United States v. Romeo Langhorne
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
United States v. Romeo Langhorne
Opinion
USCA11 Case: 22-12412 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 05/07/2024 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12412
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ROMEO XAVIER LANGHORNE,
Defendant- Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 3:19-cr-00218-HES-LLL-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12412
Before LUCK, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Romeo Langhorne appeals his 240-month prison sentence,
arguing that it was cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amend-
ment. We affirm.
I.
Langhorne pledged his allegiance to ISIS in 2014. In late
2018 and early 2019, Langhorne participated in online chatrooms
with fellow ISIS supporters and advocated for attacks on “infra-
structure, specifically government buildings” at times of day when
civilian casualties would be minimized. He also had an apparent
interest in targeting military personnel. After Langhorne shared
his interest in creating an explosives instructional video, he was
connected with an undercover federal agent posing as an ISIS
member who offered to help put together the video.
Langhorne worked with that agent to produce iterations of
a video explaining how to make and use explosive material that
could be assembled with readily available ingredients. The agent
sent Langhorne a draft video but altered the explosive recipe so
that it wouldn’t create a combustible product. Langhorne up-
loaded the video, overlaid with Islamic vocal music, to a publicly
viewable video sharing website that he previously used to share
ISIS propaganda.
Langhorne was arrested and indicted for knowingly at-
tempting to provide material support and resources to a foreign
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22-12412 Opinion of the Court 3
terrorist organization, in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 2339B(a)(1).
Langhorne pleaded guilty, admitting that he had attempted to cre-
ate and distribute “an instructional video intended to teach follow-
ers of ISIS how to obtain materials for explosives without arousing
suspicion and combine those materials to make an explosive suffi-
cient to destroy specific types of targets.”
At sentencing, the district court overruled Langhorne’s ob-
jections to the application of the violent act and terrorism guideline
enhancements. The resulting guideline range of thirty years’ to life
imprisonment far exceeded the statutory maximum of twenty
years’ imprisonment, and so Langhorne’s guideline calculation be-
came that twenty-year statutory maximum. See U.S.S.G. sec-
tion 5G1.1(a) (“Where the statutorily authorized maximum sen-
tence is less than the minimum of the applicable guideline range,
the statutorily authorized maximum sentence shall be the guide-
line sentence.”). Langhorne put a psychologist on the witness
stand who testified that Langhorne most likely suffered from
ADHD and undiagnosed Asperger’s syndrome, a syndrome that
made him more susceptible to “fundamentalist beliefs, whether it’s
ISIS or some other issue[].” Based on the psychologist’s testimony
and cases featuring similar conduct, Langhorne asked for a sen-
tence of just over eight years.
The district court instead imposed the 240-month guideline
sentence. The district court explained that it decided not to cut
anything off Langhorne’s guideline sentence because Langhorne
already received a significant “benefit” by pleading guilty and
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12412
avoiding the government bringing further charges that would’ve
carried a longer sentence.
II.
Langhorne appeals his sentence on the ground it violates his
Eighth Amendment right under the Constitution to be free from
excessive punishment. He argues his twenty-year sentence is
grossly disproportionate to the offense he committed because
(1) the explosives instructional video he helped create provided
faulty instructions, (2) he advocated for striking targets that would
minimize civilian casualties, and (3) he was suffering from un-
treated mental health problems at the time of his offense. Lang-
horne also highlights three out-of-circuit cases in which the defend-
ants received lighter sentences for “providing support to terrorist
organizations” in ways he argues were “more abhorrent and ex-
treme.” See United States v. Van Haften, 881 F.3d 543 (7th Cir. 2018);
United States v. Banol-Ramos, 516 F. App’x 43 (2d Cir. 2013); United
States v. Assi, 428 F. App’x 570 (6th Cir. 2011).
Langhorne acknowledges he makes this Eighth Amendment
challenge for the first time on appeal, and so we review it for plain
error. United States v. Flanders, 752 F.3d 1317, 1342 (11th Cir. 2014)
(“[W]hen a defendant fails to raise an Eighth Amendment chal-
lenge to a sentence in the district court, we review that challenge
on appeal for plain error.”). For a defendant to succeed on a plain
error challenge to his sentence, he must show the district court
clearly or obviously violated our precedent, the Supreme Court’s
precedent, or “the explicit language of a statute or rule.” United
States v. Sosa, 782 F.3d 630, 637 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted).
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22-12412 Opinion of the Court 5
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel
and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. XVIII. “Successful
Eighth Amendment challenges in non-capital cases are exceedingly
rare.” United States v. Suarez, 893 F.3d 1330, 1336 (11th Cir. 2018)
(quotation omitted). “[W]e have never held that a non-capital sen-
tence for an adult has violated the Eighth Amendment.” Id. “Out-
side the context of capital punishment cases, the Eighth Amend-
ment encompasses, at most, only a narrow proportionality princi-
ple” that assesses whether a sentence “is grossly disproportionate
to the offense committed.” Id. at 1335–36 (quotation omitted). A
sentence within statutory limits generally isn’t grossly dispropor-
tionate. United States v. Johnson, 451 F.3d 1239, 1243 (11th Cir. 2006).
See also McCullough v. Singletary, 967 F.2d 530, 535 (11th Cir. 1992)
(“[S]evere, mandatory penalties may be cruel, but they are not un-
usual in the constitutional sense.”). But if the sentence is deter-
mined to be grossly disproportionate, then we must “consider the
sentences imposed on others convicted in the same jurisdiction and
the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other
jurisdictions.” United States v. Bowers, 811 F.3d 412, 432 (11th Cir.
2016) (citation omitted).
The district court did not plainly err in sentencing Lang-
horne to twenty-years’ imprisonment, the statutory maximum for
his offense. See 18 U.S.C. section 2339B(a)(1). That Langhorne’s
sentence was within the statutory limits is a general indication that
his sentence wasn’t grossly disproportionate. See Johnson, 451 F.3d
at 1243 (“Because the district court sentenced [the defendant]
within the statutory limits, he has not made a threshold showing
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-12412
of disproportionality with respect to his sentence.”). And he pro-
vides no precedent from this court or the Supreme Court to sup-
port his argument. Without such authority there’s no basis to find
the district court committed “clear or obvious error.” Sosa, 782
F.3d at 637 (quotation omitted).
Because Langhorne hasn’t shown the district court imposed
a grossly disproportionate sentence, there’s no need for us to ex-
amine the sentences imposed for the same offense in the three out-
of-circuit cases Langhorne relies upon. Even so, Langhorne’s ac-
tions were serious: he admitted he attempted to create and distrib-
ute “an instructional video intended to teach followers of ISIS how
to obtain materials for explosives without arousing suspicion and
combine those materials to make an explosive sufficient to destroy
specific types of targets.” His sentence is reasonable as compared
to those for less or similarly “abhorrent and extreme” offenses. Cf.
United States v. Gibson, 708 F.3d 1256, 1282–83 (11th Cir. 2013) (de-
fendant’s life sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to dis-
tribute cocaine base was reasonable); Suarez, 893 F.3d at 1338 (de-
fendant’s life sentence was reasonable for his attempt to use a
weapon of mass destruction and attempting to provide material
support to ISIS).
III.
It was not plain error for the district court to impose the 240-
month guideline prison sentence. We AFFIRM.
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished