U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 2024

Kathleen Steele v. Commissioner of Social Security

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Decided February 29, 2024

94 F.4th 1263 (Federal Reporter, Fourth Series)

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 20-11656 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 02/29/2024 Page: 1 of 8

[PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 20-11656 ____________________ KATHLEEN STEELE, Plaintiﬀ-Appellant, versus COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 8:18-cv-02522-VMC-AEP ____________________ Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

USCA11 Case: 20-11656 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 02/29/2024 Page: 2 of 8

2 Opinion of the Court 20-11656 LAGOA, Circuit Judge: This case involving a posthumously conceived child returns to us for disposition from the Florida Supreme Court, to which we certified two questions of Florida law. Steele v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. (“Steele I”), 51 F.4th 1059, 1065 (11th Cir. 2022). In considering our certified questions, the Florida Supreme Court found our first ques- tion dispositive: “Under Florida law, is P.S.S. ‘provided for’ in the decedent’s will within the meaning of Fla. Stat. § 742.17(4)?” Id.; see Steele v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. (“Steele II”), No. SC2022-1342, 2024 WL 630219 (Fla. Feb. 15, 2024). In answering this question, the Florida Supreme Court held that “‘provided for’ in section 742.17(4) means that the testator actually left something to the posthumously conceived child through the will” and that, as such, “the will must show that the testator contemplated the possibility of a child being conceived following his or her death.” Steele II, 2024 WL 630219, at *3. And the Florida Supreme Court concluded that the will of the decedent, Phillip Steele, did not provide for P.S.S., Mr. Steele’s posthumously conceived child. Id. As we explain below, we hold that Mr. Steele’s will does not provide for P.S.S. and that he is not “eligible for a claim against the decedent’s estate,” § 742.17(4), based the Florida Supreme Court’s answer to our first certified question. Therefore, the administra- tive law judge did not err in denying Katherine Steele’s claim for child’s insurance benefits (“CIB”) for P.S.S. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order upholding the administrative law judge’s decision.

USCA11 Case: 20-11656 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 02/29/2024 Page: 3 of 8

20-11656 Opinion of the Court 3 I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND We have set forth the relevant facts of this appeal in Steele I, F.4th at 1061–62, but we briefly recount them for context. Mr. Steele, before his death, provided sperm samples to a fertility clinic.

Id. at 1061. Following Mr. Steele’s death, Ms. Steele used one of those samples and conceived P.S.S. through in vitro fertilization. Id. Additionally, before Mr. Steele’s death, he prepared a will that spe- cifically listed his living children but also stated, “[t]he terms ‘chil- dren’ and ‘lineal descendants’ shall include those later born or adopted and whenever used in this instrument shall be equivalent to blood relationship and relationship by adoption.” Id. After P.S.S.’s birth, Ms. Steele applied for CIB under the So- cial Security Act on behalf of P.S.S., but the Social Security Admin- istration denied her claim. Id. Ms. Steele sought administrative review of that denial, but an administrative law judge similarly de- nied the claim for CIB. Id. at 1061–62. Ms. Steele then challenged the denial of her claim for CIB in federal court. Id. at 1062; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). A magistrate judge recommended af- firming the administrative law judge’s decision, and the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation over Ms. Steele’s objections. Steele I, 51 F.4th at 1062. This appeal ensued.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW When an administrative law judge denies benefits and the Appeals Council denies review, as occurred in this case, we review the administrative law judge’s decision as the Commissioner’s final decision. Viverette v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 13 F.4th 1309, 1313 (11th USCA11 Case: 20-11656 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 02/29/2024 Page: 4 of 8

4 Opinion of the Court 20-11656 Cir. 2021). For factual questions, we determine whether the denial is supported by substantial evidence. Id. “In reviewing for substan- tial evidence, we ‘may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evi- dence, or substitute our judgment for that of” the administrative law judge. Id. at 1314 (quoting Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011)). But we review questions of law presented by the administrative law judge’s decision de novo. Id. at 1313–14.

III. ANALYSIS As we explained in Steele I, the main issue in this appeal is whether P.S.S.—Mr. Steele’s posthumously conceived child—is considered a “child” within the meaning of the Social Security Act and is entitled to CIB. 51 F.4th at 1062–63.

Under the Social Security Act, an applicant qualiﬁes for CIB if he “meets the Act’s deﬁnition of ‘child,’ is unmarried, is below speciﬁed age limits (18 or 19) or is under a disability which began prior to age 22, and was dependent on the insured at the time of the insured’s death.” Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 566 U.S. 541, 547 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 402(d). The Social Security Act deﬁned “child,” in relevant part, as “(1) the child or legally adopted child of an indi- vidual, (2) a stepchild [under certain circumstances], and (3) . . . the grandchild or stepgrandchild of an individual or his spouse [who meets certain conditions].” Astrue, 566 U.S. at 547 (alterations in original); 42 U.S.C. § 416(e). Additionally, a subsequential deﬁni- tion provision—42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A)—provides that “[i]n deter- mining whether an applicant is the child or parent of [an] individual USCA11 Case: 20-11656 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 02/29/2024 Page: 5 of 8

20-11656 Opinion of the Court 5 for purposes of this subchapter, the Commissioner of Social Secu- rity shall apply [the intestacy law of the insured individual’s domi- ciliary State].” Astrue, 566 U.S. at 548 (some alterations in original) (quoting § 416(h)(2)(A)). Section 416(h)(2)(A) “completes the deﬁ- nition of ‘child’ ‘for purposes of th[e] subchapter’ that includes § 416(e)(1).” Id. at 558 (quoting § 416(h)(2)(A)).

