USCA11 Case: 23-11604    Document: 38-1      Date Filed: 12/10/2024   Page: 1 of 10




                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-11604
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellee,
        versus
        LORENZO GAROD PIERRE,


                                                    Defendant-Appellant.


                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-20321-JEM-1
                           ____________________
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        2                       Opinion of the Court                   23-11604

            ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
                         UNITED STATES

        Before NEWSOM, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                We previously affirmed Lorenzo Pierre’s conviction for be-
        ing a felon in possession of a firearm, 

(g)(1), reject-
        ing his argument that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to
        his case in light of N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 

        (2022). United States v. Pierre, No. 23-11604, 

        (“Pierre I”), at *1 (11th Cir.) (unpublished), vacated, __U.S.__, 

 (“Pierre II”), at *1 (Oct. 21, 2024) (mem.). In doing so,
        we concluded that Pierre’s argument was foreclosed by United
        States v. Dubois, 

 (11th Cir. 2024), which held that
        our prior precedent in United States v. Rozier, 

 (11th Cir.
        2010) (upholding the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) in all circum-
        stances) “remain[ed] good law.” Pierre I, 

, at *1.
               In October 2024, the Supreme Court granted Pierre’s peti-
        tion for a writ of certiorari, vacated our judgment, and remanded
        the case for further consideration in light of United States v. Rahimi,
        

 (2024). Pierre II, __U.S. __, 

, at *1.
        Upon careful review, we reach the same conclusion and, again, af-
        firm Pierre’s conviction. To explain why, we briefly detail our rul-
        ings in Rozier and Dubois and the Supreme Court’s rulings in Bruen
        and Rahimi.
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        23-11604                   Opinion of the Court                                 3

               In Rozier, a defendant challenged his conviction under
        § 922(g)(1) as unconstitutional under District of Columbia v. Heller,
        

 (2008). 

. We rejected Rozier’s chal-
        lenge, however. 

. We explained that the “language [of
        Heller] suggest[ed] that statutes disqualifying felons from pos-
        sessing a firearm under any and all circumstances do not offend the
        Second Amendment.” 

 (citing Heller, 

). We
        noted:
                [S]tatutory restrictions of firearm possession, such as
                § 922(g)(1), are a constitutional avenue to restrict the
                Second Amendment right of certain classes of peo-
                ple. Rozier, by virtue of his felony conviction, falls
                within such a class. Therefore, the fact that Rozier
                may have possessed the handgun for purposes of self-
                defense (in his home), is irrelevant.
        Id. 1


        1 Both before and after Bruen, we have applied Rozier to reject Second Amend-

        ment challenges and, in doing so, have interpreted it as foreclosing as-applied
        challenges to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1), albeit often in unpublished
        decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Cropper, 

, 931 (11th Cir.
        2020) (unpublished) (“As Cropper acknowledges, we have held that statutes
        prohibiting felons from possessing firearms do not violate the Second Amend-
        ment.” (citing Rozier, 

)) (before Bruen); United States v. Jimenez-
        Shilon, 

 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing Rozier for the proposition
        that “certain groups of people . . . may be ‘disqualified from’ possessing arms
        without violating the Second Amendment” (quoting Heller, 

))
        (before Bruen); United States v. Diaz, No. 21-11625, 

, at *2
        (11th Cir. 2023) (unpublished) (“Statutes disqualifying felons from possessing
        a firearm under any and all circumstances do not offend the Second
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        4                         Opinion of the Court                     23-11604

               In Bruen, the Supreme Court addressed a challenge to New
        York’s gun-licensing regime. 

. New York’s statu-
        tory scheme prohibited citizens from obtaining a license to carry
        firearms outside their home unless they proved “a special need for
        self-defense.” 

. “The [Supreme] Court ruled [New York’s
        statutory] scheme unconstitutional because ‘the Second and Four-
        teenth Amendments protect an individual’s right to carry a hand-
        gun for self-defense outside the home.’” Dubois, 

        (quoting Bruen, 

). Bruen also rejected the second step
        of “a two-step test that then prevailed in most circuits” for analyz-
        ing Second Amendment challenges. 

 (citing Bruen, 

). 2 Instead, the Supreme Court explained, the proper standard
        for assessing whether a challenged firearm regulation is:
               When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an
               individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively
               protects that conduct. The government must then
               justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is con-
               sistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of fire-
               arm regulation. Only then may a court conclude that


        Amendment.” (quoting Rozier, 

) (alteration adopted)) (after
        Bruen); United States v. Hyde, No. 22-10332, 

, at *3 (11th Cir.
        2024) (unpublished) (“Our conclusion in Rozier that § 922(g)(1) is a constitu-
        tional restriction on a defendant’s Second Amendment rights is still binding
        precedent, and we are bound to follow that panel’s decision.” (citing Rozier,
        

)) (after Bruen).
        2 We had “never actually applied the second, means-end-scrutiny step” of this

        now-overruled two-step test. See Dubois, 

 (citing Jimenez-Shi-
        lon, 

 (Newsom, J., concurring)).
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        23-11604                Opinion of the Court                          5

               the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second
               Amendment’s “unqualified command.”

