 Order of the Court 23-11302
final judgment “[u]pon the consent of the parties,” in which case
the parties can appeal the magistrate judge order or judgment di-
rectly to us. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
Consent under § 636(c) may be express written or oral con-
sent or inferred from a party’s conduct. Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S.
580, 590 (2003). For example, in Roell, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that two defendants who never filed explicit written con-
sent nevertheless implicitly consented by participating in the pro-
ceedings without objection up through a jury trial and final judg-
ment after they were notified that they could refuse magistrate
judge jurisdiction. Id. at 582-87, 590; see also Chambless v. Louisi-
ana-Pacific Corp., 481 F.3d 1345, 1350-51 (11th Cir. 2007) (conclud-
ing that party implicitly consented under § 636(c) where party un-
derstood the consent procedure and participated in pretrial pro-
ceedings before a magistrate judge for eight months before object-
ing for the first time).
Here, we conclude that the Maddox Defendants implicitly
consented to the magistrate judge conducting the case. Although
the Pettway Defendants have argued that the Maddox Defendants
were not parties and expressed some uncertainty as to whether
their counsel represented the Maddox Defendants, we conclude
that the Pettway Defendants’ counsel represented the Maddox De-
fendants because counsel (1) filed notices of appearance and other
documents on behalf of the Maddox Defendants until filing their
notice of appeal; (2) moved to dismiss the claims against the Mad-
dox Defendants; (3) filed a report concerning a planning meeting
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23-11302 Order of the Court 5
identifying themselves as counsel for the Maddox Defendants; and
(4) filed a notice of withdrawal expressly identifying one lawyer as
counsel for the Maddox Defendants. Thus, the Maddox Defend-
ants participated in this action through defense counsel for years
without objecting to magistrate judge jurisdiction even after they
were notified of the need for consent and their right to refuse. See
Roell, 538 U.S. at 584, 586, 590; Chambless,481 F.3d at 1350-51
. Fur-
thermore, defense counsel agreed with the district court’s conclu-
sion on remand that there was consent.
II.
Second, we conclude that the district court’s denial of quali-
fied immunity is immediately appealable. Although we generally
only have jurisdiction to review district courts’ final decisions, an
order denying a defendant qualified immunity is immediately ap-
pealable under the collateral order doctrine if the denial rests on a
legal question. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Gar-
den City, 235 F.3d 1325, 1327(11th Cir. 2000); Mitchell v. Forsyth,472 U.S. 511, 525-30
(1985). Here, the Pettway Defendants argue on
appeal that the district court erred by denying them qualified im-
munity after Foy failed to respond to their motion for summary
judgment and by concluding that a qualified immunity defense was
not available as to two of Foy’s claims. Both arguments are purely
legal, so we may review them. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525-30.
III.
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6 Order of the Court 23-11302
Finally, we conclude that Agee and Scott lack appellate
standing as prevailing parties and that the Pettway Defendants lack
standing to raise arguments on behalf of the non-appealing Maddox
Defendants.
Litigants must establish standing to appeal, and only a liti-
gant aggrieved by an order may appeal. Wolff v. Cash 4 Titles, 351
F.3d 1348, 1353-54(11th Cir. 2003); Hawes v. Gleicher,745 F.3d 1337, 1342
(11th Cir. 2014). A prevailing party generally lacks standing
to appeal because the appealed order did not injure him. Agripost,
Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cnty. ex rel. Manager, 195 F.3d 1225, 1230 (11th
Cir. 1999). Furthermore, a party generally may not appeal to pro-
tect the rights of others. Hawes, 745 F.3d at 1342.
Here, the district court dismissed all claims against Agee and
Scott, so they were not aggrieved by the appealed order. Wolff, 351
F.3d at 1353-54; Agripost, Inc.,195 F.3d at 1230
. The Pettway De-
fendants argue that Agee and Scott have standing because the court
allowed part of Foy’s Count 1, an excessive force claim, to proceed
and it is arguable that Count 1 was raised against Agee and Scott.
We disagree because (1) Count 1 of the counselled complaint was
titled as raised against other defendants; (2) Foy did not allege that
Agee or Scott participated in the alleged beating that formed the
basis for Count 1; (3) the Pettway Defendants did not argue in their
motion for summary judgment that Count 1 was raised against
Scott and Agee; and (4) the court described Count 1 as raised
against other defendants and noted that neither Scott nor Agee
were present for the alleged beating. While the body of Count 1
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23-11302 Order of the Court 7
asserted that the claim was raised against all defendants in their in-
dividual capacities, we cannot read that language as raising Count
1 against Agee and Scott given the above facts.
Furthermore, although the Maddox Defendants never ap-
pealed, the Pettway Defendants argue that the district court erred
by denying the Maddox Defendants qualified immunity and allow-
ing Counts 2 and 5 to proceed as to the Maddox Defendants. How-
ever, the Pettway Defendants lack standing to raise arguments on
behalf of other parties. See Wolff, 351 F.3d at 1353-54; Hawes,745 F.3d at 1342
.
Accordingly, this appeal is DISMISSED IN PART for lack of
jurisdiction as to Agee and Scott and any arguments the Pettway
Defendants raise on behalf of the Maddox Defendants. The appeal
may otherwise proceed.
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished