USCA11 Case: 23-10780 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2024 Page: 1 of 4

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 23-10780 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus CHRISTOPHER WAYNE MITCHELL,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-00111-KD-B-1 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 23-10780 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2024 Page: 2 of 4

2 Opinion of the Court 23-10780

Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Christopher Wayne Mitchell appeals his conviction for pos- sessing a firearm as a convicted felon. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He argues that § 922(g)(1) is facially unconstitutional under New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). Our precedent forecloses Mitchell’s challenge. So we affirm. I. A police officer conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle regis- tered to Mitchell, who had an active warrant. While detaining Mitchell during the stop, the officer saw a silver pistol in plain view on the floor of the car. Then, during a brief search of the car, offic- ers found a loaded pistol magazine under the driver’s seat. Mitchell, who had a prior felony conviction, was charged by indictment with two counts of violating § 922(g)(1). Mitchell moved to dismiss the indictment based on the Supreme Court’s de- cision in Bruen, but the district court denied the motion. Mitchell then pled guilty to one § 922(g) count, and the other count was dis- missed at sentencing. The court sentenced Mitchell to time served, plus a term of supervised release. Mitchell appeals, renewing his challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1). II. We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 2010). Our prior- USCA11 Case: 23-10780 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2024 Page: 3 of 4

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precedent rule requires us to follow our precedent unless it is over- ruled by an en banc decision or by the Supreme Court. United States v. White, 837 F.3d 1225, 1228 (11th Cir. 2016). “An intervening Su- preme Court decision abrogates our precedent only if the interven- ing decision is both clearly on point and clearly contrary to our ear- lier decision.” United States v. Dubois, 94 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 2024) (quotation marks omitted). The Second Amendment protects “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms.” U.S. Const. amend. II. Section 922(g)(1) makes it a crime for any person who has been convicted of a felony to possess firearms or ammunition. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In Bruen, the Supreme Court held that Second Amendment challenges must be analyzed under a text-and-history standard, ra- ther than means-end scrutiny. See 597 U.S. at 18–19, 26–27. The central inquiry, in other words, is “whether modern firearms regu- lations are consistent with the Second Amendment’s text and his- torical understanding.” Id. at 26. If the amendment’s plain text co- vers the conduct, the government “must affirmatively prove that its firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.” Id. at 17, 19. Mitchell maintains that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under Bruen because (1) felons are among “the people” protected by the text of the Second Amendment, and (2) the United States has no historical tradition of disarming those convicted of felonies. Our precedent forecloses Mitchell’s facial Second Amend- ment challenge to § 922(g)(1). After the Supreme Court’s decision USCA11 Case: 23-10780 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2024 Page: 4 of 4

4 Opinion of the Court 23-10780

in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008), we upheld § 922(g)(1) on the threshold ground that felons are categorically “disqualified” from exercising their Second Amendment right. United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 770–71 (11th Cir. 2010). Then, in Dubois, we rejected the argument that Bruen abro- gated Rozier and reaffirmed that Rozier remained binding prece- dent. See 94 F.4th at 1293. We explained that, in Rozier, we “inter- preted Heller as limiting the right to ‘law-abiding and qualified indi- viduals’ and as clearly excluding felons from those categories by referring to felon-in-possession bans as presumptively lawful.” Id. And we concluded that Bruen did not contradict that holding, not- ing that Bruen “repeatedly stated that its decision was faithful to Heller,” which itself “did not cast doubt on felon-in-possession pro- hibitions.” Id. Because our prior precedent forecloses Mitchell’s challenge to the facial constitutionality of § 922(g)(1), we affirm. 1 AFFIRMED.

1 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Rahimi does not

change our analysis. 144 S. Ct. 1889 (2024). Rahimi did not “demolish” or “eviscerate” the “fundamental props” of Rozier or Dubois. See Dubois, 94 F.4th at 1292. Rahimi did not discuss section 922(g)(1) or undermine our interpreta- tion of Heller. To the contrary, Rahimi reiterated that prohibitions on the “pos- session of firearms by ‘felons and the mentally ill,’ are ‘presumptively lawful.’” Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. at 1902 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626, 627 n.26).