        Bruen, 

 (quoting Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 

, 50 n.10 (1961)).
               After Bruen, we rejected a defendant’s facial and as-applied
        challenges to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) in Dubois, a case
        where the defendant argued that Bruen had abrogated Rozier.
        

. After summarizing Heller, Bruen, and Rozier,
        we explained that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bruen “left no
        doubt that it viewed its decision as a faithful application of Heller,
        not a departure from it.” 

. We also noted that “Bruen,
        like Heller, [had] repeatedly described the [Second Amendment]
        right as extending only to ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens.’” 

        (quoting Bruen, 

). We then explained:
               Bruen did not abrogate Rozier. Because the Supreme
               Court made it clear in Heller that its holding did not
               cast doubt on felon-in-possession prohibitions, and
               because the Court made it clear in Bruen that its hold-
               ing was in keeping with Heller, Bruen could not have
               clearly abrogated [Rozier]. Indeed, the Bruen majority
               did not mention felons or section 922(g)(1). Dubois
               argues that we may depart from Rozier because Bruen
               abrogated all prior precedent relying on the two-step
               analysis. But Rozier upheld section 922(g)(1) on the
               threshold ground that felons are categorically disqual-
               ified from exercising their Second Amendment right
               under Heller. We interpreted Heller as limiting the
               right to law-abiding and qualified individuals and as
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        6                         Opinion of the Court                     23-11604

               clearly excluding felons from those categories by re-
               ferring to felon-in-possession bans as presumptively
               lawful. And far from demolishing or eviscerating
               Rozier’s reliance on Heller, Bruen repeatedly stated that
               its decision was faithful to Heller. We require clearer
               instruction from the Supreme Court before we may
               reconsider the constitutionality of section 922(g)(1).
               Because Rozier binds us, Dubois’s challenge based on
               the Second Amendment necessarily fails.

        Id. at 1293 (alterations adopted, internal citations and quotation
        marks omitted). 3
                In Rahimi, decided after Dubois and Pierre’s initial appeal, the
        Supreme Court held that § 922(g)(8)—which prohibits firearm pos-
        session by individuals subject to a domestic violence restraining or-
        der—was constitutional because the provision comported with the
        principles underlying the Second Amendment. 

.
        In reaching that conclusion, the Supreme Court explained that
        “some courts [had] misunderstood the methodology” of its “recent
        Second Amendment cases.” 

. It clarified that Bruen does
        not require a regulation to have existed at the founding in an iden-
        tical form: instead, “[t]he law must comport with the principles un-
        derlying the Second Amendment, but it need not be a ‘dead ringer’
        or a ‘historical twin.’” 

 at 692 (quoting Bruen, 

).

        3As noted above, shortly after we decided Dubois, we decided Pierre’s initial

        appeal, concluding that his as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of
        § 922(g)(1) was foreclosed because we had recently determined, in Dubois, that
        Rozier was still binding precedent. Pierre I, 

, at *1.
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        23-11604               Opinion of the Court                         7

        The Supreme Court also reiterated that prohibitions on felons’ pos-
        session of firearms are “presumptively lawful.” 

 at 699 (quoting
        Heller, 

). It added that, in Heller, it had “recog-
        nized that the right [secured by the Second Amendment] was never
        thought to sweep indiscriminately.” 

. Additionally, it held
        that § 922(g)(8) was constitutional as applied to Rahimi because the
        restraining order to which he was subject included a finding that
        he posed “a credible threat to the physical safety” of another, and
        the government provided “ample evidence” that the Second
        Amendment permitted “the disarmament of individuals who pose
        a credible threat to the physical safety of others.” Id. at 693-701.
        The Court added that the restriction imposed on Rahimi’s rights
        by § 922(g)(8) was temporary because it applied only while he was
        subject to a restraining order. Id. at 699.
               Under the prior panel precedent rule, we are bound to fol-
        low prior binding precedent until it is overruled by the Supreme
        Court or this Court sitting en banc. United States v. White, 

 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Lee, 

, 1163
        n.3 (11th Cir. 2018). “To constitute an ‘overruling’ for the purposes
        of this prior panel precedent rule, the Supreme Court decision
        ‘must be clearly on point.’” United States v. Kaley, 

 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham
        Bd. of Trs., 

 (11th Cir. 2003)). “In addition to
        being squarely on point, the doctrine of adherence to prior prece-
        dent also mandates that the intervening Supreme Court case actu-
        ally abrogate or directly conflict with, as opposed to merely
        weaken, the holding of the prior panel.” 

