USCA11 Case: 23-13043 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 06/16/2025 Page: 1 of 8

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 23-13043 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus WALTER CHASE RIDER,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cr-00081-KD-B-1 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 23-13043 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 06/16/2025 Page: 2 of 8

Before LAGOA, KIDD, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: Defendant Appellant Walter Rider appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). On appeal, Rider argues that New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), and United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), dictate that § 922(g) is unconstitutional as applied to him. He also argues that the Second Amendment does not permit a permanent ban on firearm possession that is predi- cated on a non-violent drug offense. Under both Bruen and Rahimi, § 922(g) is constitutional as applied to Rider, and the Second Amendment permits a permanent ban on his firearm possession.

As a result, we affirm.

I.

In April 2023, a grand jury charged Rider under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Rider had three prior felony convictions for unlawful possession of alpra- zolam, methamphetamine, and synthetic marijuana.

Rider moved to dismiss the indictment against him and ar- gued that, under the Bruen text-and-history framework, his posses- sion of a firearm was protected by the Second Amendment. The district court denied Rider’s motion. It noted that this court re- jected a Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) in United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam), albeit before Bruen. But it reasoned that the Supreme Court’s decision in USCA11 Case: 23-13043 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 06/16/2025 Page: 3 of 8

23-13043 Opinion of the Court 3 Bruen did not change the regulatory framework that prohibits fel- ons from possessing firearms After the court denied Rider’s motion, he pleaded guilty.

The district court sentenced Rider to thirty-six months’ imprison- ment and three years of supervised release. We held Rider’s appeal in abeyance, first pending the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), and then pending our decision in United States v. Dubois, -- F.4th --, 2025 WL 1553843 (11th Cir. 2025).

II.

We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo as a question of law. United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 2010). 1 Section 922(g)(1) makes it a crime for any person convicted of a felony to possess firearms or ammunition. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We turn first to Rider’s argument that Bruen and Rahimi determined that § 922(g) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment to as applied to him. 2

2 The distinction between as applied and facial constitutional challenges “goes to the breadth of the remedy employed by the Court, not what must be pleaded in a complaint.” Citizens United v. Fed. Election Com’n, 558 U.S. 310, 331 (2010).

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In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court first rec- ognized that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to possess and carry weapons for lawful self-defense, unconnected with militia service. 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). The Court then con- cluded that “on the basis of both text and history,” D.C.’s law pro- hibiting the possession of handguns in homes violated the Second Amendment. Id. at 595. But the Heller Court also acknowledged that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms was “not unlimited,” emphasizing that “nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.” Id. at 626. The Supreme Court labeled these restrictions as “presumptively lawful.” Id. at 627 n.26. It specifically ruled that Heller only had a right to register his handgun and carry it in his home if he was “not disqualified from the exercise of Sec- ond Amendment rights.” Id. at 635.

After Heller, we considered and rejected a constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on felons possessing firearms.

See Rozier, 598 F.3d at 770–71. We explained, “the first question to be asked” under Heller “is whether one is qualified to possess a fire- arm.” Id. at 770. When making this determination, a convicted felon’s Second Amendment right to bear arms “is not weighed in the same manner as that of a law-abiding citizen.” Id. at 771. In- stead, Heller recognized that prohibiting felons from possessing fire- arms was a “presumptively lawful longstanding prohibition.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). And this language from Heller “sug- gest[ed] that statutes disqualifying felons from possessing a firearm USCA11 Case: 23-13043 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 06/16/2025 Page: 5 of 8

23-13043 Opinion of the Court 5 under any and all circumstances do not offend the Second Amend- ment.” Id. We concluded that § 922(g)(1) was a “constitutional av- enue to restrict the Second Amendment right of certain classes of people,” including those with felony convictions. Id. We rejected Rozier’s argument that the statement from Hel- ler about “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons” was “merely dicta” for two reasons. Id. at 771 n.6. First, to the extent that the statement “limit[ed] the Court’s opinion to possession of firearms by law-abiding and qualified individuals,” it was necessary to the decision reached. Id. Second, even if the state- ment was superfluous to Heller’s holding, we would still afford it “considerable weight,” as dicta from the Supreme Court is not to be lightly ignored. Id. Because Rozier, as a convicted felon, fell within a class of people who could be excluded from firearm pos- session, Rozier’s purpose for possessing a handgun and the fact that he only used the gun in his home for purposes of self-defense were “irrelevant.” Id. at 770.

