USCA11 Case: 24-11250 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 09/02/2025 Page: 1 of 6

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-11250 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus

TERRY LEE GAMMAGE, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 9:23-cr-80120-AMC-1 ____________________

Before JILL PRYOR, LUCK, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Terry Gammage appeals his conviction for possessing a fire- arm and ammunition as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(1). He argues that section 922(g)(1) is USCA11 Case: 24-11250 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 09/02/2025 Page: 2 of 6

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unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Second Amendment. The government, in turn, moves for summary affir- mance, arguing that our precedent forecloses both of Gammage’s constitutional challenges to section 922(g)(1). Because the govern- ment’s position is clearly right as a matter of law, we grant its mo- 1 tion and affirm. In United States v. McAllister, we held that section “922(g)(1) is not an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.” 77 F.3d 387, 389–90, 391 (11th Cir. 1996). Sec- tion 922(g)(1)’s requirement of a connection to interstate com- merce, we explained, was sufficient to satisfy the Commerce Clause’s “minimal nexus” requirement. Id. In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment right to bear arms presumptively “be- long[ed] to all Americans” but the right was not unlimited. 554 U.S. 570, 581, 626 (2008). The Court noted that, while it “[did] not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis . . . of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons[.]” Id. at 626.

1 We review de novo the constitutionality of a statute. United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 2010). Summary disposition is appropriate when “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case[.]” Groen- dyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). USCA11 Case: 24-11250 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 09/02/2025 Page: 3 of 6

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In United States v. Rozier, we considered a constitutional chal- lenge to section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on felons possessing fire- arms. 598 F.3d 768, 770–71 (11th Cir. 2010). We held that “statu- tory restrictions of firearm possession, such as [section] 922(g)(1), are a constitutional avenue to restrict the Second Amendment right of certain classes of people,” observing that Heller “suggest[ed] that statutes disqualifying felons from possessing a firearm under any and all circumstances do not offend the Second Amendment.” Id. at 771. Heller, we explained, recognized that prohibiting felons from possessing firearms was a “presumptively lawful longstand- ing prohibition.” Id. (citing United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1205–06 (11th Cir. 2010)). Over a decade later, in N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, the Supreme Court considered a Second Amendment challenge to New York’s gun-licensing regime that limited when a law-abiding citizen could obtain a license to carry a firearm outside the home. See 597 U.S. 1, 10–11 (2022). In Bruen, the Supreme Court recog- nized that “the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect an in- dividual’s right to carry a handgun for self-defense outside the home.” Id. at 10. The Supreme Court further explained that, in determining whether a restriction on the possession of firearms is constitutional, courts must begin by asking whether the firearm law or regulation at issue governs conduct that falls within the plain text of the Second Amendment right. Id. at 17. If the regulation covers such conduct, it survives constitutional scrutiny only if the government “affirmatively prove[s] that its firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the USCA11 Case: 24-11250 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 09/02/2025 Page: 4 of 6

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right to keep and bear arms.” Id. at 19. Bruen also emphasized that Heller established the correct test for determining the constitution- ality of gun restrictions. See id. at 19, 39. As in Heller, Bruen again confirmed that the Second Amendment protects the right of “law- abiding citizens” to possess handguns for self-defense. See, e.g., id. at 9–10, 71. After Bruen came United States v. Rahimi, in which the Su- preme Court considered a challenge to the federal law prohibiting individuals subject to domestic violence restraining orders from possessing firearms. 602 U.S. 680, 684–86 (2024); see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). In applying the Bruen history-and-tradition test, the Su- preme Court warned that “some courts have misunderstood the methodology of our recent Second Amendment cases,” which “were not meant to suggest a law trapped in amber.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 691. Rahimi reiterated that a historical analogue “need not be a ‘dead ringer’ or a ‘historical twin’” to establish that a modern regulation “comport[s] with the principles underlying the Second Amendment.” Id. at 692. (alteration adopted) (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 30). And after analogizing to surety and going armed laws from the Founding era, the Court “ha[d] no trouble concluding that [s]ection 922(g)(8) survive[d] Rahimi’s facial challenge.” Id. at 693–99. Finally, in United States v. Dubois, we explained that neither Bruen nor Rahimi abrogated our decision in Rozier, which upheld the constitutionality of section 922(g)(1) under the Second Amend- ment. 139 F.4th 887, 890–94 (11th Cir. 2025). Applying our prior- USCA11 Case: 24-11250 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 09/02/2025 Page: 5 of 6

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panel-precedent rule in considering the defendant’s Second Amendment challenge to his conviction and sentence under sec- tion 922(g)(1), we affirmed, holding that Rozier continued to bar Second Amendment challenges to section 922(g)(1) unless and un- til the Supreme Court offered clearer instruction. Id. at 893. Rozier, we made clear, remained binding precedent in this Circuit. Id. The government is clearly right that Gammage’s Com- merce Clause challenge fails under our binding precedent in McAl- lister. See 77 F.3d at 389–91. Gammage stipulated that the firearm and ammunition underlying his conviction traveled in interstate commerce and conceded that binding precedent foreclosed his Commerce Clause challenge, both facially and as applied. So, un- der McAllister, Gammage’s conviction under section 922(g)(1) does not run afoul of the Commerce Clause. See id. The government is also clearly right that Gammage’s Sec- ond Amendment challenge fails under Rozier, which as Dubois con- firmed, remains binding in this Circuit. See Dubois, 139 F.4th at 890–94. Gammage admitted his culpability as to the underlying el- ements qualifying him as a felon as well as his unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of section 922(g)(1). As we held in Dubois, our reasoning in Rozier rejecting Second Amend- ment challenges to section 922(g)(1) remains consistent with Heller, Bruen, and Rahimi. See id. Because Rozier continues to bind us, and there has been no “intervening Supreme Court decision” that is both “clearly on point and clearly contrary to our earlier deci- sion[s],” id. at 893 (internal quotation marks omitted), Gammage’s USCA11 Case: 24-11250 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 09/02/2025 Page: 6 of 6

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Second Amendment challenge to section 922(g)(1) fails, see id. at 890–94. The government’s position as to Gammage’s Commerce Clause and Second Amendment challenges to section 922(g)(1) “is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case.” See Groendyke Transp., 406 F.2d at 1162. Thus, we grant the government’s motion for sum- mary affirmance. AFFIRMED.