USCA11 Case: 25-10992 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 05/12/2025 Page: 1 of 3

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-10992 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus CLARENCE CHRISTOFER WARD, a.k.a. Khaled Yaqub Mansur-El,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 5:24-cr-00052-TPB-PRL-1 USCA11 Case: 25-10992 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 05/12/2025 Page: 2 of 3

2 Opinion of the Court 25-10992 ____________________ Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: This appeal is DISMISSED, sua sponte, for lack of jurisdic- tion. Clarence Ward, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s March 10, 2025 orders denying (1) his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his arrest and (2) his original and amended motions to dismiss the superseding indictment.

We lack jurisdiction over Ward’s appeal because, for the fol- lowing reasons, the district court’s March 10, 2025 orders are not final or otherwise appealable.

First, the orders are not final because Ward has not been convicted or sentenced. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (providing that gen- erally, this Court has jurisdiction to review only “final decisions of the district courts”); Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263 (1984) (providing that in a criminal case, the rule of finality gener- ally “prohibits appellate review until conviction and imposition of sentence”).

Second, the order denying Ward’s motion to suppress evi- dence is not immediately appealable. See United States v. Kirk, 781 F.2d 1498, 1501 n.2 (11th Cir. 1986) (noting that the denial of an interlocutory motion to suppress evidence is not appealable by the defendant).

USCA11 Case: 25-10992 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 05/12/2025 Page: 3 of 3

25-10992 Opinion of the Court 3 Lastly, the order denying Ward’s original and amended mo- tions to dismiss the superseding indictment is also not immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine, given that his mo- tions did not present any argument that the superseding indictment should be dismissed on double jeopardy grounds or under the Speech and Debate Clause of the Constitution. See United States v. Shalhoub, 855 F.3d 1255, 1260 (11th Cir. 2017) (explaining that (1) this Court applies the final judgment rule with “utmost strictness in criminal cases,” unless the challenged order falls within the col- lateral-order doctrine and (2) that the only kinds of pretrial orders in criminal cases that the Supreme Court has stated are important enough to fall within this doctrine implicate an asserted right the legal and practical value of which would be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial); id. (explaining that the denial of a motion to dismiss the indictment is immediately appealable by the defend- ant under the collateral-order doctrine if the motion raises a double jeopardy issue or if the motion is based on the Speech and Debate Clause of the Constitution); see also Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350 (2006) (“And we have meant what we have said; although the Court has been asked many times to expand the ‘small class’ of col- laterally appealable orders, we have instead kept it narrow and se- lective in its membership.”).

No petition for rehearing may be filed unless it complies with the timing and other requirements of 11th Cir. R. 40-3 and all other applicable rules.