USCA11 Case: 23-11434 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 02/06/2024 Page: 1 of 6

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-11434 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

LISA REMBERT, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus DUNMAR ESTATES, DUNMAR ESTATES HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATION; FERDINANDSEN ENTERPRISES, INC., D/B/A/ WORLD OF HOMES; EMPIRE MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC.; CITY OF WINTER SPRINGS; CITY OF WINTER SPRINGS CODE ENFORCEMENT BOARD,

Defendant-Appellees.

____________________ USCA11 Case: 23-11434 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 02/06/2024 Page: 2 of 6

2 Opinion of the Court 23-11434

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 6:22-c-00877-CEM-LHP ____________________

Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Plaintiff-Appellant Lisa Rembert appeals from the district court’s sua sponte order dismissing her case without prejudice for failure to file a notice of pendency of other actions and disclosure statement and the district court’s order denying her motion for re- consideration. Rembert seeks equitable relief from what she ar- gues was an “arbitrary dismissal” of her case. After careful consid- eration, we affirm the district court’s dismissal. I Lisa Rembert first filed a lawsuit against the defendants in early 2022. That case was dismissed without prejudice by the dis- trict court because Rembert failed to comply with a local rule that required her to file a certificate of interested persons and corporate disclosure statement. Rembert appealed the dismissal, and we af- firmed. Rembert v. Dunmar Estates, No. 22-11526, 2022 WL 17986207 (11th Cir. Dec. 29, 2022). While her first appeal was pending, Rembert filed the case now before us, raising substantially similar claims. Four days after she filed this lawsuit, the district court issued an initial order regarding case management and deadlines. In USCA11 Case: 23-11434 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 02/06/2024 Page: 3 of 6

23-10585 Opinion of the Court 3

relevant part, the order required each party to comply “with Local Rule 1.07(c) and file a Notice of Pendency of Other Actions in the form on Judge Mendoza’s pages on the Middle District of Florida website.” The district court also separately issued a “notice to counsel and parties” stating that “[f]ailure to comply with any local rules or court orders may result in the imposition of sanctions in- cluding, but not limited to, the dismissal of this action or entry of default without further notice.” On the same day, Rembert filed a “Notice of Compliance,” in which she certified that she “conducted a due diligence review of the court website” and had “filed her Certificate of Interested Persons & Corporate Disclosure Statement in conformity there- with.” The notice was an attempt to “avoid further miscommuni- cation and conflict.” Rembert did not file any notice of related ac- tions. Over the next few months, defendants in this case filed their notices of related actions per Local Rule 1.07(c). Ten months after its initial case management order, the dis- trict court, upon sua sponte review of the case file, dismissed the case without prejudice due to Rembert’s failure to file her “Notice of Pendency of Other Actions and Disclosure Statement.” Rem- bert moved for reconsideration of the Order. The district court issued its order denying the motion for reconsideration. This ap- peal followed. On appeal, Rembert argues that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing her case for violating a local rule. II USCA11 Case: 23-11434 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 02/06/2024 Page: 4 of 6

4 Opinion of the Court 23-11434

Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs involuntary dismissals of federal cases. In general, involuntary dis- missals of complaints without prejudice are final, appealable or- ders. Justice v. United States, 6 F.3d 1474, 1481 (11th Cir. 1993). We review these dismissals for abuse of discretion. Foudy v. Indian River Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 845 F.3d 1117, 1122 (11th Cir. 2017). Though “dismissal is an extraordinary remedy, dismissal upon disregard of an order, especially where the litigant has been forewarned, gener- ally is not an abuse of discretion.” Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989). Rembert does not contest that she failed to meet the require- ments of the local rule or the court’s order. Rather, she argues that there was no justification for the sanction of dismissal. But we have “upheld sua sponte dismissals” for “failure to comply with court or- ders” in the past. Jefferson Fourteenth Assocs. v. Wometco de Puerto Rico, Inc., 695 F.2d 524, 526 (11th Cir. 1983). Rembert cites as controlling authority Woodham v. American Cytoscope Co. of Pelham, N.Y., where the court held that failure to comply with a local rule did not warrant dismissal of a complaint. 335 F.2d 551, 552 (5th Cir. 1964). 1 In Woodham, the court deter- mined that dismissal was too harsh a sanction when an out-of-town lawyer failed to comply with the strictures of a local rule. Id. at 556. That case is distinguishable from the facts here because, as we

1 Decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to October 1, 1981, con-

stitute binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981). USCA11 Case: 23-11434 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 02/06/2024 Page: 5 of 6

23-10585 Opinion of the Court 5

pointed out before, the out-of-town lawyer there was “unaware of” the local rules. Id. at 552; Rembert, No. 22-11526, at *1. Here, however, Rembert’s brief concedes that her counsel knew of Local Rule 1.07(c) and does not allege any lack of knowledge of the docket entry explaining the consequences of vi- olating Local Rule 1.07(c). But she argues that her “notice of com- pliance,” filed after the initial case management order, showed a “good faith” belief of compliance and an “apparent lack of aware- ness” that she had not met the requirements of Local Rule 1.07(c). Rembert also argues that because “most of the local judges . . . do not enforce Local Rule[] 1.07(c) in the same, stringent manner” as the judge did here, the district court had no justification for dismiss- ing the case. There was, according to Rembert, “no evidence of a failure to prosecute or of a repeated refusal to follow the court’s orders.” None of these arguments persuades us. “It was not an abuse of discretion to dismiss . . . due to plaintiff’s ‘personal inattention to this case.’” Rembert, 2022 WL 17986207 at *1 (quoting Martin- Trigona, 627 F.2d at 682). Rembert was on notice of the local rule when the district court issued its case management order, and she was also made aware that violations of the local rules could be cause for sua sponte dismissal in the district court’s subsequent or- der. The district court here did not abuse its discretion by entering an order of dismissal without additional warning to Rembert or her counsel. Because we have in the past declined to “serve as de facto counsel” even for pro se plaintiffs in similar contexts, we decline to USCA11 Case: 23-11434 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 02/06/2024 Page: 6 of 6

6 Opinion of the Court 23-11434

require the district court to do so here for Rembert or her counsel. Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd., 760 F.2d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014). It is within the power of a district court to dismiss cases if a party fails to comply with a court order, and Rembert has failed to show why dismissal was improper here. See Fed R. Civ P. 41(b); Betty K Agen- cies, Ltd. v. M/V Monada, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005). 2 * * * Because the district court did not abuse its discretion by dis- missing Rembert’s claim without prejudice for failure to comply with court orders, we AFFIRM.

2 Rembert also argues that, due to the nature of the complaint, “an unfair,

biased district court judge could utilize the local rules of procedure” to dismiss her case. Rembert has presented no evidence of this in her brief, nor have we found any upon review of the record. Therefore, we do not address this issue.