USCA11 Case: 23-10247 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/17/2025 Page: 1 of 6

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 23-10247 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus DEVON MAURICE GRAY,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-20258-BB-1 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 23-10247 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/17/2025 Page: 2 of 6

2 Opinion of the Court 23-10247

ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: Devon Gray appeals his conviction for possession of a fire- arm and ammunition as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Gray argues that his conviction should be vacated on the ground that § 922(g)(1) facially violates the Sec- ond Amendment as interpreted in New York State Rifle & Pistol As- sociation, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). We decided Gray’s case, but the Supreme Court vacated our decision for further considera- tion in light of United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024). See United States v. Gray, No. 23-10247, 2024 WL 4647991 (11th Cir. Nov. 1, 2024), cert. granted, judgment vacated, No. 24-6451, 2025 WL 1020352 (U.S. Apr. 7, 2025). After further review, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

In addressing Gray’s Second Amendment challenge, we begin with District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). The Supreme Court explained that the Second Amendment right to bear arms presumptively “belongs to all Americans” but “is not un- limited.” 1 Id. at 581, 626. The Court noted that, while it “[did] not We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 2010). A criminal defendant’s guilty plea does not bar a subsequent constitutional challenge to the statute supporting the convic- tion. Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174, 178 (2018).

USCA11 Case: 23-10247 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/17/2025 Page: 3 of 6

23-10247 Opinion of the Court 3 undertake an exhaustive historical analysis . . . of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.” Id. at 626.

After the Court’s decisions in Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), which held that Second Amendment protections apply to state and local governments by dint of the Fourteenth Amendment, courts of appeals used a two-step frame- work in assessing Second Amendment challenges: (1) determine whether the challenged law regulates activity within the scope of the right to bear arms based on its original historical meaning; and (2) if so, apply means-end scrutiny to test the law’s validity. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 18–19.

In United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam), we addressed the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1). We held that statutory restrictions such as § 922(g)(1) provide “a constitu- tional avenue to restrict the Second Amendment right of certain classes of people,” including felons. 598 F.3d at 771. Our reasoning did not employ means-end scrutiny; instead, we recognized that prohibiting felons from possessing firearms was a “presumptively lawful longstanding prohibition.” Id. (citation modified). We ex- plained that Heller suggested that “statutes disqualifying felons from possessing a firearm under any and all circumstances do not offend the Second Amendment.” Id. And we concluded that USCA11 Case: 23-10247 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/17/2025 Page: 4 of 6

4 Opinion of the Court 23-10247 Rozier’s arguments, including that he wanted to possess firearms for the purpose of self-defense, were immaterial because felons as a class could be validly excluded from firearm possession under the Second Amendment. Id. at 770–71.

Twelve years later, in Bruen, the Supreme Court replaced the means-ends approach to Second Amendment challenges. 597 U.S. at 19. Under Bruen, courts must first ask whether the contested firearm regulation covers conduct that falls within the plain text of the Second Amendment. Id. at 17. If the regulation limits covered activity, it should be upheld only if the government “affirmatively prove[s] that its firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.” Id. at 19. The Court in Bruen, as it had previously in Heller, refer- enced the Second Amendment right as it pertains to “law-abiding, responsible citizens.” Id. at 26, 38 n.9, 70; Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.

In United States v. Dubois, we rejected a defendant’s Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1). 94 F.4th 1284, 1291–93 (11th Cir. 2024) (Dubois I), vacated by Dubois v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 1041 (2025), and reinstated by United States v. Dubois, No. 22-10829, 2025 WL 1553843 (11th Cir. June 2, 2025) (Dubois II). We held (1) that Bruen did not abrogate our precedent in Rozier because the Su- preme Court made clear that Heller did not cast doubt on felon-in- possession prohibitions and (2) that its holding in Bruen was con- sistent with Heller. Dubois I, 94 F.4th at 1293. We noted that Rozier interpreted Heller as limiting the Second Amendment right to “law-abiding and qualified individuals” and as “clearly excluding USCA11 Case: 23-10247 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/17/2025 Page: 5 of 6

23-10247 Opinion of the Court 5 felons from those categories by referring to felon-in-possession bans as presumptively lawful.” Id. (citation modified). We held that clearer Supreme Court guidance was necessary before we could re- consider § 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality and, accordingly, that we were still bound by Rozier under the prior-panel-precedent rule. Id. Dubois’s challenge based on the Second Amendment therefore failed. Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Dubois, vacated our judgment, and remanded “for further consideration in light of Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 680.” 2 Dubois, 145 S. Ct. at 1041–42. On remand, we held that Rahimi did not abrogate our holding in Rozier and that § 922(g)(1)’s ban on felon firearm possession was permitted under the Second Amendment, and we “reinstate[d] our previous opinion and affirm[ed] [the defendant’s] convictions and sentence.” Dubois II, 2025 WL 1553843, at *1.

Gray’s facial challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) thus fails, as it is foreclosed by our holdings in both Rozier, which held that § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment, and Dubois II, which held that neither Bruen nor Rahimi abrogated Rozier. Rozier, 598 F.3d at 770–71; Dubois II, 2025 WL 1553843, at *1. The prior-panel-precedent rule requires us to follow a prior In Rahimi, the Supreme Court applied the Bruen methodology to evaluate the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). 602 U.S. at 692–702. It held that § 922(g)(8) did not facially violate the Second Amendment because regulations prohibiting the misuse of firearms by those whom a court has found to pose a credible threat of harm to others are part of this country’s historical tradition.

Id. at 702.

USCA11 Case: 23-10247 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/17/2025 Page: 6 of 6

6 Opinion of the Court 23-10247 panel’s holding unless it is overruled by this Court en banc or abro- gated by the Supreme Court. United States v. White, 837 F.3d 1225, 1228 (11th Cir. 2016).

Gray’s challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed by our precedent. Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.