USCA11 Case: 22-13187 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 01/22/2024 Page: 1 of 3

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 22-13187 ____________________

ROY STEWART MOORE, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus TIANA LOWE, JERRY DUNLEAVY, TIMOTHY CARNEY, PHILLIP KLEIN, BRAD POLUMBO, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees. USCA11 Case: 22-13187 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 01/22/2024 Page: 2 of 3

2 Order of the Court 22-13187

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Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cv-00124-CLM ____________________

Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges. BY THE COURT: This appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. By statute, Congress has limited our jurisdiction, at least as a general matter, to “final decisions of the district courts[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “To constitute a final decision, the district court’s order generally must adjudicate all claims against all parties[.]” Jenkins v. Prime Ins. Co., 32 F.4th 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 276 F.3d 1229, 1230 (11th Cir. 2001)). In this case, portions of two of Moore’s claims—portions re- lated to Counts I and II—survived the defendants’ motion to dis- miss. Without citing any specific source of authority, Moore (who was proceeding pro se) filed a pleading styled “Plaintiff’s Voluntary Dismissal of Remaining Claims,” in which he agreed to dismiss the remaining aspects of Counts I and II and asked the district court to enter final judgment. The district court construed Moore’s motion as one filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), granted it, and directed the clerk to close the case. The district court’s reliance on Rule 41(a) was misplaced. We have explained that Rule 41(a) may be used to dismiss only USCA11 Case: 22-13187 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 01/22/2024 Page: 3 of 3

22-13187 Order of the Court 3

entire “action[s],” not individual claims. See, e.g., Perry v. Schu- macher Grp. of La., 891 F.3d 954, 957–58 (11th Cir. 2018). Had the district court instead construed Moore’s pleading as a motion to amend his complaint to abandon Counts I and II and invoked Fed- eral Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), it could have entered final judg- ment, and jurisdiction would have been proper here. See id. (ex- plaining that “Rule 15 was designed for situations like this”); accord, e.g., GEICO v. Glassco, Inc., 58 F.4th 1338, 1343 (11th Cir. 2023). DISMISSED.