USCA11 Case: 23-12368 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 04/15/2024 Page: 1 of 5

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 23-12368 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus YAQUELIN DIAZ DELGADO,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cr-20460-JLK-1 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 23-12368 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 04/15/2024 Page: 2 of 5

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Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH and DUBINA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Appellant Yaquelin Diaz Delgado appeals her 12-month im- prisonment sentence imposed by the district court upon revocation of her supervised release. Delgado argues that her sentence is sub- stantively unreasonable because the district court unjustifiably re- lied on the repeated nature of her violations and failed to address her arguments in mitigation. Having reviewed the record and read the parties’ briefs, we affirm Delgado’s sentence. I. We generally review a sentence imposed on revocation of supervised release for reasonableness, applying an abuse-of-discre- tion standard. United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014). The party challenging a sentence’s reasonableness bears the burden of establishing that it is unreasonable based on the facts of the case and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204, 1224 (11th Cir. 2018). II. In reviewing for substantive reasonableness, we do not “sub- stitute our own judgment for that of the sentencing court and we will affirm a sentence so long as the court’s decision was in the ball- park of permissible outcomes.” United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to afford USCA11 Case: 23-12368 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 04/15/2024 Page: 3 of 5

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consideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper fac- tors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Campa, 459 F.3d 1121, 1174 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc)). We have also concluded that a district court’s im- position of a sentence “well below the statutory maximum” can be an “indicator of reasonableness.” United States v. Croteau, 819 F.3d 1293, 1310 (11th Cir. 2016). Before imposing a sentence after revoking a term of super- vised release, a district court must consider “the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)-(D), and (a)(4)-(a)(7).” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Under the relevant portions of § 3553(a), a sentencing court must impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to, among other things, afford adequate deterrence and protect the public from further crimes of the defendant. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(B)-(D). The court also must consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.” Id. § 3553(a)(1). Sentencing courts are required to consider all of the applica- ble sentencing factors. Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355. “[T]he weight given to each factor is committed to the sound discretion of the district court, [and] [w]e will not second guess the weight given to a § 3553(a) factor so long as the sentence is reasonable under the cir- cumstances.” Id. “In fact, a district court may attach great weight to one § 3553(a) factor over others.” Id. However, “[a] district USCA11 Case: 23-12368 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 04/15/2024 Page: 4 of 5

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court’s unjustified reliance on any one Section 3553(a) factor may be a symptom of an unreasonable sentence.” United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008). A district court is not required to explicitly discuss, or state, that it has considered each of the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013). And a district court’s failure to discuss mitigating evidence does not mean that the court “erroneously ‘ignored’ or failed to consider th[e] evidence.” United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007). Instead, an ac- knowledgment by the district court that it considered the § 3553(a) factors is typically sufficient. United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1281 (11th Cir. 2007). III. As an initial matter, we decline to address the government’s arguments that Delgado invited any error in the length of her sen- tence and failed to preserve a challenge to the substantive reasona- bleness of her sentence because we conclude, based on the record, that her sentence is reasonable even under an abuse-of-discretion standard of review. The record demonstrates that the district court gave weight to several relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. The district court emphasized the repeated nature of Delgado’s shop- lifting violations, and it found that the crimes she committed were serious and financially harmed the community. The district court referenced the need for general and specific deterrence and implied the need to protect the public from her crimes. The district court further noted that during one of her crimes, Delgado engaged in a USCA11 Case: 23-12368 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 04/15/2024 Page: 5 of 5

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scuffle with a store security guard, and it found that to be an aggra- vating circumstance. Thus, the record shows that the district court did not unreasonably rely on a single factor in sentencing Delgado. Delgado contends that the district court erred because it failed to consider mitigating factors before announcing her sen- tence. We note that a district court does not need to explicitly dis- cuss or state that it considered mitigating factors. See Kuhlman, 711 F.3d at 1326. Moreover, even though the district court did not ex- plicitly mention the mitigating factors that Delgado raised, it did reject the government’s argument for an upward variance and sen- tenced Delgado within the guideline range, as her counsel re- quested, intimating that it agreed with Delgado’s mitigating asser- tions. Amedeo, 487 F.3d at 833. Thus, Delgado has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in imposing her 12-month sentence such that the sentence falls outside the “ballpark of per- missible outcomes.” Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355. Accordingly, based on the aforementioned reasons, we af- firm Delgado’s sentence. AFFIRMED.