United States v. Michael Robinson
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
United States v. Michael Robinson
Opinion
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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-11325
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MICHAEL ALLEN ROBINSON,
Defendant- Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-20063-BB-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11325
Before WILSON, JILL PRYOR, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant-Appellant Michael Robinson, who is presently in-
carcerated, appeals his 75-month sentence for possession of a fire-
arm as a convicted felon.
I.
On March 1, 2021, Robinson arrived at a corner store in Mi-
ami, Florida. He exited the passenger side of a white Chevy Mal-
ibu, and the driver remained in the parking lot. While in the store,
Robinson removed a gun from his waistband and placed it back
into his pants. A store clerk recognized Robinson—claiming he had
come to the store two weeks prior and “bragged” about being in-
volved in a local shooting. After approximately thirty minutes,
Robinson exited the store. The store’s video surveillance showed
him loitering outside before being approached by an unidentified
man. Their discussion quickly escalated, and a struggle between
the two men ensued. The video showed Robinson reaching toward
his waistband and producing a firearm. Robinson then reached to-
ward the man’s waistband and grabbed another firearm. The uni-
dentified man began to run away as Robinson fired several shots in
his direction. The store clerk who had recognized Robinson earlier
began firing shots at Robinson from the store’s doorway, and Rob-
inson shot back. Robinson then returned to the Chevy and was
driven away.
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23-11325 Opinion of the Court 3
Law enforcement responded to the scene and recovered
store surveillance footage, which provided clear views of the en-
counter, Robinson’s face, and the Chevy’s plate number. The next
day, the same officer observed a white Chevy Malibu with the iden-
tified plate. After the Chevy ran a red light, the officer initiated a
traffic stop, and upon approaching the vehicle, recognized Robin-
son from the store’s surveillance footage in the passenger seat. A
records check confirmed Robinson’s identity and his status as a con-
victed felon. Robinson was taken into custody.
On September 1, 2022, Robinson was charged with two
counts of being a felon in knowing possession of a firearm. 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He pled guilty in exchange for the government
dismissing the second count.
Robinson’s probation officer prepared a Presentence Investi-
gation Report (PSI). The PSI calculated Robinson’s base offense
level as 27 under U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1(a)(2) because the offense involved
attempted murder, and because the cross-reference provision pur-
suant § 2K2.1(c)(1)(A) directs application of § 2X1.1 if the defend-
ant possessed a firearm in connection with another offense and the
resulting offense level is higher. After reducing three levels for Rob-
inson’s acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1, Robinson’s total
offense level was 24. The PSI also reported criminal history, which
included two armed robberies and a prior conviction for possessing
a firearm as a felon. Robinson had six criminal history points, es-
tablishing a criminal history category of III. The PSI determined,
based on his total offense level of 24 and criminal history category
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-11325
of III, that Robinson had an advisory sentencing guidelines range
of 63 to 78 months of imprisonment.
At the sentencing hearing, Robinson objected to the PSI on
the grounds that his possession of a firearm was not in connection
with an attempted murder because he had no ability to retreat and
was thus acting in self-defense under Florida law and federal law.
Robinson also moved for a downward variance, arguing that his
history of substance abuse, poor mental health, acceptance of re-
sponsibility, and firing in self-defense justified a variance from the
Guidelines.
Over Robinson’s objections, the district court sentenced him
to 75 months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised
release. Robinson timely appealed. On appeal, he argues that:
(1) the district court erred in applying the base offense level for at-
tempted murder pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines’ cross-ref-
erence provisions because he was acting in self-defense and, thus,
his felon in possession offense was not connected to an attempted
murder; and (2) even if the cross-reference provisions properly ap-
ply, the district court’s sentence was substantively unreasonable.
II.
We review the district court’s fact findings for clear error
and its application of the Sentencing Guidelines to particular facts
de novo. United States v. Massey, 443 F.3d 814, 818 (11th Cir. 2006).
For a factual error to be clear, we, “after reviewing all the evidence,
must be left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed.” United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 363 F.3d 1134,
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1137 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotations omitted). We defer to a credibil-
ity determination by a factfinder “unless it is contrary to the laws
of nature, or is so inconsistent or improbable on its face that no
reasonable factfinder could accept it.” United States v. Ramirez-
Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotations omitted). At
the district court level, the government has the burden of establish-
ing a sentencing enhancement by a preponderance of reliable evi-
dence. United States v. Askew, 193 F.3d 1181, 1183 (11th Cir. 1999).
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant convicted of
unlawful possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) has their
offense level calculated under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1. A
base offense level of 20 is assigned if they have one prior felony
conviction for a crime of violence or a serious drug offense. Id.
§ 2K2.1(a)(4). Typically, four levels are added if the defendant pos-
sessed the firearm in connection with another felony offense. Id.
§ 2K2.1(b)(6). However, a separate cross-reference provision,
§ 2X1.1, is used if the defendant possessed the gun in connection
with another felony offense and the use of the cross-reference pro-
vision results in a higher offense level. Id. § 2K2.1(c)(1)(A). The
cross-reference provision directs that, whenever an attempt is sep-
arately covered in a Guidelines provision, that provision should be
applied. Id. § 2X1.1(c)(1). Attempted murder is covered by § 2A2.1.
Id. § 2A2.1. The base offense level thereunder is 27 unless the com-
pleted offense would have been first degree murder. Id.
§ 2A2.1(a)(1)–(2).
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In Florida, “attempted second-degree murder has two ele-
ments: (1) the defendant intentionally committed an act that could
have resulted, but did not result, in the death of someone, and
(2) the act was imminently dangerous to another and demon-
strated a depraved mind without regard for human life.” Coicou v.
