United States v. Johnathan Anton Williams
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
United States v. Johnathan Anton Williams
Opinion
USCA11 Case: 23-13858 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 01/07/2025 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-13858
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOHNATHAN ANTON WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:22-cr-00308-JSM-AAS-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-13858
Before JORDAN, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Johnathan Williams appeals his conviction for possession of
a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon, arguing that 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment and the Com-
merce Clause, both facially and as applied to him. Both Williams
and the government agree that the judgment contains a clerical er-
ror incorrectly citing the offense of conviction.
I.
We generally review the constitutionality of a statute de
novo. United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 2010).
We are bound to adhere to our prior panel precedent unless
that precedent has been abrogated by our Court sitting en banc or
by the Supreme Court. United States v. White, 837 F.3d 1225, 1228
(11th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks omitted). “To constitute an
overruling for the purposes of this prior panel precedent rule, the
Supreme Court decision must be clearly on point.” United States v.
Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246, 1255 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omit-
ted). To abrogate precedent, the Supreme Court must “demolish
and eviscerate each of its fundamental props.” United States v. Du-
bois, 94 F.4th 1284, 1293 (11th Cir. 2024) (quotation marks omitted).
Section 922(g) of Title 18 of the United States Code prohibits
anyone who has been convicted of a crime punishable by more
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23-13858 Opinion of the Court 3
than one year of imprisonment from possessing a firearm or am-
munition. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
The Commerce Clause reads: “The Congress shall have
Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. Const.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3. We have held that § 922(g) is constitutional under
the Commerce Clause. United States v. Stancil, 4 F.4th 1193, 1200
(11th Cir. 2021). We have also rejected as-applied challenges to 18
U.S.C. § 922(g), holding that the government proves a “minimal
nexus” to interstate commerce where it proves that the firearms
were manufactured outside the state where the offense took place
and thus necessarily traveled in interstate commerce. Wright, 607
F.3d at 715-16. In United States v. McAllister, we explicitly rejected
the argument that United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) ren-
dered § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional as applied to the appellant, hold-
ing that § 922(g)(1)’s statutory requirement of a connection to in-
terstate commerce could satisfy the “minimal nexus” requirement
that remained in binding precedent. 77 F.3d 387, 390 (11th Cir.
1996). Similarly, in United States v. Scott, we held that United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) did not abrogate McAllister because
§ 922(g)(1) contained an explicit statutory jurisdictional require-
ment that “immunizes § 922(g)(1) from Scott’s facial constitutional
attack,” and Morrison did not compel a different conclusion than
reached in McAllister. 263 F.3d 1270, 1273 (11th Cir. 2001).
The Second Amendment reads: “A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-13858
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const.
amend. II. In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court noted
that while it “[did] not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis .
. . of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in [the Hel-
ler] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibi-
tions on the possession of firearms by felons.” 554 U.S. 570, 626
(2008). In United States v. Rozier, we relied on Heller to hold that
§ 922(g)(1) did not violate the Second Amendment. 598 F.3d 768,
770 (11th Cir. 2010). The Rozier decision recognized that prohibit-
ing felons from possessing firearms was a “presumptively lawful
longstanding prohibition.” Id. at 771 (quotation marks omitted).
We stated that Heller suggested that “statutes disqualifying felons
from possessing a firearm under any and all circumstances do not
offend the Second Amendment.” Id.
In Dubois, we rejected a defendant’s Second Amendment
challenge to § 922(g)(1). 94 F.4th at 1291-93. We determined that
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), did not
abrogate our precedent in Rozier under the prior-panel-precedent
rule because the Supreme Court made it clear that Heller did not
cast doubt on felon-in-possession prohibitions and that its holding
in Bruen was consistent with Heller. Id. at 1293. We held that, be-
cause we required clearer instruction from the Supreme Court be-
fore we could reconsider § 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality, we were
still bound by Rozier. Id.
Here, we conclude that the district court did not err in con-
victing Williams under § 922(g)(1) because his challenges are
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23-13858 Opinion of the Court 5
foreclosed by our binding precedent. Dubois and Rozier foreclose
Williams’s Second Amendment arguments. See Rozier, 598 F.3d at
770-71; Dubois, 94 F.4th at 1293. Further, as Williams conceded, his
Commerce Clause arguments are similarly foreclosed by our prec-
edent. See McAllister, 77 F.3d at 390; Scott,263 F.3d at 1273
. Ac-
cordingly, we affirm Williams’s conviction under § 922(g)(1).
II.
We may recognize errors in the judgment and remand with
instructions for the district court to correct the errors. See United
States v. Anderton, 136 F.3d 747, 751 (11th Cir. 1998) (sua sponte re-
manding with directions to correct the judgment, where it cited
the wrong statute).
Rule 36 allows a court “at any time [to] correct a clerical er-
ror in a judgment, order, or other part of the record, or correct an
error in the record arising from oversight or omission.” Fed. R.
Crim. P. 36; United States v. Portillo, 363 F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir.
2004). Rule 36 encompasses “minor, uncontroversial errors” and
may not be used to correct substantive legal errors such as adding
a term of forfeiture that was not imposed at sentencing or increas-
ing a term of imprisonment. Portillo, 363 F.3d at 1164-65 (quotation
mark omitted).
Because the district court’s written judgment incorrectly
lists Williams’s offense as “18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and (a)(2),” rather
than 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8), we vacate Williams’s
written judgment, in part, and remand for the limited purpose of
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6 Opinion of the Court 23-13858
allowing the district court to amend the judgment to reflect the
proper statute.
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART AND
REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished