United States v. Raheem Morrissette

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

United States v. Raheem Morrissette

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 24-10353    Document: 25-1     Date Filed: 11/07/2024   Page: 1 of 6




                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 24-10353
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiff-Appellee,
       versus
       RAHEEM MORRISSETTE,


                                                  Defendant-Appellant.


                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Southern District of Alabama
                   D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cr-00143-JB-MU-1
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                 24-10353


       Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Raheem Morrissette appeals his conviction for possessing a
       firearm as a felon, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 922
(g)(1). He chal-
       lenges the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on the pos-
       session of firearms by felons. After careful consideration, we affirm.
                                         I.
              A police officer observed a vehicle driven by Morrissette
       commit a traffic infraction and initiated a traffic stop. During the
       stop, the officer smelled marijuana coming from the vehicle. He
       searched the vehicle and found not only marijuana but also a pistol.
               Morrissette, who had previous felony convictions, was
       charged with one count of possessing a firearm as a convicted
       felon. See 
18 U.S.C. § 922
(g)(1). He initially pleaded not guilty and
       filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statutory
       ban on felons possessing firearms violated the Second Amendment.
       After the district court denied the motion to dismiss, Morrissette
       pleaded guilty. The district court ultimately imposed a 57-month
       sentence. This is Morrissette’s appeal.
                                        II.
               Ordinarily, when a defendant enters a valid guilty plea, he
       waives any non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings. United
       States v. Brown, 
752 F.3d 1344, 1347
 (11th Cir. 2014). But Morris-
       sette’s guilty plea did not waive his constitutional challenge to the
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       24-10353               Opinion of the Court                         3

       statutory prohibition on felons’ possession of firearms. See Class v.
       United States, 
583 U.S. 174, 181
 (2018) (holding that a defendant
       who pleaded guilty did not waive his Second Amendment chal-
       lenge to a statute of conviction when the claim did not “contradict
       the terms of the indictment or the written plea agreement”).
               We review de novo the constitutionality of a statute. United
       States v. Gruezo, 
66 F.4th 1284
, 1292 (11th Cir. 2023).
                                        III.
              Morrissette challenges the constitutionality of 
18 U.S.C. § 922
(g)(1), which generally prohibits individuals with felony con-
       victions from possessing firearms. According to Morrissette, this
       prohibition, both on its face and as applied to him, runs afoul of the
       Second Amendment.
              To assess the constitutionality of the prohibition on felons
       possessing firearms, we begin with the Supreme Court’s decision
       in District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570
 (2008). In Heller, the
       Court considered a Second Amendment challenge to a District of
       Columbia law that barred the private possession of handguns in
       homes. 
Id. at 635
. After considering both the text and history of the
       Second Amendment, the Court concluded that it conferred on an
       individual a right to keep and bear arms. 
Id. at 595
. The Court ulti-
       mately held that the ban on handgun possession in the home vio-
       lated the Second Amendment. 
Id. at 635
. But the Court acknowl-
       edged that the right to keep and bear arms was “not unlimited,”
       emphasizing that “nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast
       doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 24-10353

       by felons and the mentally ill.” 
Id. at 626
. Indeed, the Court labeled
       such restrictions as “presumptively lawful.” 
Id.
 at 627 n.26.
               After Heller, we considered a constitutional challenge to
       § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on felons’ possession of firearms. See
       United States v. Rozier, 
598 F.3d 768, 770
 (11th Cir. 2010). We held
       that “statutes disqualifying felons from possessing a firearm under
       any and all circumstances do not offend the Second Amendment.”
       
