USCA11 Case: 23-12657 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 02/20/2024 Page: 1 of 3

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 23-12657 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICAN CORPORATION, a foreign corporation, Plaintiff-Third Party Defendant Counter Defendant-Appellant, versus NORTH AMERICAN AUTOMOTIVE SERVICES, INC., an Illinois Corporation, et al.,

Defendants,

EFN WEST PALM MOTOR SALES, LLC, an Illinois Limited Liability Company, GENE KHAYTIN, USCA11 Case: 23-12657 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 02/20/2024 Page: 2 of 3

2 Opinion of the Court 23-12657

ERNIE REVUELTA, EDWARD W. NAPLETON, GEOVANNY PELAYO, individuals, et al.,

Defendants-Counter Claimants Third Party Plaintiffs-Appellees,

HYUNDAI MOTOR COMPANY,

Third Party Defendant-Counter Defendant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 9:20-cv-82102-WM ____________________

Before WILSON, JORDAN, and GRANT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Upon our review of the record and the parties’ response to the jurisdictional question, this appeal is DISMISSED for lack of ju- risdiction. EFN West Palm Motor Sales, LLC’s stipulations of volun- tary dismissal of its fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth USCA11 Case: 23-12657 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 02/20/2024 Page: 3 of 3

23-12657 Opinion of the Court 3

counterclaims against Hyundai Motor American Corporation, pur- suant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), were inva- lid because that Rule generally does not permit dismissal of only particular claims or counterclaims within an action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), 41(c); Rosell v. VMSB, LLC, 67 F.4th 1141, 1144 (11th Cir. 2023); Esteva v. UBS Fin. Servs. Inc. (In re Esteva), 60 F.4th 664, 675 (11th Cir. 2023); Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1106 (11th Cir. 2004). The district court’s subse- quent orders adjudging those counterclaims dismissed pursuant to the stipulations were also ineffective to dismiss the counterclaims under Rule 41(a)(2). See Rosell, 67 F.4th at 1144. We decline to construe the stipulations as seeking amend- ment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 or as abandonment of the counter- claims. The filings were labeled as stipulations of dismissal and ex- pressly invoked Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), and the district court’s orders recognizing them explicitly accepted them as stipulations and con- templated dismissal under Rule 41. And unlike Hyundai’s explicit withdrawal, at trial, of one of its claims and the district court’s ex- press recognition that the claim was abandoned, the parties have not pointed to anything in the record mentioning withdrawal or abandonment, at any time, of any counterclaim. Accordingly, the counterclaims have not been resolved and remain pending before the district court, so we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Supreme Fuels Trading FZE v. Sargeant, 689 F.3d 1244, 1246 (11th Cir. 2012).