USCA11 Case: 23-10208 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 02/04/2025 Page: 1 of 11

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 23-10208 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ CARLUS MCKAUFMAN, Petitioner-Appellant, versus WARDEN,

Respondent-Appellee.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cv-24824-KMW ____________________ USCA11 Case: 23-10208 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 02/04/2025 Page: 2 of 11

2 Opinion of the Court 23-10208

Before ROSENBAUM, BRASHER, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: Carlus McKaufman, a state prisoner, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his federal habeas petition. During a state pre- trial hearing, McKaufman relied on a state judge’s assurance of his trial date when he withdrew his demand for a speedy trial and mo- tion to discharge counsel. Because of numerous continuances, McKaufman’s trial occurred over a year after the agreed upon date.

He argues that this delay violated his due process and speedy trial rights. The district court disagreed and denied his petition. After careful review, we affirm the district court.

I.

The state charged McKaufman, in February 2011, with one count of armed kidnapping with a firearm, one count of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, one count of sexual battery by threat, one count of aggravated battery with great bodily harm, and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Eight months later, in October 2011, McKaufman’s counsel moved for and obtained a trial continuance.

McKaufman disagreed with his counsel’s choice for a con- tinuance. So he filed, pro se, a demand for a speedy trial and motion to discharge his counsel. The trial court held a hearing on the mo- tion. At that hearing, the trial judge assured McKaufman that his case would go to trial on February 21, 2012, if he withdrew his USCA11 Case: 23-10208 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 02/04/2025 Page: 3 of 11

23-10208 Opinion of the Court 3 demand for a speedy trial and motion to discharge his counsel.

McKaufman withdrew his requests.

Despite this assurance, two months later, McKaufman’s counsel requested a trial continuance because he needed to depose witnesses. The prosecution also expressed a need for additional time, so the trial court issued the continuance. McKaufman then filed a motion, pro se, to discharge his counsel and void the contin- uances. At this time, he also filed a notice of expiration of time for speedy trial.

The trial court held a hearing on McKaufman’s requests and explained that it was unavailable for trial on February 21, 2012, be- cause of a different trial scheduled for that day. The judge set trial for April 16, 2012, and permitted McKaufman to terminate his counsel. Before that scheduled date, at a pre-trial hearing in early April, McKaufman told the judge he was prepared for trial but needed the prosecutor to arrange his defense depositions. Because McKaufman had to contact the prosecutor for this scheduling, the court issued a continuance until April 30, 2012, based on the mis- understanding.

But the court delayed the proceedings, again, because the prosecutor requested a continuance. McKaufman asserted another notice of expiration of speedy trial, but the trial court rejected it because McKaufman had waived his speedy trial right. Then McKaufman filed a habeas petition to the state trial court. In this petition, he raised a state speedy trial claim and Sixth and Four- teenth Amendment claims. That court denied his petition, without USCA11 Case: 23-10208 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 02/04/2025 Page: 4 of 11

4 Opinion of the Court 23-10208 explaining its decision for rejecting his federal law claims. Based on that denial, McKaufman filed a pro se notice of appeal to the Florida Supreme Court. That court transferred the appeal to the Third Dis- trict Court of Appeal, which summarily affirmed the trial court’s denial of his habeas petition.

The criminal trial started on May 20, 2013, over two years after the state charged McKaufman. A jury convicted him of kid- napping, battery, sexual battery by threat, and felony battery. He appealed the conviction, but the state appeals court affirmed the judgment. After denial of his appeals on direct review, he contin- ued to seek state postconviction relief. In these petitions, McKauf- man alleged ineffective assistance of counsel claims for, among other reasons, failing to properly raise his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. But the state courts denied his requests.

McKaufman sought federal review. He first filed a habeas petition during the pendency of his state proceedings. The district court denied that petition for failure to exhaust state remedies, and this Court denied his motion for a certificate of appealability. Five years later, he filed another federal habeas petition.

In assessing that petition, the district court addressed McKaufman’s argument that the state violated his due process and Sixth Amendment rights by inducing him to withdraw his demand to speedy trial and motion to discharge counsel. First, as to the due process argument, the district court determined that the trial court neither acted unfairly nor with bias. Second, the district court ap- plied the factors from Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), which USCA11 Case: 23-10208 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 02/04/2025 Page: 5 of 11

23-10208 Opinion of the Court 5 assess a federal speedy trial claim, and determined the trial court did not violate his rights.

McKaufman appealed the ruling to this Court, and we granted a certificate of appealability on one issue: “Whether the trial court violated McKaufman’s due process and speedy trial rights by failing to fulfill promises that induced him to withdraw his demand for a speedy trial and his motion to discharge counsel, where the trial was not held until over one year later.”

On appeal, McKaufman reasserts his arguments that the state court violated his due process and speedy trial rights when it moved his trial date despite its promises. The state disagrees, argu- ing, among other things, that nothing in the record shows that the trial court acted with prejudice in delaying the trial date. Before addressing these arguments, we start with our reviewing standard.

II.

Several principles govern our review of this appeal. We re- view de novo the district court’s denial of a habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For habeas appeals from state prisoners, our defer- ence to the state court judgment depends on whether the court de- cided the issues on the merits. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). If a petitioner presents “a federal claim . . . to a state court and the state court has denied relief,” we may “presume[] that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state- law procedural principles to the contrary.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). Put another way, this presumption means that USCA11 Case: 23-10208 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 02/04/2025 Page: 6 of 11

6 Opinion of the Court 23-10208 the state court need not “give reasons” for its decision to be con- sidered adjudicated on the merits. Id. at 100.

When a state court adjudicates a petitioner’s claims on the merits, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 limits our ability to grant habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. That Act requires us to deny the petition unless the state court decision is (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly es- tablished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or (2) “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)– (2).

III.

To start, we determine whether the state court adjudicated McKaufman’s claims on the merits. During his proceedings, on di- rect and collateral review, he alleged violations, among others, of his due process and speedy trial rights. And the state trial court ex- plained that the unfulfilled promise of his trial date did not violate his state law speedy trial right. In denying his petition, the state court did not explain its reason for rejecting his federal law claims.

Then the state appellate court affirmed, without explanation, that determination.

We recognize that state courts do not always expressly ad- dress all the claims a petitioner raises. In those circumstances, “when a state court issues an order that summarily rejects without discussion all the claims raised by a defendant, including a federal USCA11 Case: 23-10208 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 02/04/2025 Page: 7 of 11

23-10208 Opinion of the Court 7 claim that the defendant subsequently presses in a federal habeas proceeding,” we “must presume (subject to rebuttal) that the fed- eral claim was adjudicated on the merits.” Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 292 (2013). Here, nothing rebuts the presumption that the state trial court and the state appellate court ruled sub silentio on the merits of McKaufman’s federal claims. There is no reason to suspect, for example, that they rejected the federal claims for pro- cedural reasons unrelated to the merits.

Because the state courts ruled on the merits of his federal claims, AEDPA requires McKaufman to establish that the state courts’ decision was based on an unreasonable application of fed- eral law or an unreasonable determination of the facts. “Where a state court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the ha- beas petitioner’s burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. “[E]ven a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. at 102. Rather, a pris- oner must show that the state court’s ruling “was so lacking in jus- tification that there was an error well understood and compre- hended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disa- greement.” Id. at 103.

With that standard of review in mind, we turn to McKauf- man’s due process claim. For this argument, McKaufman contends that his agreement with the trial court created a liberty interest.

And when the court failed to hold trial on the agreed upon date, the court deprived him of that interest. He suggests that the USCA11 Case: 23-10208 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 02/04/2025 Page: 8 of 11

8 Opinion of the Court 23-10208 “material breach” of the agreement “left [him] ignorant of his legal options” therefore depriving him of “adequate procedure of proper notice and hearing.” But even if we assume that the agreement cre- ated a liberty interest, we cannot say that the state courts unrea- sonably rejected this claim.

First, the trial court’s decision is neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law as interpreted by the Su- preme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Supreme Court has ex- plained that the Due Process Clause establishes a “constitutional floor,” which “clearly requires a ‘fair trial in a fair tribunal’ . . . be- fore a judge with no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of his particular case.” Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904–05 (1997) (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975)).

Relevant to this fairness inquiry, McKaufman directs us to Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). There, a defendant relied on a prosecutor’s promise in accepting his plea deal. Id. at 258.

Later, during sentencing, a different prosecutor broke that initial promise. Id. at 259. The Supreme Court observed, “when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” Id. at 262. McKauf- man’s reading requires us to extend Santobello to statements made by a state court judge when establishing a trial schedule. But San- tobello involved “adjudicative element[s] inherent in accepting a plea of guilty,” id., which distinguish those facts from this case. The circumstances, here, fail to demonstrate that the judge’s promise USCA11 Case: 23-10208 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 02/04/2025 Page: 9 of 11

23-10208 Opinion of the Court 9 influenced the adjudication establishing McKaufman’s guilt. Based on this precedent, we cannot say the state court’s decision is “con- trary to” clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

Second, we cannot say the state courts unreasonably deter- mined the facts considering the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Looking to the record, McKaufman relied on the judge’s promise in withdrawing his initial demand for a speedy trial—but nothing prohibited him from reasserting that demand later. His contentions focus on the fact that the trial did not occur on the agreed upon date to prove the deprivation of due process.

But that fact, alone, does not demonstrate a lack of fairness.

Throughout the proceedings, the state judge tried to explain the speedy trial procedures to McKaufman, considering his arguments and requests. The judge also told him the benefits of a court-ap- pointed attorney compared to proceeding pro se. Because the rec- ord neither reveals a lack of fairness nor bias, we cannot say the state court denied his due process claim based on unreasonable fact determinations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

Finally, we turn to whether the state court unreasonably ap- plied federal law by rejecting McKaufman’s federal speedy trial claim. We conclude that it did not. In Barker, the Supreme Court established a four-factor balancing test to determine whether a court deprived a defendant of his Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. These four factors weigh the conduct of the prosecution and the defendant: (1) “[l]ength of delay,” (2) “the reason for the delay,” (3) “the defendant’s assertion of his USCA11 Case: 23-10208 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 02/04/2025 Page: 10 of 11

10 Opinion of the Court 23-10208 right,” and (4) “prejudice to the defendant.” Id. The Court ex- plained that “none of the four factors identified above [are] either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial.” Id. at 533.

Applying these factors, two weigh in McKaufman’s favor and one weighs in favor of the government. The delay was sub- stantial, and McKaufman asserted his right to speedy trial. The state charged McKaufman in February 2011 and convicted him over two years later in May 2013, and he explicitly asserted his right to a speedy trial several times. But the reasons for the delay weigh against McKaufman. His miscommunication for scheduling depo- sitions led to a continuance, and then his state habeas petition re- sulted in a stay of the trial proceedings.

We cannot say that, in light of our deferential review of the state court’s decision, the final prejudice factor weighs in favor of McKaufman. McKaufman argues that the trial court’s unfulfilled promise satisfies “the substantial showing of prejudice.” But be- sides conclusory statements, McKaufman fails to explain how the trial delay impacted his defense in any way. The fourth Barker fac- tor considers three interests in determining prejudice: (1) “to pre- vent oppressive pretrial incarceration”; (2) “to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused”; and (3) “to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. McKaufman’s arguments require the state courts and this Court to presume that proof of a delay establishes prejudice. But the Supreme Court has never applied a presumption of prejudice under the Barker test, and USCA11 Case: 23-10208 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 02/04/2025 Page: 11 of 11

23-10208 Opinion of the Court 11 the test itself sets out prejudice as a separate factor that must be considered. We cannot say that the state court’s decision not to presume prejudice was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

Because McKaufman has not “show[n] there was no reason- able basis for the state court to deny relief,” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98, the district court correctly denied his habeas petition.

IV.

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court.