Id. at 771
.
              Several years later, the Supreme Court considered a Second
       Amendment challenge to New York’s gun-licensing regime that
       limited when a law-abiding citizen could obtain a license to carry a
       firearm outside the home. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen
       
597 U.S. 1, 11
 (2022). The Court recognized that “the Second and
       Fourteenth Amendments protect an individual’s right to carry a
       handgun for self-defense outside the home.” 
Id. at 10
. The Court
       explained that to determine whether a restriction on the possession
       of firearms was constitutional, a court must begin by asking
       whether the firearm regulation at issue governs conduct that falls
       within the plain text of the Second Amendment. 
Id. at 17
. If the
       regulation covers such conduct, the court may uphold it only if the
       government “affirmatively prove[s] that its firearms regulation is
       part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the
       right to keep and bear arms.” 
Id. at 19
. Bruen emphasized that Heller
       established the correct test for determining the constitutionality of
       gun restrictions. See 
id. at 39
. And, like Heller, Bruen described
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       24-10353               Opinion of the Court                        5

       Second Amendment rights as extending only to “law-abiding, re-
       sponsible citizens.” 
Id. at 26
 (internal quotation marks omitted).
              Based on Bruen, Morrissette challenges § 922(g)(1)’s prohibi-
       tion on the possession of firearms by felons, arguing that the gov-
       ernment failed to carry its burden to demonstrate that felon disen-
       franchisement is “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition
       of firearm regulation.” Appellant’s Br. 9. This argument is fore-
       closed by precedent.
              After Bruen, we considered another Second Amendment
       challenge to § 922(g)(1). See United States v. Dubois, 
94 F.4th 1284, 1289
 (11th Cir. 2024). We held that the challenge was foreclosed by
       Rozier, which “interpreted Heller as limiting the [Second Amend-
       ment] right to law-abiding and qualified individuals and as clearly
       excluding felons from those categories by referring to felon-in-pos-
       session bans as presumptively lawful.” 
Id. at 1293
 (internal quota-
       tion marks omitted). Although the defendant argued that Bruen ab-
       rogated our decision in Rozier, we observed that even in Bruen the
       Supreme Court continued to describe the right to bear arms as ex-
       tending only to “law-abiding, responsible citizens.” 
Id.
 (internal
       quotation marks omitted). We thus concluded that Bruen did not
       abrogate Rozier. Because Rozier foreclosed a Second Amendment
       challenge to § 922(g)(1), we affirmed the defendant’s conviction. Id.
              The Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v.
       Rahimi, 
144 S. Ct. 1889
 (2024), does not change our analysis. In
       Rahimi, the Court considered a Second Amendment challenge to
       the federal statute that prohibits an individual who is subject to a
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                  24-10353

       domestic violence restraining order from possessing a firearm
       when the order includes a finding that he represents a credible
       threat to the safety of an intimate partner or a child of that partner
       or individual. See 
id.
 at 1898 (citing 
18 U.S.C. § 922
(g)(8)). It held
       that this firearm restriction was constitutional. And it once again
       declared that the prohibition on “the possession of firearms by ‘fel-
       ons’ . . . [is] ‘presumptively lawful.’” 
Id.
 at 1902 (quoting Heller,
       
554 U.S. at 626
, 627 n.26).
              Rahimi does not displace our holding in Dubois that Bruen did
       not abrogate Rozier. Under our prior panel precedent rule, an “in-
       tervening Supreme Court decision abrogates our precedent only if
       the intervening decision is both clearly on point and clearly con-
       trary to our earlier decision.” Dubois, 
94 F.4th at 1293
 (internal quo-
       tation marks omitted). “If the Supreme Court never discussed our
       precedent and did not otherwise comment on the precise issue be-
       fore the prior panel, our precedent remains binding.” 
Id.
 (alteration
       adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rahimi did not in-
       volve § 922(g)(1) nor did it otherwise comment on the precise issue
       before us in Rozier. Moreover, in Rahimi, the Supreme Court once
       again reiterated, albeit in dicta, that the prohibition “on the posses-
       sion of firearms by felons . . . [is] presumptively lawful,” which
       greatly undermines Morrissette’s position. 144 S. Ct. at 1902 (inter-
       nal quotation marks omitted).
              Under our precedent, Morrissette’s Second Amendment
       challenge to § 922(g)(1) fails. Accordingly, we affirm his conviction.
              AFFIRMED.


Reference

Status
Unpublished