State, 39 So. 3d 237, 241 (Fla. 2010) (quotations omitted). However,
an individual may “use deadly force if he or she reasonably believes
that using or threatening to use such force is necessary to prevent
imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or an-
other or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony.”
Fla. Stat. § 776.012(2). Such an individual has a duty to retreat if
they are engaged in criminal activity. See id. The defendant’s esca-
lation of an incident forecloses self-defense and permits application
of the cross-reference. United States v. Moore, 76 F.4th 1355, 1375–
76 (11th Cir 2023) (discussing self-defense under a similar section
of Alabama law, Ala. Code § 13A-3-23).
This court has held that a federal justification defense exists
as to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) if the defendant: (1) was under “immi-
nent . . . threat of death”; (2) did not recklessly place themselves in
that situation; (3) had no reasonable alternative to possessing a gun;
and (4) “there was a direct causal relationship between the criminal
action and the avoidance of the threatened harm.” United States v.
Rice, 214 F.3d 1295, 1297 (11th Cir. 2000).
As a preliminary matter, the district court correctly applied
the cross-reference provision under § 2K2.1(c)(1)(A). That provi-
sion is applicable if the government shows by a preponderance of
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23-11325 Opinion of the Court 7
the evidence that Robinson’s possession of a firearm was in con-
nection with another offense and if calculating his offense levels
under the cross-reference results in a higher offense level. U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1(c)(1)(A); Askew, 193 F.3d at 1183.
The district court did not err in finding that Robinson pos-
sessed the firearm in connection with an attempted murder. The
store’s video evidence showed that Robinson was the only one who
drew a gun during the altercation, that he then seized a gun from
the unidentified man, and that he fired three shots at the man as
the man fled. It was not “contrary to the laws of nature” to disbe-
lieve Robinson’s testimony at his sentencing hearing to the extent
it contradicted the video evidence. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d at 749
(quotations omitted).
Based on these facts, the district court did not err in deter-
mining that Robinson intentionally committed an act which could
have resulted in death, was imminently dangerous to another, and
that demonstrated a lack of regard for human life, such that his ac-
tions could constitute attempted murder under Florida law. Coicou,
39 So. 3d at 241.
Neither did the district court err in determining that Robin-
son’s actions were not covered by Florida’s self-defense law or fed-
eral law’s justification defense. Robinson was not under a suffi-
ciently imminent threat of death, rendering his belief in such a
threat unreasonable. See Fla. Stat. § 776.012(2); Rice,214 F.3d at 1297
. Robinson was the only one during the confrontation to draw
a gun, showing that he escalated the confrontation to the level of
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deadly force. Rice, 214 F.3d at 1297; Moore, 76 F.4th at 1375–76. And
even if the man’s flight was tactical repositioning to attack Robin-
son, the repositioning afforded Robinson a chance to safely retreat.
III.
This court reviews the substantive reasonableness of the
sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard in light of
the 18 U.S.C. § 3353(a) factors. Gall v. United States,552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007); United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933, 936 (11th Cir. 2016) (per
curiam). This court will vacate a sentence “if, but only if, [it is] left
with the definite and firm conviction that the district court com-
mitted a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors
by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable
sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United States v. Irey, 612
F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotation omitted). This
court may not “set aside a sentence merely because [it] would have
decided that another one is more appropriate” because the district
court’s sentence need only be “a reasonable one.” Id. at 1191.
The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of
showing it to be unreasonable in light of the record and the
§ 3553(a) factors. United States v. Langston, 590 F.3d 1226, 1236 (11th
Cir. 2009). In imposing a criminal sentence, the court should con-
sider factors including: the nature and circumstances of the of-
fense; the history and characteristics of the defendant; the need to
reflect the offense’s seriousness, promote respect for the law, pro-
vide just punishment, adequately deter criminal conduct, and pro-
tect the public; and the Guidelines sentencing range. 18 U.S.C.
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23-11325 Opinion of the Court 9
§ 3553(a). District courts are required to “impose a sentence suffi-
cient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes”
of sentencing. Id. They need not give all the factors equal weight
and have discretion to attach great weight to one factor over an-
other. United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir.
2015). This discretion is particularly pronounced when weighing
criminal history. United States v. Riley, 995 F.3d 1272, 1279 (11th Cir.
2021).
This court “ordinarily expect[s] a sentence within the Guide-
lines range to be reasonable.” United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d
1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). The Guidelines range for
a defendant with 24 offense levels and a criminal history category
of III is 63 to 78 months’ imprisonment, U.S.S.G. chap. 5, pt. A, and
the maximum sentence for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is 15
years. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8).
Here, Robinson’s 75-month sentence is not substantively un-
reasonable. First, it is within the Guidelines range and falls under
the statutory maximum. U.S.S.G. chap. 5, pt. A; Gonzalez, 550 F.3d
at 1324;18 U.S.C. § 924
(a)(8). Second, Robinson’s offense was quite
serious and implicated the need to protect the public, as it involved
shooting at a retreating opponent who had not even drawn a gun.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), (C). Third, Robinson’s criminal history
includes a crime of violence and shows rapid rearmament despite
Robinson knowing he was not permitted to possess firearms,
which the district court was entitled to give substantial weight in
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evaluating the need to protect the public and deter Robinson. Riley,
995 F.3d at 1279;18 U.S.C. § 3553
(a)(2)(B)–(C).
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, this court should affirm the dis-
trict court’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished