Daniel Andres Rodriguez v. State of Florida

USCA11 Case: 23-13830 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 04/10/2025 Page: 1 of 5

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________

No. 23-13830

Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

DANIEL ANDRES RODRIGUEZ,

Petitioner-Appellant, versus STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent-Appellee. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 9:22-cv-81260-DMM

____________________ 2 Opinion of the Court 23-13830 Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Daniel Rodriguez, a former Florida prisoner currently serv- ing a ten-year term of probation following his custodial sentence for child pornography offenses, appeals from the district court’s de- nial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. He argues that the dis- trict court erred in denying his petition because the state violated his due process rights by using an unsupervised informant to entice him into committing child-pornography offenses. To succeed on his § 2254 petition, Rodriguez needs to show that a state-court de- cision was contrary to clearly established federal law. But his due process arguments rely entirely on state-court decisions about Flor- ida law. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision to dis- miss his habeas petition.

I

We review de novo the district court’s denial of a habeas pe- tition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Trotter v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 535 F.3d 1286, 1290 (11th Cir. 2008). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 provides that a federal court should not grant a habeas petition “with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits . . . unless” the state court decision (1) “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Therefore, although we review the 23-13830 Opinion of the Court 3 district court’s habeas denial de novo, we grant “deference to the final state habeas judgment.” Reed v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 593 F.3d 1217, 1239 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation and quotation marks omit- ted).

Clearly established federal law consists of the governing le- gal principles set forth in the decisions of the Supreme Court at the time the state court issues its decision. Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir. 2010). Importantly, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing that the state court’s ruling was contrary to or in- volved an unreasonable application of federal law. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).

II

Rodriguez’s standalone due process claim was not grounded in federal law, and therefore he failed to establish that the state court’s ruling was contrary to or involved an unreasonable applica- tion of federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. 1 His 4 Opinion of the Court 23-13830 petition explicitly mentioned the United States Constitution just once, in the context of his ineffective-assistance claims; his due pro- cess argument relied entirely on three Florida state-court cases, two of which were based on the due process provision of the Flor- ida Constitution, and one of which mentioned neither due process nor constitutional law of any variety. And at no point in his peti- tion did Rodriguez argue that the state court applied federal law in an objectively unreasonable manner when it denied his due process claim. So, as best we can tell, the due process argument Rodriguez raised in his habeas petition is entirely based on Florida law—and, as such, cannot possibly establish that the state court’s ruling was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of federal law. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 103; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). On appeal, Rodri- guez belatedly cites several cases about substantive due process un- der the United States Constitution. But, even setting aside the pro- priety of these innovations, Rodriguez still cites to no Supreme Court decision that clearly establishes that the state’s conduct in this case violated substantive due process. Accordingly, Rodriguez did not meet his burden under § 2254(d).

III

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Rodriguez has failed to meet his burden of establishing that the state court’s rejection arguments fail on the “merits” of the § 2254(d) analysis, there’s no need to consider whether he properly objected. We likewise have no need to pass on Florida’s argument that Rodriguez’s petition was barred by an independent and adequate state-law procedural ground.

23-13830 Opinion of the Court 5 of his due process claim was contrary to or involved an unreason- able application of federal law.

AFFIRMED.