Several years later, the Supreme Court in Bruen introduced a new framework to correctly apply “Heller’s text-and-history standard.” 597 U.S. at 39. At the first step, the court must decide whether the challenged law burdens conduct protected by the plain text of the Second Amendment. Id. at 17, 32. If the law bur- dens protected conduct, the government must demonstrate the re- striction burdens the Second Amendment right in a way that is “consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regula- tion.” Id. at 17.

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First, a total or near-total ban on carrying weapons outside the home would infringe the Second Amendment right. Id. Second, the state failed to identify a “historical tradition limiting public carry only to those law-abiding citizens who demonstrate a special need for self-defense.” Id. at 38–39.

Applying Bruen, we rejected a defendant’s Second Amend- ment challenge to § 922(g)(1) in United States v. Dubois, 94 F.4th 1284, 1291–93 (11th Cir. 2024), vacated, 145 S. Ct. 1041 (2025), rein- stated by -- F.4th --, 2025 WL 1553843 (11th Cir. June 2, 2025). We found the challenge was foreclosed by Rozier, which “interpreted Heller as limiting the [Second Amendment] right to ‘law-abiding and qualified individuals’ and as clearly excluding felons from those categories by referring to felon-in-possession bans as presump- tively lawful.” Id. at 1293 (quoting Rozier, 598 F.3d at 771 & n.6).

We also rejected the defendant’s argument that Bruen abrogated Rozier, observing that “Bruen, like Heller, repeatedly described the right as extending only to ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens.’” Id. (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 26). Because Rozier stood as binding, it foreclosed the defendant’s Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1). Id. Then, in Rahimi, the Supreme Court rejected a Second Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which prohibits USCA11 Case: 23-13043 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 06/16/2025 Page: 7 of 8

23-13043 Opinion of the Court 7 individuals subject to a domestic violence restraining order from possessing a firearm. 602 U.S. at 684–85, 693. The Court again de- clared that prohibitions on “the possession of firearms by ‘felons and the mentally ill,’ are ‘presumptively lawful.’” Id. at 699 (quot- ing Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26).

The Court observed that in Heller and Bruen, it “used the term ‘responsible’ to describe the class of ordinary citizens who un- doubtedly enjoy the Second Amendment right.” Id. at 701–02.

Even in holding that the statute was not unconstitutional as ap- plied, the Court rejected the government’s argument that a person could be disarmed “simply because he is not ‘responsible.’” Id. at 701. It reasoned that the term was too vague to impose a meaning- ful limitation. Id. But, unlike individuals merely deemed irrespon- sible, “[a]n individual found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of another may be temporarily disarmed con- sistent with the Second Amendment.” Id. at 702 (emphasis added).

In January 2025, the Supreme Court vacated our decision in Dubois and remanded the case for further consideration after Rahimi. See Dubois, 145 S. Ct. at 1041. We reinstated our previous opinion in June 2025, concluding “that Rahimi—like [Bruen]—did not abrogate our holding in Rozier that section 922(g)(1) is consti- tutional under the Second Amendment.” Dubois, 2025 WL 1553843, at *1. We reasoned that “[t]he only time that the Rahimi majority mentioned felons was to reiterate Heller’s conclusion that prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the men- tally ill are presumptively lawful.” Id. at *5 (internal quotation USCA11 Case: 23-13043 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 06/16/2025 Page: 8 of 8

IV.

For the same reasons, Rider’s argument that the Second Amendment does not permit a permanent ban on firearm posses- sion predicated on a non-violent drug offense is without merit.

We, therefore, affirm.

AFFIRMED.