USCA11 Case: 23-13846 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 12/26/2024 Page: 1 of 4

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-13846 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus CORY SMITH, a.k.a. Gavin White,

Defendant-Appellant. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-00411-TWT-CMS-1 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 23-13846 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 12/26/2024 Page: 2 of 4

2 Opinion of the Court 23-13846

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and ROSENBAUM and ABUDU, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Cory Smith appeals his sentence for money laundering. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). Smith argues that the district court erred when it pronounced the standard conditions of his supervised release at sentencing without orally describing or justifying each condition. We review de novo “whether a defendant ‘had no oppor- tunity to object at sentencing because the court included the [con- ditions] for the first time in its written final judgment.’” United States v. Hayden, 119 F.4th 832, 838 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 75 F.4th 1231, 1246 n.5 (11th Cir. 2023). When a defendant has notice of the standard conditions of supervised re- lease and fails to object, we review for plain error. Id. We review the adequacy of the court’s sentencing explanation de novo, even if the defendant did not object below. United States v. Hamilton, 66 F.4th 1267, 1274 (11th Cir. 2023). The parties dispute the applicable standard of review. The government argues that plain error review applies because Smith had adequate notice of the standard conditions of release and failed to object, and Smith argues that we should review his challenge de novo because he had no opportunity to object. We agree with the government. USCA11 Case: 23-13846 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 12/26/2024 Page: 3 of 4

23-13846 Opinion of the Court 3

Hayden controls our standard of review. Smith had adequate notice of the standard conditions of supervised release when the district court orally pronounced that he must “comply with the standard conditions of supervision that have been adopted by this court” and solicited objections. See Hayden, 119 F.4th at 838. Be- cause Smith did not object to his conditions of supervised release, we review his challenge for plain error. See id. Under Hayden, the district court did not err, much less plainly err, when it failed to describe the conditions of supervised release in its oral pronouncement. In Hayden, we held that the dis- trict court did not err by failing to describe each condition of su- pervised release in its oral pronouncement when it referenced the standard conditions adopted by the district court, which were pub- licly available, tracked the standard conditions in the relevant sen- tencing guideline, and did not conflict with the written judgment. Id. at 838–39. As in Hayden, the district court stated that Smith would need to comply with the publicly available standard condi- tions of supervised release adopted by the district court, which matched the standard conditions in the relevant sentencing guide- line. See id.; Standard Conditions of Supervision, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE N.D. OF GA., https://perma.cc/H75J-HHN5 (last visited Dec. 20, 2024); United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5D1.3(c) (Nov. 2023). And those conditions did not conflict with the written judgment. See Hayden, 119 F.4th at 838–39. Smith also argues that the district court erred by failing to explain how the standard conditions of supervised release were USCA11 Case: 23-13846 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 12/26/2024 Page: 4 of 4

4 Opinion of the Court 23-13846

necessary under the statutory sentencing factors, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), or were tailored to his individual circumstances. The dis- trict court is required to state the reasons for the imposition of its sentence. Id. § 3553(c). But a district court is not required to make separate explanations for the term of imprisonment and term of supervised release. Hamilton, 66 F.4th at 1275. It satisfies its obliga- tion if the record establishes that it has “considered the parties’ ar- guments and has a reasoned basis” for its sentencing decision. Id. at 1276 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We have not held that the district court must articulate how each standard con- dition of supervised release is related to the sentencing factors, and the relevant statute and sentencing guideline impose no such re- quirement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3. The district court complied with section 3553(c) when it mentioned the nature and circumstances of the offense, Smith’s history and characteris- tics, and the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, afford adequate deterrence, promote respect for law, and avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). It considered both the seriousness of Smith’s offense alongside his lack of criminal history. That explanation was sufficient to explain why the standard conditions of supervised release were appropri- ate. See Hamilton, 66 F.4th at 1276. AFFIRMED.