United States v. Derrick Fitgerald Dial

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

United States v. Derrick Fitgerald Dial

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 24-10732    Document: 26-1     Date Filed: 12/13/2024   Page: 1 of 6




                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 24-10732
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiff-Appellee,
       versus
       DERRICK FITZGERALD DIAL,


                                                  Defendant-Appellant.


                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Southern District of Alabama
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cr-00146-JB-N-1
                          ____________________
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       2                       Opinion of the Court                    24-10732


       Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Derrick Dial appeals his conviction for possessing a firearm
       and ammunition as a felon, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 922
(g)(1). He
       challenges the constitutionality of the prohibition on felons pos-
       sessing firearms and ammunition. After careful consideration, we
       affirm.
                                           I.
              When police officers observed a vehicle driven by Dial com-
       mit a traffic violation, they initiated a traffic stop. During the traffic
       stop, the officers smelled marijuana. They searched the vehicle and
       found a firearm and ammunition.
              Dial, who had previous felony convictions, was charged
       with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of
       
18 U.S.C. § 922
(g)(1). He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing
       that the statutory ban on the possession of firearms by felons vio-
       lated the Second Amendment. After the district court denied the
       motion to dismiss, Dial pleaded guilty. The court imposed a sen-
       tence of 77 months’ imprisonment. This is Dial’s appeal.
                                          II.
               Ordinarily, when a defendant enters a valid guilty plea, he
       waives any non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings. United
       States v. Brown, 
752 F.3d 1344, 1347
 (11th Cir. 2014). But Dial’s
       guilty plea did not waive his constitutional challenge to the
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       24-10732               Opinion of the Court                          3

       statutory prohibition on felons’ possession of firearms. See Class v.
       United States, 
583 U.S. 174
, 181 (2018) (holding that a defendant
       who pleaded guilty did not waive his Second Amendment chal-
       lenge to a statute of conviction when the claim did not “contradict
       the terms of the indictment or the written plea agreement”).
               We review de novo the constitutionality of a statute. United
       States v. Gruezo, 
66 F.4th 1284
, 1292 (11th Cir. 2023).
                                        III.
              Dial challenges the constitutionality of 
18 U.S.C. § 922
(g)(1),
       which generally prohibits individuals with felony convictions from
       possessing firearms or ammunition. He argues that this prohibition
       runs afoul of the Second Amendment, which states that: “A well
       regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
       right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”
       U.S. Const. amend. II.
              To assess the constitutionality of the prohibition on felons
       possessing firearms, we begin with the Supreme Court’s decision
       in District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570
 (2008). In Heller, the
       Court considered a Second Amendment challenge to a District of
       Columbia law that barred the private possession of handguns in
       homes. 
Id. at 635
. After considering both the text and history of the
       Second Amendment, the Court concluded that it conferred on an
       individual a right to keep and bear arms. 
Id. at 595
. The Court held
       that the ban on handgun possession in the home violated the Sec-
       ond Amendment. 
Id. at 635
. But the Court acknowledged that the
       Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms was “not
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                  24-10732

       unlimited,” emphasizing that “nothing in [its] opinion should be
       taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession
       of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.” 
Id. at 626
. Indeed, the
       Court labeled such restrictions as “presumptively lawful.” 
Id.
 at 627
       n.26.
               After Heller, we considered a constitutional challenge to
       § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on felons’ possession of firearms. See
       United States v. Rozier, 
598 F.3d 768, 770
 (11th Cir. 2010). We held
       that “statutes disqualifying felons from possessing a firearm under
       any and all circumstances do not offend the Second Amendment.”
       
Id. at 771
.
               Several years later, the Supreme Court considered a Second
       Amendment challenge to New York’s gun-licensing regime that
       limited when a law-abiding citizen could obtain a license to carry a
       firearm outside the home. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen,
       
597 U.S. 1
, 11 (2022). The Court recognized that “the Second and
       Fourteenth Amendments protect an individual’s right to carry a
       handgun for self-defense outside the home.” 
Id. at 10
. The Court
       explained that to determine whether a restriction on firearms was
       constitutional, a court must begin by asking whether the firearm
       regulation at issue governs conduct that falls within the plain text
       of the Second Amendment. 
Id. at 17
. If the regulation does cover
       such conduct, the court may uphold it only if the government “af-
       firmatively prove[s] that its firearms regulation is part of the histor-
       ical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and
       bear arms.” 
Id. at 19
. Bruen emphasized that Heller established the
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       24-10732               Opinion of the Court                         5

       correct test for determining the constitutionality of gun re-
       strictions. See 
id. at 26
. And, like Heller, Bruen described Second
       Amendment rights as extending only to “law-abiding, responsible
       citizens.” 
Id.
 (internal quotation marks omitted).
              Based on Bruen, Dial argues that § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on
       felons’ possession of firearms is unconstitutional because the stat-
       ute “flunks Bruen’s text-and-history test.” Appellant’s Br. 8. His ar-
       gument is foreclosed by precedent.
              After Bruen, we considered another Second Amendment
       challenge to § 922(g)(1). See United States v. Dubois, 
94 F.4th 1284
,
       1289 (11th Cir. 2024). We held that the challenge was foreclosed by
       Rozier, which “interpreted Heller as limiting the [Second Amend-
       ment] right to law-abiding and qualified individuals and as clearly
       excluding felons from those categories by referring to felon-in-pos-
       session bans as presumptively lawful.” 
Id. at 1293
 (internal quota-
       tion marks omitted). We concluded that Bruen did not abrogate our
       decision in Rozier, observing that even in Bruen the Supreme Court
       continued to describe the right to bear arms as extending only to
       “law-abiding, responsible citizens.” 
Id.
 (internal quotation marks
       omitted).
              The Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v.
       Rahimi, 
602 U.S. 680
 (2024), does not change our analysis. In
       Rahimi, the Court considered a Second Amendment challenge to
       the federal statute that prohibits an individual who is subject to a
       domestic violence restraining order from possessing a firearm
       when the order includes a finding that he represents a credible
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       6                        Opinion of the Court                    24-10732

       threat to the safety of an intimate partner or a child of that partner
       or individual. See 
id.
 at 693 (citing 
18 U.S.C. § 922
(g)(8)). The Court
       held that this firearm restriction was constitutional. 
Id.
 And it once
       again declared that the prohibition on “the possession of firearms
       by ‘felons’ . . . [is] ‘presumptively lawful.’” 
Id.
 at 699 (quoting Heller,
       
554 U.S. at 626
, 627 n.26).
              Rahimi does not displace our holding in Dubois that Bruen did
       not abrogate Rozier. Under our prior panel precedent rule, an “in-
       tervening Supreme Court decision abrogates our precedent only if
       the intervening decision is both clearly on point and clearly con-
       trary to our earlier decision.” Dubois, 94 F.4th at 1293 (internal quo-
       tation marks omitted). “If the Supreme Court never discussed our
       precedent and did not otherwise comment on the precise issue be-
       fore the prior panel, our precedent remains binding.” Id. (alteration
       adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rahimi did not in-
       volve § 922(g)(1) nor did it otherwise comment on the precise issue
       before us in Rozier. Moreover, in Rahimi, the Supreme Court once
       again reiterated, albeit in dicta, that the prohibition “on the posses-
       sion of firearms by felons . . . [is] presumptively lawful.” 
602 U.S. at 699
 (internal quotation marks omitted).
              Under our precedent, Dial’s Second Amendment challenge
       to § 922(g)(1) fails. We affirm his conviction.
              AFFIRMED.


Reference

Status
Unpublished