USCA11 Case: 24-12091 Document: 65-1 Date Filed: 04/16/2025 Page: 1 of 6

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-12091 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ CHARMAINE SAUNDERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus CITY OF LAKELAND, FLORIDA, LAKELAND POLICE DEPARTMENT, CHIEF OF POLICE, LAKELAND POLICE DEPARTMENT, CHRISTINA STEWART, Detective,

Defendants-Appellees, USCA11 Case: 24-12091 Document: 65-1 Date Filed: 04/16/2025 Page: 2 of 6

2 Opinion of the Court 24-12091 MAYOR OF LAKELAND, FLORIDA, a.k.a. Bill,

Defendant.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 8:22-cv-02482-MSS-UAM ____________________ Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LAGOA and WILSON, Cir- cuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: Charmaine Saunders appeals pro se the dismissal with preju- dice of her third amended complaint alleging claims under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and state-law neg- ligence against the City of Lakeland, the Lakeland Police Depart- ment, and Chief Ruben Garcia and Detective Christina Stewart in their official capacities, for failure to state a claim. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 2000d. We affirm.

We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim and accept the allegations of the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Newbauer v. Carnival USCA11 Case: 24-12091 Document: 65-1 Date Filed: 04/16/2025 Page: 3 of 6

24-12091 Opinion of the Court 3 Corp., 26 F.4th 931, 934 (11th Cir. 2022). We review a denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion. Woldeab v. Dekalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2018). Although we liberally construe pro se pleadings, we cannot “rewrite an otherwise defi- cient pleading.” Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC, 981 F.3d 903, 911 (11th Cir. 2020).

The district court did not err in dismissing Saunders’s claims under the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI. To state a claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must allege a policy, practice, or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional violation.

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).

Absent a policy, a plaintiff is required to allege a widespread custom or practice, and a single incident of unconstitutional activity is in- sufficient. Craig v. Floyd Cnty., Ga., 643 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2011). To state an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must establish intentional discrimination. Wright v. City of Ozark, 715 F.2d 1513, 1516 (11th Cir. 1983).

Saunders’s conclusory allegations that the City had a cus- tom, policy, or practice of providing less protection to black victims of sexual assault than white victims were insufficient to state a claim. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“[C]ourts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Saunders failed to provide any allegations that there was a widespread custom or practice of discriminatory sexual assault investigations beyond her reported sexual assault. Her USCA11 Case: 24-12091 Document: 65-1 Date Filed: 04/16/2025 Page: 4 of 6

4 Opinion of the Court 24-12091 allegations regarding prior discrimination involved arrests of black men, not sexual assault investigations. The single incident involv- ing her sexual assault is insufficient to establish a custom or prac- tice. See Craig, 643 F.3d at 1311. And she did not allege facts allowing a reasonable inference that any investigative failures were moti- vated by discriminatory intent. See Wright, 715 F.2d at 1516. She did not identify similarly situated white women who were treated more favorably than her or allege facts supporting a reasonable in- ference that she received different treatment based on her race. The district court did not err in dismissing her Title VI claim for the same reasons as her equal protection claim. Elston v. Talladega Cnty.

Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1405 & n.11 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that Title VI provides no more protection than the Equal Protec- tion Clause because both require intentional discrimination).

The district court did not err in dismissing her claim under the Due Process Clause. “[T]he Due Process Clause does not re- quire the [s]tate to provide its citizens with particular protective services.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989). In a non-custodial setting, “conduct by a govern- ment actor will rise to the level of a substantive due process viola- tion only if the act can be characterized as arbitrary or conscience shocking in a constitutional sense.” Waddell v. Hendry Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 329 F.3d 1300, 1305 (11th Cir. 2003). “[O]nly the most egre- gious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitu- tional sense,” Maddox v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 1109, 1119 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), such as “[a]cts intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any USCA11 Case: 24-12091 Document: 65-1 Date Filed: 04/16/2025 Page: 5 of 6

24-12091 Opinion of the Court 5 government interest,” Waddell, 329 F.3d at 1305 (citation and inter- nal quotation marks omitted). Saunders alleged that the defendants were deliberately indifferent when investigating her sexual assault allegations by failing to train employees, properly handle evidence, conduct an unbiased investigation, and respond to her requests for documents such that they caused her emotional harm. She did not allege that any of the defendants intended to injure her. See id. Even if we assume her allegations of emotional harm could state a claim, we have never held that deliberate indifference is sufficient to state a substantive due process claim in a non-custodial setting. Waldron v. Spicher, 954 F.3d 1297, 1310 (11th Cir. 2020). And even if deliber- ate indifference were sufficient, Saunders did not allege that the City was deliberately indifferent to an “extremely great risk of seri- ous injury.” Waddell, 329 F.3d at 1306.

The district court did not err in dismissing Saunders’s claims against Chief Garcia, Detective Stewart, and the Lakeland Police Department. The district court correctly dismissed the claims against Detective Stewart and Chief Garcia in their official capaci- ties because suits against a municipal officer in their official capac- ity and suits against municipalities are “functionally equivalent.”

Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991). And the district court did not err in dismissing the complaint against the Lakeland Police Department. Capacity to be sued is “determined by the law of the state in which the district court is held,” Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), and police departments cannot be sued USCA11 Case: 24-12091 Document: 65-1 Date Filed: 04/16/2025 Page: 6 of 6

6 Opinion of the Court 24-12091 under Florida law, Fla. City Police Dep’t v. Corcoran, 661 So. 2d 409, 410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).

Nor did the court err by dismissing her claim of negligence.

The conduct of police investigations does not give rise to a cause of action for negligence. Fernander v. Bonis, 947 So. 2d 584, 589–90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). And the police did not owe Saunders a special duty because she did not allege that any of the defendants placed her in a zone of risk. Pollock v. Fla. Dep’t of Highway Patrol, 882 So. 2d 928, 935 (Fla. 2004) (holding that a special duty might arise when officers “place people within a zone of risk by creating or permitting dangers to exist, by taking persons into police cus- tody, detaining them, or otherwise subjecting them to danger” (in- ternal quotation marks omitted)).

To the extent Saunders raises a claim for intentional inflic- tion of emotional distress for the first time on appeal, we do not consider it. Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that we will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal absent extraordinary circumstances).

And the district court did not abuse its discretion in not permitting Saunders to amend her complaint. It had already twice provided her leave to amend and identified deficiencies in the complaint. See Woldeab, 885 F.3d at 1291–92 (holding that a pro se plaintiff must re- ceive at least one opportunity to amend the complaint if she might be able to state a claim).

We AFFIRM the dismissal of Saunders’s third amended complaint.