USCA11 Case: 25-10149 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 07/30/2025 Page: 1 of 5

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-10149 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus ANDREY ARTEAGA-VELASQUEZ, a.k.a. Oscar Hernandez,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 8:24-cr-00177-RAL-CPT-1 USCA11 Case: 25-10149 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 07/30/2025 Page: 2 of 5

PER CURIAM: Andrey Arteaga-Velasquez appeals his total sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment for illegal reentry by a deported alien who had previously been convicted of a felony. He argues that his sen- tence is substantively unreasonable because it was driven by a ju- venile offense and the court did not adequately consider his history of abuse. After thorough review, we affirm.

We review the sentence a district court imposes for “reason- ableness,” which “merely asks whether the trial court abused its discretion.” United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation modified). In reviewing the “‘substantive reasona- bleness of [a] sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion stand- ard,’” we consider the “‘totality of the circumstances.’” Id. at 1190 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). The district court must impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than nec- essary to comply with the purposes” listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 1

25-10149 Opinion of the Court 3 The court must consider all of the § 3553(a) factors, but “the weight given to each factor is committed to the sound discretion of the district court,” and the court may attach great weight to one factor over the others -- a decision that is within its sound discretion.

United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1354–55 (11th Cir. 2022); United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015). The district court is not required to discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors, and an acknowledgment that it has considered the § 3553(a) factors will suffice. United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1281 (11th Cir. 2007). Additionally, the court’s “failure to discuss mitigating evi- dence does not indicate that the court erroneously ignored or failed to consider the evidence.” Butler, 39 F.4th at 1356 (citation modi- fied).

However, a sentence may be substantively unreasonable when a court unjustifiably relies on any single § 3553(a) factor, fails to consider pertinent § 3553(a) factors, bases the sentence on im- permissible factors, or selects the sentence arbitrarily. Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191–92. A sentence that suffers from one of these symp- toms is not per se unreasonable; rather, we must examine the total- ity of the circumstances to determine the sentence’s reasonable- ness. Id. at 1192. “We will not second guess the weight (or lack thereof) that the [court] accorded to a given [§ 3553(a)] factor . . . as long as the sentence ultimately imposed is reasonable in light of all the circumstances presented.” United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d

Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

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Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191.

The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the rec- ord, the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and the substantial def- erence afforded sentencing courts. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1256.

A sentence imposed well below the statutory maximum penalty is an indicator of a reasonable sentence. See United States v. Stanley, 739 F.3d 633, 656 (11th Cir. 2014).

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it varied downward to sentence Arteaga-Velasquez to 18 months’ im- prisonment. In imposing the below-guidelines sentence, the court explained that Arteaga-Velasquez had a difficult life, suffered from PTSD, anxiety, and depression and spent most of his life in prison.

The court particularly noted that Arteaga-Velasquez’s prior convic- tion for trafficking cocaine -- his first offense -- had resulted in what it described as a “severe” sentence of 16 years’ imprisonment. In so doing, the court discussed Arteaga-Velasquez’s history and char- acteristics and expressly acknowledged that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors. As for Arteaga-Velasquez’s argument that the court did not give his mitigating circumstances sufficient weight, nothing in the record suggests that it failed to do so. To the USCA11 Case: 25-10149 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 07/30/2025 Page: 5 of 5

25-10149 Opinion of the Court 5 contrary, the court expressly discussed these circumstances and then varied downward. Indeed, Arteaga-Velasquez’s 18-month sentence is below the 21- to 27-month guideline range and well be- low the 20-year statutory maximum. See Stanley, 739 F.3d 656. Ac- cordingly, Arteaga-Velasquez has not shown that his sentence is substantively unreasonable and we affirm.

AFFIRMED.