USCA11 Case: 23-14015 Document: 19-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2024 Page: 1 of 5

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 23-14015 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ VISHRUT AMIN, JIGARBHAI N. AMIN, Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus JUDGE CARLA R. PEPPERMAN, in her individual capacity and official capacity as County Judge, in and for Lake County, Florida,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________ USCA11 Case: 23-14015 Document: 19-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2024 Page: 2 of 5

2 Opinion of the Court 23-14015 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 8:23-cv-02345-KKM-JSS ____________________ Before BRASHER, ABUDU, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: Vishrut Amin and Jigarbhai N. Amin, proceeding pro se, sued state court Judge Carla R. Pepperman, County Judge for the Fifth Judicial Circuit in and for Lake County, Florida, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that she deprived them of their Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and acted in a discriminatory and retaliatory manner toward them in connection with certain rulings and other conduct in a state-court proceeding to which they are a party. They appeal the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of their second amended complaint with prejudice as a shotgun pleading, arguing that dismissal was unwarranted and requesting additional relief from this Court apart from review of the district court’s final judgment. Judge Pepperman argues that regardless of whether dis- missal on shotgun pleading grounds was warranted, the claims are barred by judicial immunity. After careful review, we affirm. 1 Whether an official is entitled to absolute judicial immunity is a question of law we review de novo. Stevens v. Osuna, 877 F.3d 1 In addition, Attorney David Asti’s motion to withdraw as counsel for Appel- lee is GRANTED.

USCA11 Case: 23-14015 Document: 19-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2024 Page: 3 of 5

23-14015 Opinion of the Court 3 1293, 1301 (11th Cir. 2017). To determine whether a defendant is entitled to absolute immunity, we accept as true the allegations of the complaint and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them. Long v. Satz, 181 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 1999). We can affirm for any reason supported by the record, even if the dis- trict court did not rely on that reason. Wright v. City of St. Petersburg, 833 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 2016).

“Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from dam- ages for those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial ca- pacity unless they acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”

Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotations omit- ted). “This immunity applies even when the judge’s acts are in er- ror, malicious, or were in excess of his or her jurisdiction.” Id. Ab- solute immunity also applies to claims made in an individual capac- ity. Stevens, 877 F.3d at 1300–01, 1304–08 (applying absolute im- munity where the plaintiff’s claims were against the judge in his individual capacity). Absolute immunity flows from the “nature of the responsibilities of the individual official,” and it extends to state court judges. Id. at 1301–02 (quotations omitted).

Whether a judge’s actions were made while acting in his judicial capacity depends on whether: (1) the act complained of constituted a normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the judge’s chambers or in open court; (3) the controversy involved a case pend- ing before the judge; and (4) the confrontation arose immediately out of a visit to the judge in his judicial capacity.

USCA11 Case: 23-14015 Document: 19-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2024 Page: 4 of 5

4 Opinion of the Court 23-14015 Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005).

Under Florida law, Florida “[c]ircuit courts shall have exclu- sive original jurisdiction . . . [i]n all actions at law not cognizable by the county courts.” Fla. Stat. § 26.012(2)(a). Florida “[c]ounty courts shall have original jurisdiction . . . [o]f all actions at law, ex- cept those within the exclusive jurisdiction of the circuit courts, in which the matter in controversy does not exceed, exclusive of in- terest, costs, and attorney fees: . . . $30,000,” if filed on or after Jan- uary 1, 2020. Id. § 34.01(1)(c).

Here, regardless of whether the district court’s dismissal of the case on shotgun pleading grounds was improper -- an issue we need not reach -- dismissal was nevertheless warranted because the Amins’ claims are barred by judicial immunity. 2 As the record makes clear, the actions that formed the basis of the Amins’ claims fall squarely within Judge Pepperman’s judicial capacity. Indeed, issuing orders, resolving motions, and regulating the court’s docket are all actions that constitute normal judicial functions, and the ac- tions here involved a case pending before Judge Pepperman. See

2 We recognize that Judge Pepperman is raising the affirmative defense of ju- dicial immunity for the first time on appeal. Ordinarily, we will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331–32 (11th Cir. 2004). However, the Amins’ complaint was dis- missed with prejudice on November 20, 2023, before Judge Pepperman was due to file a responsive pleading, so she had no chance to assert the affirmative defense of judicial immunity. Thus, we will consider the issue, especially since it a pure question of law and its proper resolution is beyond any doubt. Id. at 1332.

USCA11 Case: 23-14015 Document: 19-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2024 Page: 5 of 5

23-14015 Opinion of the Court 5 Sibley, 437 F.3d at 1070–71. Thus, Judge Pepperman is entitled to absolute judicial immunity so long as she did not act in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” See Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1239 (quotations omitted). She did not. Judge Pepperman had jurisdiction to hear the state-court action filed against the Amins, and she undertook the relevant conduct in the context of those proceedings. Accord- ingly, we affirm.3 AFFIRMED.

3 Additionally, to the extent the Amins seek relief apart from their appeal from the district court’s dismissal order, their request -- which asks for, among other things, disciplinary proceedings against Judge Pepperman and an order di- rected at the U.S. Marshal -- is outside the bounds of our appellate jurisdiction and we cannot consider it. See Thomas v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n, 594 F.3d 823, 828 (11th Cir. 2010) (explaining that our appellate jurisdiction is lim- ited to, aside from instances not at issue here, “appeals from final decisions of the district courts”).