Angela W. DeBose v. USA

USCA11 Case: 22-13380 Document: 73-1 Date Filed: 02/08/2024 Page: 1 of 6

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________

No. 22-13380

Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

ANGELA W. DEBOSE,

Plaintiff-Appellant, versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,

RONALD FICARROTTA,

Chief Judge, in official capacity,

ELIZABETH GADDY RICE,

GREGORY P. HOLDER, et al.,

Individually and Official Capacities,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cv-02127-SDM-AAS ____________________

Before WILSON, LUCK, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Angela Debose, a licensed attorney proceeding pro se, 1 ap- peals the district court’s dismissal of her second amended com- plaint. Debose asserts the court abused its discretion when it im- posed a limited injunction enjoining her from filing further lawsuits about her employment at the University of South Florida (USF) without the signature of an attorney barred in Florida or the Mid- dle District of Florida. Debose also contends the court erred in granting the Appellees’ motion to dismiss based on res judicata. Af- ter review, 2 we affirm the district court.

A. Limited Injunction

Federal courts have the power to manage their own dockets. Smith v. Psychiatric Solutions, Inc., 750 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2014). That power “includes broad discretion in deciding how best to manage the cases before them.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has stated a litigant’s constitutional right of access may be counterbalanced by the traditional right of courts to manage their dockets and limit abusive filings. In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989). District courts possess the power to issue pre- filing injunctions “to protect against abusive and vexatious litiga- tion.” Martin-Trigona v. Shaw, 986 F.2d 1384, 1387 (11th Cir. 1993). We have explained a court has “a responsibility to prevent single litigants from unnecessarily encroaching on the judicial machinery needed by others” and a litigant “can be severely restricted as to what he may file and how he must behave in his applications for judicial relief ” as long as he is not “completely foreclosed from any access to the court.” Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1074 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (emphasis in original).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting a limited injunction against Debose from filing further lawsuits about her employment at USF without the signature of a lawyer barred in Florida or the Middle District of Florida. The court found novo.” Norfolk S. Corp. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 371 F.3d 1285, 1288 (11th Cir. 2004).

Debose had brought a multitude of prior claims in both federal and state court regarding the same issues and same Appellees. See Mar- tin-Trigona, 986 F.2d at 1387. While Debose argues the injunction violated her rights, the injunction did not completely foreclose her from filing any new claims because it allows her to file claims re- garding her employment at USF as long as an attorney signs off on the filing. See Procup, 792 F.2d at 1074. The court also did not abuse its discretion by using its inherent authority to issue this injunction as it is allowed to control its own dockets. See Smith, 750 F.3d at 1262. B. Res Judicata

Res judicata bars the parties to a prior action from relitigating the same causes of action that were, or could have been, raised in that prior action, if that action resulted in a final judgment on the merits. In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 244 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2001). Res judicata “generally applies not only to issues that were litigated, but also to those that should have been but were not.” Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. McCoy Restaurants, Inc., 708 F.2d 582, 586 (11th Cir. 1983). The bar applies where four factors are shown: (1) the prior decision was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) there was a final judgment on the merits, (3) both cases involve the same parties or their privies, and (4) both cases involve the same causes of action. In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 244 F.3d at 1296. As to the third factor, we have explained “privity” comprises several different types of relationships and generally applies “when a person, although not a party, has his interests adequately 22-13380 Opinion of the Court 5 represented by someone with the same interests who is a party.” E.E.O.C. v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 383 F.3d 1280, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004). As to the fourth factor, “[i]n general, cases involve the same cause of action for purposes of res judicata if the present case arises out of the same nucleus of operative fact, or is based upon the same factual predicate, as a former action.” Israel Disc. Bank Ltd. v. Entin, 951 F.2d 311, 315 (11th Cir. 1992) (quotation marks omitted). “In determining whether the causes of action are the same, a court must compare the substance of the actions, not their form.” In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 244 F.3d at 1297 (quotation marks omitted). “The test for a common nucleus of operative fact is whether the same facts are involved in both cases, so that the present claim could have been effectively litigated with the prior one.” Lobo v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 704 F.3d 882, 893 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted).

The court did not err when it granted the USF Board of Trustees and its members, Greenberg Traurig, P.A., and Richard McCrea’s motion to dismiss based on res judicata. Debose’s prior state and federal cases had final judgments on the merits. See In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 244 F.3d at 1296. The previous state court and federal court cases involved the same parties or their privies. See Penco Aeroplex, 383 F.3d at 1286. In Debose’s previous complaints, she sued the USF Board of Trustees and its members, Greenberg Traurig, and McCrea. All of Debose’s cases arose out of the same nucleus of operative facts as the current case because all of Debose’s claims concern or stem from her employment and firing from USF. See Israel Disc. Bank Ltd., 951 F.2d at 315. Therefore, the district court did not err when it found res judicata barred all of Debose’s claims against the USF Board of Trustees and its mem- bers, Greenberg Traurig, and McCrea.

II. CONCLUSION

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it granted a limited injunction against Debose from filing further law- suits about her employment at USF without the signature of a law- yer barred in Florida or the Middle District of Florida. The district court also did not err when it granted the USF Board of Trustees and its members, Greenberg Traurig, and McCrea’s motion to dis- miss based on res judicata. Accordingly, we affirm. 3 AFFIRMED.