 Thus, “[t]o abrogate
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        8                           Opinion of the Court                         23-11604

        a prior-panel precedent, ‘the later Supreme Court decision must
        demolish and eviscerate each of its fundamental props.’” Dubois,
        

 (quoting Del Castillo v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Health,
        

 (11th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 

).
        “So, for example, if our precedent relied on ‘a line of Supreme
        Court precedents that the [Supreme] Court itself emphasizes in a
        later decision is not implicated by that later decision,’ the Supreme
        Court’s intervening decision ‘cannot have’ abrogated our prece-
        dent.” 

 (alteration in original) (quoting Del Castillo, 

). Of course, however, the Supreme Court does not have to
        directly cite our precedent to abrogate it. See id.; Edwards v. U.S.
        Att’y Gen., 

 (11th Cir. 2024), pet. for rehearing pend-
        ing, (No. 19-15077).
               With these principles in mind, we conclude that Rahimi, like
        Bruen, did not overrule or abrogate our decision in Rozier.4 As we

        4 We recognize that other circuits have reached different results on whether

        challenges to § 922(g)(1) are foreclosed because of pre-Bruen caselaw. See, e.g.,
        United States v. Diaz, 

 (5th Cir. 2024) (“Bruen constitutes . . . a
        change [in law that] render[s] our prior precedent obsolete.” (internal citation
        and quotation omitted)); Range v. Att’y Gen, 

 (3d Cir. 2023)
        (en banc) (“[T]he Government’s contention that Bruen does not meaningfully
        affect this Court’s precedent, is mistaken . . . .” (internal citation and quotation
        omitted)), vacated sub nom. Garland v. Range, 

 (2024) (mem.). Ul-
        timately, however, it is the binding precedent of this Court and the Supreme
        Court which binds us, not the precedent of other circuits. Here, we held in
        Rozier that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional in all applications and the Supreme
        Court has not abrogated that precedent so we must apply it. See Walker v.
        Mortham, 

 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[A] decision of a prior panel
        cannot be overturned by a later panel.” (emphasis added)).
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        23-11604               Opinion of the Court                          9

        explained in Dubois, Rozier did not rely on the “two-step” Second
        Amendment analysis which other circuits used at that time. Du-
        bois, 

. Thus, the reasoning in Dubois, in this respect,
        was not affected by Bruen’s overturning of this two-step procedure.
        See 

 Rahimi, which upheld a challenged gun regulation as con-
        sistent with Bruen’s text-and-history test for Second Amendment
        regulations (or step-one under the previous two-step test) also did
        not “demolish and eviscerate each of [Rozier’s] fundamental
        props”; instead, it reinforces our conclusion that cases decided on
        “step one” remain binding. Dubois, 

. That is be-
        cause Rahimi essentially performed the same analysis as we did in
        Rozier by analyzing whether the challenged regulation was “con-
        sistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition”
        and “‘relevantly similar’ to laws that our tradition is understood to
        permit . . . .’” Rahimi, 

 (quoting Bruen, 

). In Rahimi, the result of that inquiry led the Supreme Court to
        conclude that certain historical laws—namely “surety and going
        armed laws”—established a “common sense” conclusion that
        “[w]hen an individual poses a clear threat of physical violence to
        another, the threatening individual may be disarmed” consistent
        with the Second Amendment. Id. at 698. In Rozier, we concluded
        that Heller’s statement that “‘nothing in our opinion should be
        taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession
        of firearms by felons’” showed that “statutes disqualifying felons
        from possessing a firearm under any and all circumstances” were
        likewise consistent with tradition and constitutional under the Sec-
        ond Amendment. 

 (quoting Heller, 

).
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        10                         Opinion of the Court                       23-11604

                Rahimi—like Bruen—also reiterated this same point from
        Heller and stated that prohibitions on felons’ possession of firearms
        are “presumptively lawful.” 

 (quoting Heller,
        

 n.26). Accordingly, Rozier binds us because neither
        Bruen nor Rahimi can fairly be read to reject, abrogate, or even call
        into question the portion of Heller which we relied on in Rozier.
        Compare Heller, 

 (“[N]othing in our opinion should
        be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the posses-
        sion of firearms by felons and the mentally ill . . . .”), with Rahimi,
        

 (similar); and Bruen, 

 (noting Heller’s
        “discussion of ‘longstanding laws’” for which the Supreme Court
        was “aware of no dispute[] regarding . . . lawfulness” under the
        Second Amendment); see also Rozier, 

-71 (citing Hel-
        ler, 

). 5
               We reiterate what we said in Dubois: “[w]e require clearer
        instruction from the Supreme Court before we may reconsider the
        constitutionality of section 922(g)(1).” Dubois, 

. Be-
        cause neither Bruen nor Rahimi overruled, or abrogated to the point
        of overruling, our caselaw that forecloses Pierre relief, we affirm.
                AFFIRMED.




        5 Affirmance here also prevents us from reading a decision of the Supreme

        Court (Rahimi) that upheld one part of a statute, § 922(g)(8), as constitutional,
        to render another portion of the same statute, § 922(g)(1), to be unconstitu-
        tional.