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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-12732 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ ROBERT WINENGER, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus APRIL MARTIN LOWRY, Defendant-Appellee. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 2:22-cv-00135-SCJ ____________________ Before NEWSOM, KIDD, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: Plaintiff Robert Winenger appeals the district court’s dismis- sal of his complaint against defendant April Lowry, his ex-wife.

The dispute arises out of $54,000 in joint tax deposits that were USCA11 Case: 24-12732 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 08/26/2025 Page: 2 of 9

As the case unfolded, the other claims dropped out and the parties proceeded on Winenger’s § 7431 claim alone. In August 2024, the district court dismissed Winenger’s § 7431 claim on the basis that he also needed to allege a violation of 26 U.S.C. § 6103, and he had failed to do so. On appeal, Winenger seeks to reverse only the dismissal of his § 7431 claim because, he says, the district court misinterpreted the requirements of §§ 7431(a)(2) and 6103.

After careful review, we affirm.

I.

The relevant background is this. Winenger and Lowry are former spouses who separated in June 2013 and divorced in Sep- tember 2013. According to Winenger, in 2013 he made three esti- mated income tax payments to the IRS for the account associated with his social security number, totaling $54,000. In September 2014, one year after Lowry and Winenger divorced, Lowry alleg- edly forged Winenger’s signature on a power of attorney form (IRS Form 2848) and then used the document to contact the IRS and inspect Winenger’s 2013 tax return over the phone. According to USCA11 Case: 24-12732 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 08/26/2025 Page: 3 of 9

24-12732 Opinion of the Court 3 Winenger, during the phone call, Lowry also convinced the IRS agent to transfer $54,000 from Winenger’s income tax account to Lowry’s income tax account. Lowry disputes these allegations, de- nies forging Winenger’s signature, and in turn claims that because she was the sole income earner in their marriage that year, the IRS properly allocated the tax credits to her individual account.

Winenger admits that he knew in 2014 that Lowry had “managed to convince the [IRS] to shift $54,000.00” from his tax account into her own account, but he says that he did not discover that Lowry had used a forged Form 2848 to inspect his 2013 tax return and facilitate the transfer until 2022. Upon discovering this information, Winenger sued, alleging unauthorized inspection of his 2013 federal tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7431(a)(2) (Count I), fraud (Count II), conversion (Count III), and identity theft (Count IV).

On Lowry’s motions, the district court granted judgment on the pleadings to her against Winenger’s claim for conversion (Count III), and granted summary judgment to her on Winenger’s claims for fraud (Count II) and identity theft (Count IV). The par- ties proceeded towards trial on Winenger’s sole remaining claim, a violation of § 7431 (Count I). But roughly two weeks before trial was scheduled to start, the district court sua sponte entered an order due to a “concern about whether Count I states a cognizable claim for relief.” The district court recognized that § 7431(a)(2) “permits a taxpayer to ‘bring a civil action for damages against’ a person, other than an officer or employee of the United States, who USCA11 Case: 24-12732 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 08/26/2025 Page: 4 of 9

Following briefing and the pretrial conference, the district court issued an order dismissing Winenger’s § 7431 claim on the grounds outlined in its prior order and closing the case. The district court explained that “[a]lthough [Lowry] allegedly conducted an unauthorized inspection of [Winenger’s] tax return information, because [Lowry] is not an individual covered under § 6103, the al- leged unauthorized inspection did not violate § 6103.” Therefore, the court held, Winenger “cannot meet a critical element of his claim for a § 7431(a)(2) violation.”

Winenger timely appealed, challenging only the dismissal of his § 7431 claim.

II.

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim, accepting the allegations in the com- plaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Henderson v. McMurray, 987 F.3d 997, 1001 (11th Cir. USCA11 Case: 24-12732 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 08/26/2025 Page: 5 of 9

24-12732 Opinion of the Court 5 2021). We also review de novo questions of statutory interpretation.

Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 872 (11th Cir. 2008).

Here, the district court properly dismissed Winenger’s com- plaint on the basis that his sole remaining claim failed to properly state a claim for relief under § 7431(a)(2). By its plain language, § 7431(a)(2) creates a cause of action against “any person who is not an officer or employee of the United States,” who “knowingly, or by reason of negligence, inspects or discloses any return or return information with respect to a taxpayer in violation of any provision of section 6103 or in violation of section 6104(c).” 26 U.S.C. § 7431 (a)(2). Thus, a claim for relief under § 7431(a)(2) must state a vio- lation of either § 6103 or § 6104(c).

In his complaint, Winenger is suing his ex-wife, Lowry, and only Lowry, so he must plead that she somehow violated either § 6103 or § 6104(c). However, § 6104(c) concerns the actions of “[s]tate officials,” which plainly does not apply to her, and Winenger does not claim that it does. 26 U.S.C. § 6104(c). As for § 6103, it prohibits the improper handling of tax returns by three enumerated categories of people, providing that: (1) no officer or employee of the United States, (2) no officer or employee of any State, any local law enforcement agency receiving information under subsection (i)(1)(C) or (7)(A), any tribal or local child support enforcement agency, or any local agency ad- ministering a program listed in subsection (l)(7)(D) USCA11 Case: 24-12732 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 08/26/2025 Page: 6 of 9

The first two categories listed by § 6103(a) -- essentially, governmental workers -- clearly do not apply to Lowry. Section 6103(a)’s third category likewise does not apply to Lowry because it is limited to certain persons who are authorized to obtain tax re- turn information from the IRS for specific, regulated purposes.

This group includes individuals who obtain tax returns of a corpo- ration in which they own shares, id. § 6103(e)(1)(D)(iii), or persons USCA11 Case: 24-12732 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 08/26/2025 Page: 7 of 9

24-12732 Opinion of the Court 7 who receive tax return information in order to verify eligibility re- quirements for certain government programs, id. § 6103(l)(21). 1 On appeal, Winenger argues that “Section 6103 is not a stat- ute enumerating who is barred from inspecting or disclosing re- turns and/or return information, but rather providing an exclusive list of those people who are permitted to inspect or disclose such information.” But this argument ignores the plain text of § 6103(a),

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As the Seventh Circuit has explained, Congress set out to “limit disclosure by persons who get tax returns in the course of public business -- employees of the IRS, state employees to whom the IRS makes authorized disclosures, and private persons who ob- tain return information from the IRS with strings attached.” Hrubec v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 49 F.3d 1269, 1270 (7th Cir. 1995).

Thus, § 6103 “does not forbid disclosure when information comes from other sources.” Id. Several of our sister circuits have ruled similarly. See e.g., Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, 943 F.3d 627, 649 (2d Cir. 2019), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 591 U.S. 848 (2020) (“We agree with the Seventh Circuit that section 6103(a) limits its prohibition against disclosure of tax returns to returns requested from the three categories of persons identified in subsections 6103(a)(1)–(3).”); Stokwitz v. United States, 831 F.2d 893, 893 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Section 6103 establishes a comprehensive scheme for controlling the release by the IRS of information received from tax- payers to discrete identified parties.”) (citation modified); accord Lo- mont v. O’Neill, 285 F.3d 9, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Baskin v. United States, 135 F.3d 338, 342 (5th Cir. 1998).

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24-12732 Opinion of the Court 9 In short, because Winenger failed to plead that Lowry be- longs to any of the enumerated categories in § 6103(a) or § 6104(c), the district court did not err when it dismissed Winenger’s com- plaint on the basis that he failed to state a claim under § 7431.

AFFIRMED.