USCA11 Case: 23-13129 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 10/25/2024 Page: 1 of 5

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 23-13129 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus OMAYRA UJAQUE,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 6:23-cr-00021-PGB-LHP-1 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 23-13129 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 10/25/2024 Page: 2 of 5

2 Opinion of the Court 23-13129

Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: After a jury trial, Omayra Ujaque was convicted of commit- ting bank fraud and aggravated identity theft while working as a loan officer for a residential mortgage lender. In sentencing her for those offenses, the district court imposed a two-year term of super- vised release and ordered Ujaque to comply with the “mandatory and standard conditions adopted by the Court in the Middle Dis- trict of Florida.” The subsequent written judgment included a list of thirteen “standard” conditions of supervised release. Ujaque ar- gues for the first time on appeal that the district court violated her due-process rights by failing to orally pronounce these discretion- ary conditions during the sentencing hearing. Section 3583 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code imposes several mandatory conditions of supervised release and provides that the court may order further conditions in its discretion.

(d). The Sentencing Guidelines provide for thirteen standard conditions that are generally recommended, as well as several spe- cial conditions. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c), (d). In Rodriguez, we held that “due process principles generally require district courts to pronounce at the sentencing hearing dis- cretionary, but not mandatory, conditions of supervised release.” United States v. Rodriguez,

(11th Cir. 2023). A defendant must be given “an opportunity to be heard on the dis- cretionary condition[s].”

. Courts may satisfy this USCA11 Case: 23-13129 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 10/25/2024 Page: 3 of 5

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requirement by referencing a written list of supervised-release con- ditions.

. But a court violates due process if it imposes a discretionary condition that was never identified at the sentencing hearing.

at 1248–49. When a court errs in this way, we will “vacate the conditions and remand for resentencing,” so that the court “may, after giving [the defendant] an opportunity to be heard, reconsider whether to impose each of the discretionary con- ditions.”

. Ordinarily, we review only for plain error where, as here, a defendant challenges the conditions of her supervised release for the first time on appeal. United States v. Zinn,

(11th Cir. 2003). But we review de novo where the defendant “had no opportunity to object at sentencing to the discretionary condi- tions of supervised release because they were included for the first time in the written judgment.” Rodriguez,

n.5. The government contends that plain-error review applies because Ujaque had adequate notice of the standard conditions of release and an opportunity to object or seek clarification at the sen- tencing hearing. Ujaque responds that de novo review applies any time discretionary conditions are included for the first time in a written judgment, which she believes is the case here. The government is correct. We recently held that plain-er- ror review applied on virtually identical facts. See United States v. Hayden, ___ F.3d ___, No. 19-14780,

, at *4–5 (11th Cir. Oct. 3, 2024). In Hayden, as here, the district court im- posed a term of supervised release and ordered the defendant “to USCA11 Case: 23-13129 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 10/25/2024 Page: 4 of 5

4 Opinion of the Court 23-13129

comply with the mandatory and standard conditions adopted by the Court in the Middle District.”

. And there, as here, the court asked the parties if there were any objections to the sentence or how the court had pronounced it, and the defendant did not ob- ject to the conditions of supervised release.

Based on these facts, we held in Hayden that the defendant had adequate notice of the conditions of his supervised release and failed to object, which meant that we “review[ed] his challenge for plain error.”

. We distinguished this scenario from the one present in Rodriguez, where the district court “did not reference any conditions of supervised release during the sentencing hearing.” Id.; Rodriguez,

. De novo review applied in Rodriguez because the defendant “had no opportunity to object at sentencing to the discretionary conditions of supervised release [that] were in- cluded for the first time in the written judgment.” Rodriguez, 75 F.th at 1246 n.5. But in Hayden (and here), by contrast, the district court “informed [the defendant] that there were standard condi- tions attached to his [or her] supervised release.” Hayden,

, at *5. Accordingly, following Hayden, we review Ujaque’s appeal for plain error only. Hayden also makes clear that Ujaque cannot establish plain error with regard to the district court’s failure to describe the con- ditions of supervised release in its oral pronouncement. As in Hay- den, the court notified Ujaque she would have to comply with the “mandatory and standard conditions adopted by the Court in the Middle District.”

. Then, in the written judgment, the USCA11 Case: 23-13129 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 10/25/2024 Page: 5 of 5

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court stated those conditions. Plus, as we noted in Hayden, those same conditions were “listed in the publicly available judgment form” on the court’s website and “track the standard conditions of supervised release in the relevant sentencing guideline,” U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c). See Form AO 245B Judgment in a Criminal Case, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE MIDDLE DIST. OF FLA., at 6, https://perma.cc/5PHV- Q76Q (last visited Oct. 4, 2024). 1 “Because the district court orally referenced the 13 discretionary standard conditions of supervised release for the Middle District of Florida and because the oral pro- nouncement and written judgment do not conflict, it did not err— much less plainly err.” Hayden,

, at *5. For these reasons, we affirm Ujaque’s sentence. AFFIRMED.

1 Also available at https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ao245b.pdf

(last visited Oct. 4, 2024).