United States v. Jose Denis
United States v. Jose Denis
Opinion
USCA11 Case: 23-11544 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 02/01/2024 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 23-11544 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus JOSE DENIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:99-cr-00714-JEM-1 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 23-11544 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 02/01/2024 Page: 2 of 6
Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Jose Denis appeals following the district court’s denial of his motions for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1).
The Government, in turn, moves for summary affirmance and to stay the briefing schedule, arguing, among other things, that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors weighed against Denis’s release and that Denis was a danger to the community. After review, 1 we affirm.
A district court has no inherent authority to modify a de- fendant’s sentence and may do so “only when authorized by a stat- ute or rule.” United States v. Puentes, 803 F.3d 597, 605-06 (11th Cir. 2015). “[T]he First Step Act expressly permits district courts to re- duce a previously imposed term of imprisonment.” United States v. Jones, 962 F.3d 1290, 1297 (11th Cir. 2020), vacated, 143 S. Ct. 72 (2022), reinstated in United States v. Jackson, 58 F.4th 1331 (11th Cir. 2023). Under the relevant statute, a “court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed” except under certain circumstances. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). In the context of compassion- ate release, the statute provides that:
We will not reverse unless we have a definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment. United States v. McGregor, 960 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2020).
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23-11544 Opinion of the Court 3 [T]he court, upon . . . motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is ear- lier, may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C.] section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that—extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.
Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
The district court need not conduct the compassionate re- lease analysis in any particular order. United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2021). A district court may reduce a term of imprisonment if the § 3553(a) factors favor doing so, there are extraordinary and compelling reasons for doing so, and the re- duction would not endanger any person or the community. Id. All of these necessary conditions must be satisfied before it can grant a reduction. Id. Therefore, the absence of even one condition fore- closes a sentence reduction. Id. at 1238; see also United States v. Gi- ron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1347 (11th Cir. 2021).
Summary affirmance is appropriate. See Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969) 2 (stating summary In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Cir- cuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981.
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23-11544 Opinion of the Court 5 life sentence remained appropriate. See United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2022) (stating the weight given to each § 3553(a) factor is typically “committed to the sound discretion of the district court”). Affirmance on this ground alone would be ap- propriate. Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237; Giron, 15 F.4th at 1347.
Second, the district court did not abuse its discretion in con- cluding Denis posed a danger to the community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (explaining factors considered when determining if some- one poses a danger to the community include the nature and cir- cumstances of the offense—including whether the crime involved a controlled substance—the weight of the evidence against the per- son, the history and characteristics of the person—including physi- cal and mental condition, family ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, and criminal history—and the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or community posed by the person’s release). Specifically, the nature and circumstances of Denis’s offense—including the kidnapping, torture, and murder of a victim who ultimately did not possess the money and drugs that Denis was seeking, and his plan to murder a co-conspirator—sup- port the district court’s conclusion in this respect. Denis does not show the district court committed a clear error of judgment in con- cluding he would still pose a danger to the community given these facts.
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4 We need not address Denis’s arguments regarding extraordinary and com- pelling reasons for reducing his sentence. See Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1238. Addi- tionally, we deny as moot the Government’s motion to stay the briefing sched- ule.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.