United States v. Miclaude Petion

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

United States v. Miclaude Petion

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 23-11107 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 04/24/2024 Page: 1 of 4

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 23-11107 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus MICLAUDE PETION,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 6:22-cr-00137-RBD-EJK-1 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 23-11107 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 04/24/2024 Page: 2 of 4

2 Opinion of the Court 23-11107

Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Miclaude Petion appeals his prison sentence of 70 months after pleading guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm after a fel- ony conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He challenges the district court’s decision to apply sentencing enhancements for possessing between three and seven firearms, see U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A), and for possessing a stolen firearm, see id. § 2K2.1(b)(4), when calculat- ing his advisory guideline range. The government moves to dis- miss the appeal, arguing that Petion knowingly and voluntarily waived these grounds for appeal in his plea agreement. After care- ful review, we grant that motion and dismiss the appeal. We review de novo the validity and scope of an appeal waiver provision. King v. United States, 41 F.4th 1363, 1366 (11th Cir. 2022). Sentence appeal waivers are enforceable if they are made know- ingly and voluntarily. Id. at 1367. To enforce a waiver, “[t]he gov- ernment must show that either (1) the district court specifically questioned the defendant concerning the sentence appeal waiver during the Rule 11 colloquy, or (2) it is manifestly clear from the record that the defendant otherwise understood the full signifi- cance of the waiver.” United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1351 (11th Cir. 1993). “We have consistently enforced knowing and vol- untary appeal waivers according to their terms.” United States v. Bascomb, 451 F.3d 1292, 1294 (11th Cir. 2006). USCA11 Case: 23-11107 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 04/24/2024 Page: 3 of 4

23-11107 Opinion of the Court 3

Here, the government has shown that the appeal waiver is enforceable. Among the promises exchanged in the plea agree- ment, in a provision titled and underlined, “Defendant’s Waiver of Right to Appeal the Sentence,” Petion “expressly waive[d] the right to appeal [his] sentence on any ground, including the ground that the Court erred in determining the applicable guidelines range,” except the grounds that the sentence (a) exceeded the guideline range “as determined by the [c]ourt,” (b) exceeded the statutory maximum, or (c) violated the Eighth Amendment. In addition, Pe- tion would be released from the waiver if the government ap- pealed. Petion initialed the bottom of each page of the plea agree- ment, and he and his attorney signed the final page under a certifi- cation stating that he fully understood the plea agreement’s terms. Then, during the plea colloquy, a magistrate judge ques- tioned Petion about the terms of the plea agreement, including the appeal waiver. The magistrate judge explained that Petion was “waiving [his] right to appeal [his] sentence except on four narrow grounds,” which the judge accurately recited from the plea agree- ment. Petion confirmed that he understood the appeal rights he was giving up, that he did not have any questions about the waiver, and that he made the waiver freely and voluntarily. The magistrate judge found that Petion pled guilty freely and voluntarily, with full knowledge of the consequences. And the district court accepted the plea without any objections. Because Petion was specifically questioned about the waiver, and it is otherwise clear from the record that he understood USCA11 Case: 23-11107 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 04/24/2024 Page: 4 of 4

4 Opinion of the Court 23-11107

the waiver’s full significance, we enforce the waiver according to its terms. See Bascomb, 451 F.3d at 1294; Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1351. And those terms plainly prohibit Petion from challenging his sen- tence on the ground “that the [c]ourt erred in determining the ap- plicable guidelines range,” since the sentence did not exceed the guideline range or the statutory maximum. Accordingly, we must enforce the terms of the appeal waiver and grant the government’s motion to dismiss. DISMISSED.

Reference

Status
Unpublished