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[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-12648 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ CHARLES ROBERT LEE FUTCH, II, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus CHIEF MATT LIBBY, THE CITY OF PORT WENTWORTH,

Defendants-Appellees,

PORT WENTWORTH CITY HALL,

Defendant.

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PER CURIAM: Charles Futch, II, appeals the district court’s order granting the City of Port Wentworth and Chief of Police Matt Libby’s mo- tion for summary judgment on his race-discrimination claims, brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Protection Clause, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 1 He argues that the dis- trict court erred by determining that the defendants’ proffered non-discriminatory reasons for firing him from his job as a police officer were not pretextual because, he says, they did not have probable cause to believe that Futch had engaged in criminal con- duct. The facts of the case are known to the parties, and we repeat them here only as necessary to decide the case. After carefully con- sidering the record and the parties’ arguments, we affirm.2

2 We review “a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standards applied by the district court.” Valley Drug Co. v. Ge- neva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1303 (11th Cir. 2003).

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24-12648 Opinion of the Court 3 Title VII prohibits private employers from discriminating, as relevant here, against an employee based on his race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, employers are similarly pro- hibited from discriminating against people based on their race dur- ing the making and enforcing of contracts, including employment contracts. Webster v. Fulton Cnty., 283 F.3d 1254, 1256 (11th Cir. 2002). Additionally, “[t]he Equal Protection Clause of the Four- teenth Amendment prohibits race . . . discrimination in public em- ployment.” Hornsby-Culpepper v. Ware, 906 F.3d 1302, 1312 (11th Cir. 2018). Employment-discrimination claims brought under Title VII, § 1981, and the Equal Protection Clause are all “subject to the same standards of proof and use the same analytical framework.”

Id. at 1312 n.6.

There are two ways that a plaintiff can use circumstantial ev- idence to make out a case of discrimination. First, a plaintiff can show a “convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the deci- sionmaker.” Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Second, a plaintiff can use the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDon- nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Chapter 7 Tr. v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2012). We address each method in turn.3

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Futch cannot show a convincing mosaic. On appeal, he does not argue that the timing of his termination was suspicious or that Libby or other employees of Port Wentworth said or did anything from which discriminatory intent might be inferred. Further, de- spite some discussion of this issue in the district court below, he makes no attempt on appeal to argue that similarly situated em- ployees were treated better than him. These arguments are there- fore abandoned. See Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004) (“If an argument is not fully briefed (let alone not presented at all) to the Circuit Court, evaluating its merits would be improper both because the appellants may control the issues they raise on appeal, and because the appellee would have no opportunity to respond to it.”).

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24-12648 Opinion of the Court 5 Futch does argue that the justification for terminating him is pretextual, because, he claims, there was no “probable cause for a warrant to be issued for Mr. Futch’s arrest.” Br. of Appellant at 8. But he doesn’t cite any legal authority in support of his position that Libby’s alleged failure to satisfy the “arguable probable cause” standard has any bearing on whether his proffered reasons for firing Futch were pretextual. And for good reason. “[W]e apply the standard of ‘arguable probable cause’” in false-arrest claims under the Fourth Amendment, see Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1137 (11th Cir. 2007)—not in employment-law cases like this one.

Here, “[i]n order to show pretext, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employ- ment decision.” Jackson v. Ala. State Tenure Comm., 405 F.3d 1276, 1289 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A plaintiff “may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omit- ted).

Futch has made no attempt to argue along the lines laid out in Jackson. Nor can he. The summary judgment evidence over- whelmingly demonstrates that Libby’s proffered reason to fire Futch was not pretextual. Libby testified that he terminated Futch due to his inappropriate conduct, because a nearby police depart- ment—the Hinesville Police Department (HPD)—had informed him of an incident during which Futch was intoxicated, interfered with officers’ attempts to arrest a gunman, and made threats. And USCA11 Case: 24-12648 Document: 20-1 Date Filed: 05/23/2025 Page: 6 of 6

Therefore, Futch has failed to show a convincing mosaic of inten- tional discrimination.

II Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that he (1) “belongs to a protected class,” (2) “was subjected to an ad- verse employment action,” (3) “was qualified to perform the job in question,” and (4) his “employer treated ‘similarly situated’ em- ployees outside [his] class more favorably.” Tynes v. Fla. Dep’t of Juv.

Just., 88 F.4th 939, 944 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). As already explained, Futch makes no attempt on appeal to argue that similarly situated employees were treated bet- ter than him, therefore abandoning the argument. See Access Now, 385 F.3d at 1330. And because proving a similarly situated compar- ator is a necessary step of making out a prima facie case of discrim- ination under McDonnell Douglas, Futch has not established a prima facie case under this framework. * * * For these reasons, the district court’s summary judgment or- der is AFFIRMED.