“Whether posthumously conceived children can inherit through intestacy under Florida law” was a question of ﬁrst im- pression for this Court, Steele I, 51 F.th at 1064, and the parties dis- puted the meaning and application of Florida Statute § 742.17(4) to the case, which provides that a “child conceived from the eggs or sperm of a person or persons who died before the transfer of their eggs, sperm, or preembryos to a woman’s body shall not be eligible for a claim against the decedent’s estate unless the child has been pro- vided for by the decedent’s will.” (Emphasis added). Given this, we certiﬁed two questions to the Florida Supreme Court: (1) “[u]nder Florida law, is P.S.S. ‘provided for’ in the decedent’s will within the meaning of Fla. Stat. § 742.17(4)?”; and (2) “[i]f the answer is yes, does Florida law authorize a posthumously conceived child who is provided for in the decedent's will to inherit intestate the decedent's property?” Steele I, 51 F.4th at 1065.

After considering our certiﬁed questions, the Florida Su- preme Court determined that the ﬁrst question—the interpreta- tion of the phrase “provided for” in section 742.17(4)—was USCA11 Case: 20-11656 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 02/29/2024 Page: 6 of 8

6 Opinion of the Court 20-11656 dispositive. 1 Steele II, 2024 WL 630219, at *2. Applying the suprem- acy-of-text principle to section 742.17(4), the Florida Supreme Court noted that “[t]he term ‘provided for’ is not deﬁned in the statute or in any other part of chapter 742.” Id. (quoting § 742.17(4)). Therefore, the court looked to other “sources bearing on its objective meaning.” Id. After considering “era-appropriate” dictionaries and its case law in a related context, the Florida Su- preme Court concluded that “‘provided for’ in section 742.17(4) means that the testator actually left something to the posthu- mously conceived child through the will,” i.e., “the child must have some inheritance right under the will.” Id. at *3. As part of this requirement, the court explained, “the will must show that the tes- tator contemplated the possibility of a child being conceived fol- lowing his or her death.” Id. Applying this standard to the facts of this case, the Florida Supreme Court determined that Mr. Steele’s will did not “provide for” P.S.S. because “[n]o part of the will acknowledges the possibil- ity of children being conceived after Mr. Steele’s death.” Id. The court interpreted the will’s reference to afterborn or adopted chil- dren as referring “most naturally to children born after his will was drafted but conceived before his death, i.e., when the dispositional portions of the will create vested rights.” Id. “Thus, this reference 1 Because the Florida Supreme Court determined the first certified question was dispositive of the case, it declined to answer the second question. Steele II, 2024 WL 630219, at *4.

USCA11 Case: 20-11656 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 02/29/2024 Page: 7 of 8

20-11656 Opinion of the Court 7 to later-born children would not cover P.S.S., who was conceived after Mr. Steele’s death.” Id. Moreover, the Florida Supreme Court found that, even if “post-death conception was in some generic sense contemplated by Mr. Steele, P.S.S. could not have received anything under the will,” as “Mr. Steele’s will conveyed all relevant property to Ms. Steele.” Id. The court explained that, “[i]n the event that Ms. Steele had died before Mr. Steele, the tangible personal property would have been distributed to his ‘then living children.’” Id. “By its terms,” the court explained, “this fallback provision only applied to children living at the time Mr. Steele died and necessarily excluded any posthumously conceived children, like P.S.S.” Id. Thus, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that “as it was impossible for P.S.S. to inherit anything from the will, it is clear that Mr. Steele did not provide for P.S.S. as contemplated by section 742.17(4).” Id. For the reasons stated in the Florida Supreme Court’s deci- sion in Steele II, we conclude that P.S.S., who was conceived after Mr. Steele’s death, was not “provided for” in Mr. Steele’s will, as contemplated by section 742.17(4). Therefore, under the intestacy law of Florida, P.S.S. is not “eligible for a claim against the dece- dent’s estate” under section 742.17(4) and cannot inherit Mr. Steele’s personal property through intestacy, which means that P.S.S. is not considered a “child” of Mr. Steele for purposes of qual- ifying for CIB under the Social Security Act. Accordingly, the ad- ministrative law judge did not err in denying Ms. Steele’s claim for USCA11 Case: 20-11656 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 02/29/2024 Page: 8 of 8

8 Opinion of the Court 20-11656 CIB on behalf of P.S.S., and we aﬃrm the district court’s order up- holding the administrative law judge’s decision.

IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we aﬃrm the district court’s or- der upholding the administrative law judge’s denial of Ms. Steele’s claim for CIB on behalf of P.S.S.

AFFIRMED.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.