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[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-12505 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ JEAN DOMINIQUE MORANCY, Father L.M., a minor, by and through her father, Jean Dominique Morancy, Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus SABRINA ALEX SALOMON, GERALD FRANCIS ZNOSKO, ANGELA LYNN LAMBIASE, CARLOS A. OTERO, KEITH FRANKLIN WHITE, et al., USCA11 Case: 24-12505 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 05/08/2025 Page: 2 of 9

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 6:23-cv-00714-CEM-RMN ____________________ Before ROSENBAUM, ABUDU, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: Plaintiff-Appellant Jean Dominique Morancy, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of his request for a prelim- inary injunction in his civil suit. 1 On appeal, he argues, in part, that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a preliminary injunction because it failed to support its decision with specific factual findings. Because the district court did not apply the wrong law, follow incorrect procedures, or make clearly erroneous factual findings, and because under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), Morancy’s case was unlikely to succeed on the merits, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Morancy’s re- quest for a preliminary injunction. As a result, we affirm.

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24-12505 Opinion of the Court 3 I.

Morancy filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against many people and institutions involved with his underlying state court de- pendency proceedings. 2 He alleged that the various defendants had conspired to commit offenses including fraud, abuse of power, at- tempted murder, perjury, defamation, legal malpractice, obstruc- tion of justice, and racketeering, in relation to the state court case.

The district court dismissed the case under the Younger abstention doctrine. Morancy appealed. This court reversed the dismissal for reasons not relevant on appeal but declined to address whether Younger abstention applied, instead leaving that question for the dis- trict court to address on remand. Morancy amended his complaint and a motion for a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order (TRO) or a writ of mandamus.

The district court denied Morancy’s request for a prelimi- nary injunction. The court stated that review of Morancy’s second amended complaint and motions raised the issue of whether the district court should abstain under Younger because Morancy sought relief from state court decisions. The court noted that all of Morancy’s claims related to civil state proceedings and involved is- sues of child custody, child support, and paternity. The court con- cluded that all three Middlesex 3 factors for determining abstention were met: (1) that the proceedings constituted an ongoing state Morancy petitioned in state court in late 2019 to resolve timesharing and child support issues between him and the mother of his minor child.

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II.

We review a district court’s ruling on a preliminary injunc- tion for an abuse of discretion. Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1096 (11th Cir. 2004). Similarly, a district court’s decision to abstain under Younger is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 31 Foster Child. v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1274 (11th Cir. 2003). A district court abuses its discretion when “it applies an incorrect legal stand- ard, follows improper procedures in making [a] determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” Klay, 376 F.3d at 1096.

III.

A party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that (1) it has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered unless the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed USCA11 Case: 24-12505 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 05/08/2025 Page: 5 of 9

24-12505 Opinion of the Court 5 injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.

Forsyth Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 633 F.3d 1032, 1039 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts need not ad- dress the other requirements if the movant cannot show a substan- tial likelihood of success on the merits. Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1229 (11th Cir. 2011).

The Younger doctrine “derives from the vital consideration of comity between the state and national governments.” 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1274 (internal quotation marks omitted). Un- der Younger and its progeny, “federal district courts must refrain from enjoining pending state court proceedings except under spe- cial circumstances.” Old Republic Union Ins. v. Tillis Trucking Co., 124 F.3d 1258, 1261 (11th Cir. 1997). Younger abstention applies to three categories of cases: (1) “ongoing state criminal prosecutions,” (2) “certain civil enforcement proceedings,” and (3) “civil proceed- ings involving certain orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 78 (2013) (alteration adopted and internal quotation marks omitted). In such cases, whether the case warrants Younger abstention is then threefold: (1) do the proceedings consti- tute “an ongoing state judicial proceeding,” (2) “do the proceedings implicate important state interests,” and (3) “is there an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional chal- lenges.” Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982).

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As to the second factor, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that states “have important interests in administering certain aspects of their judicial systems.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1987). Proceedings implicate important state in- terests when they are necessary for the vindication of vital state policies. 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1274. Domestic relations is- sues are historically considered important state issues left to the dis- cretion of state courts. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 434–35 (1979) (family relations are an “important” and “traditional area of state concern”).

For the third factor, “plaintiffs have the burden of establish- ing that the state proceedings do not provide an adequate remedy for their federal claims.” 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1279. “A fed- eral court should assume that state procedures will afford an ade- quate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the con- trary.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The relevant ques- tion is “not whether the state courts can do all that Plaintiffs wish they could” but whether the available remedies are adequate. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

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24-12505 Opinion of the Court 7 IV.

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deny- ing Morancy’s request for a preliminary injunction.4 The district court here provided both a factual background and caselaw and noted that the requirements of the foundational caselaw were met.

It properly applied our test for when a preliminary injunction is ap- propriate and determined that Morancy failed to meet the first prong—a substantial likelihood of success on the merits—because it was barred from considering his claims under Younger. Though the district court’s order was brief, it did specifically find that the Middlesex factors were met and that Younger abstention was war- ranted.

The district court’s analysis was not clearly erroneous be- cause the instant case directly involves civil state court proceedings in a dependency and child custody case, see Sprint Commc’ns, Inc., 571 U.S. at 78, and it satisfies all three Middlesex factors. See 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1275–79. The first Middlesex factor, requiring ongoing state judicial proceedings in which federal litigation would

4 Morancy also requested an evidentiary hearing, and the district court denied the request as moot. While a district court may hold an evidentiary hearing before ruling on a preliminary injunction, we have determined that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a), which provides that a preliminary injunction shall only issue after notice to the adverse party, “does not expressly require a hearing on every motion for injunctive relief.” Baker v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp., 856 F.2d 167, 169 (11th Cir. 1988). Therefore, to the extent that Morancy ar- gues that the district court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on his motion, he is incorrect.

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The second factor, requiring that the state proceeding impli- cate important state interests, is satisfied because domestic rela- tions issues have been historically considered a state interest. See Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432; Moore, 442 U.S. at 434–35. While Mo- rancy’s second amended complaint arguably raises federal issues, the underlying state proceedings he seeks to challenge fall squarely within the realm of state interests, and the district court therefore properly concluded that this factor was met. See Moore, 442 U.S. at 434–35; Klay, 376 F.3d at 1096.

The third factor, requiring adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges, is also satisfied be- cause the court may presume that the state proceedings will afford an adequate remedy, and Morancy did not provide any unambigu- ous authority to the contrary. See 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1279. Morancy’s claims about the bias and corruption of various state court actors are irrelevant to the third factor because the third factor is not concerned with questions of substance or equity, but is procedural, and Morancy could raise his due process claims in USCA11 Case: 24-12505 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 05/08/2025 Page: 9 of 9

24-12505 Opinion of the Court 9 the state proceedings. Johnson v. Florida, 32 F.4th 1092, 1101 (11th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In sum, the district court did not apply an incorrect legal standard, follow incorrect procedures, or make clearly erroneous factual findings when it found that the three Middlesex factors were met and that Younger abstention was likely warranted. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Morancy’s request for a preliminary injunction because he was unlikely to suc- ceed on the merits. See Forsyth Cnty., 633 F.3d at 1039; Klay, 376 F.3d at 1096. Because the district court did not err in finding that Mo- rancy failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, we need not consider the other prongs of the preliminary injunction inquiry. See Bloedorn, 631 F.3d at 1229. Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.