United States v. Raheem Morrissette
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
United States v. Raheem Morrissette
Opinion
USCA11 Case: 24-10353 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 11/07/2024 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-10353
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RAHEEM MORRISSETTE,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cr-00143-JB-MU-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 24-10353
Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Raheem Morrissette appeals his conviction for possessing a
firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He chal-
lenges the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on the pos-
session of firearms by felons. After careful consideration, we affirm.
I.
A police officer observed a vehicle driven by Morrissette
commit a traffic infraction and initiated a traffic stop. During the
stop, the officer smelled marijuana coming from the vehicle. He
searched the vehicle and found not only marijuana but also a pistol.
Morrissette, who had previous felony convictions, was
charged with one count of possessing a firearm as a convicted
felon. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He initially pleaded not guilty and
filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statutory
ban on felons possessing firearms violated the Second Amendment.
After the district court denied the motion to dismiss, Morrissette
pleaded guilty. The district court ultimately imposed a 57-month
sentence. This is Morrissette’s appeal.
II.
Ordinarily, when a defendant enters a valid guilty plea, he
waives any non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings. United
States v. Brown, 752 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2014). But Morris-
sette’s guilty plea did not waive his constitutional challenge to the
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24-10353 Opinion of the Court 3
statutory prohibition on felons’ possession of firearms. See Class v.
United States, 583 U.S. 174, 181 (2018) (holding that a defendant
who pleaded guilty did not waive his Second Amendment chal-
lenge to a statute of conviction when the claim did not “contradict
the terms of the indictment or the written plea agreement”).
We review de novo the constitutionality of a statute. United
States v. Gruezo, 66 F.4th 1284, 1292 (11th Cir. 2023).
III.
Morrissette challenges the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1), which generally prohibits individuals with felony con-
victions from possessing firearms. According to Morrissette, this
prohibition, both on its face and as applied to him, runs afoul of the
Second Amendment.
To assess the constitutionality of the prohibition on felons
possessing firearms, we begin with the Supreme Court’s decision
in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). In Heller, the
Court considered a Second Amendment challenge to a District of
Columbia law that barred the private possession of handguns in
homes. Id. at 635. After considering both the text and history of the
Second Amendment, the Court concluded that it conferred on an
individual a right to keep and bear arms. Id. at 595. The Court ulti-
mately held that the ban on handgun possession in the home vio-
lated the Second Amendment. Id. at 635. But the Court acknowl-
edged that the right to keep and bear arms was “not unlimited,”
emphasizing that “nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast
doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms
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by felons and the mentally ill.” Id. at 626. Indeed, the Court labeled
such restrictions as “presumptively lawful.” Id. at 627 n.26.
After Heller, we considered a constitutional challenge to
§ 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on felons’ possession of firearms. See
United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 770 (11th Cir. 2010). We held
that “statutes disqualifying felons from possessing a firearm under
any and all circumstances do not offend the Second Amendment.”
Id. at 771.
Several years later, the Supreme Court considered a Second
Amendment challenge to New York’s gun-licensing regime that
limited when a law-abiding citizen could obtain a license to carry a
firearm outside the home. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen
597 U.S. 1, 11 (2022). The Court recognized that “the Second and
Fourteenth Amendments protect an individual’s right to carry a
handgun for self-defense outside the home.” Id. at 10. The Court
explained that to determine whether a restriction on the possession
of firearms was constitutional, a court must begin by asking
whether the firearm regulation at issue governs conduct that falls
within the plain text of the Second Amendment. Id. at 17. If the
regulation covers such conduct, the court may uphold it only if the
government “affirmatively prove[s] that its firearms regulation is
part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the
right to keep and bear arms.” Id. at 19. Bruen emphasized that Heller
established the correct test for determining the constitutionality of
gun restrictions. See id. at 39. And, like Heller, Bruen described
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Second Amendment rights as extending only to “law-abiding, re-
sponsible citizens.” Id. at 26 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Based on Bruen, Morrissette challenges § 922(g)(1)’s prohibi-
tion on the possession of firearms by felons, arguing that the gov-
ernment failed to carry its burden to demonstrate that felon disen-
franchisement is “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition
of firearm regulation.” Appellant’s Br. 9. This argument is fore-
closed by precedent.
After Bruen, we considered another Second Amendment
challenge to § 922(g)(1). See United States v. Dubois, 94 F.4th 1284,
1289 (11th Cir. 2024). We held that the challenge was foreclosed by
Rozier, which “interpreted Heller as limiting the [Second Amend-
ment] right to law-abiding and qualified individuals and as clearly
excluding felons from those categories by referring to felon-in-pos-
session bans as presumptively lawful.” Id. at 1293 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). Although the defendant argued that Bruen ab-
rogated our decision in Rozier, we observed that even in Bruen the
Supreme Court continued to describe the right to bear arms as ex-
tending only to “law-abiding, responsible citizens.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). We thus concluded that Bruen did not
abrogate Rozier. Because Rozier foreclosed a Second Amendment
challenge to § 922(g)(1), we affirmed the defendant’s conviction. Id.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v.
Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. 1889 (2024), does not change our analysis. In
Rahimi, the Court considered a Second Amendment challenge to
the federal statute that prohibits an individual who is subject to a
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domestic violence restraining order from possessing a firearm
when the order includes a finding that he represents a credible
threat to the safety of an intimate partner or a child of that partner
or individual. See id.at 1898 (citing18 U.S.C. § 922
(g)(8)). It held
that this firearm restriction was constitutional. And it once again
declared that the prohibition on “the possession of firearms by ‘fel-
ons’ . . . [is] ‘presumptively lawful.’” Id. at 1902 (quoting Heller,
554 U.S. at 626, 627 n.26).
Rahimi does not displace our holding in Dubois that Bruen did
not abrogate Rozier. Under our prior panel precedent rule, an “in-
tervening Supreme Court decision abrogates our precedent only if
the intervening decision is both clearly on point and clearly con-
trary to our earlier decision.” Dubois, 94 F.4th at 1293 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). “If the Supreme Court never discussed our
precedent and did not otherwise comment on the precise issue be-
fore the prior panel, our precedent remains binding.” Id. (alteration
adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rahimi did not in-
volve § 922(g)(1) nor did it otherwise comment on the precise issue
before us in Rozier. Moreover, in Rahimi, the Supreme Court once
again reiterated, albeit in dicta, that the prohibition “on the posses-
sion of firearms by felons . . . [is] presumptively lawful,” which
greatly undermines Morrissette’s position. 144 S. Ct. at 1902 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
Under our precedent, Morrissette’s Second Amendment
challenge to § 922(g)(1) fails. Accordingly, we affirm his conviction.
AFFIRMED.
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished