United States v. Miguel Diaz Gonzalez

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

United States v. Miguel Diaz Gonzalez

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 24-10614 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 09/10/2025 Page: 1 of 4

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-10614 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus

MIGUEL ALEJANDRO DIAZ GONZALEZ, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 6:22-cr-00157-CEM-RMN-1 ____________________

Before ROSENBAUM, ABUDU, and DUBINA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Appellant Miguel Alejandro Diaz Gonzalez appeals the dis- trict court’s imposition of a discretionary special condition of su- pervised release related to the use of financial credit. In the district USCA11 Case: 24-10614 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 09/10/2025 Page: 2 of 4

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court’s written judgment, as part of a supervised-release term to be served following Gonzalez’s sentence of 600 months’ imprison- ment for sexual exploitation of a child and aiding and abetting the transportation of child pornography, it prohibited Gonzalez “from incurring new credit charges, opening additional lines of credit, or making an obligation for any major purchases without approval of the probation officer.” On appeal, Gonzalez argues that this special condition in the district court’s written judgment is inconsistent with the financial-credit special condition orally pronounced at sen- tencing. Having reviewed the record and read the parties’ briefs, we vacate the sentence and remand with instructions to the district court that it enter an amended judgment that conforms to its oral pronouncement at sentencing. I. Generally, when a defendant fails to object below that the district court violated his due process rights by failing to pronounce the conditions of his supervised release, we will review his argu- ment for plain error. United States v. Rodriguez, 75 F.4th 1231, 1246 n.5 (11th Cir. 2023). But when a defendant had no opportunity to object at sentencing because the conditions were included for the first time in the written judgment, we review the issue de novo. Id. II. Gonzalez argues that the district court erred in imposing a discretionary special condition of supervised release in the written judgment that it did not orally pronounce at sentencing. The gov- ernment responds that the written judgment conflicts with the USCA11 Case: 24-10614 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 09/10/2025 Page: 3 of 4

24-10614 Opinion of the Court 3

district court’s oral pronouncement of Gonzalez’s sentence and agrees that this court should remand with instructions to the dis- trict court that it remove from its written judgment the special con- dition related to credit. In Rodriguez, we concluded that “due process principles gen- erally require a court to pronounce at the sentencing hearing dis- cretionary, but not mandatory, conditions of supervised release.” Id. at 1247. Discretionary conditions include any condition other than the mandatory conditions listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). Id. at 1246. A district court is not required to list each discretionary con- dition individually if it expressly incorporates a written list detailing those conditions at sentencing. Id. at 1249. “When a sentence pronounced orally and unambiguously conflicts with the written order of judgment, the oral pronounce- ment governs.” United States v. Bates, 213 F.3d 1336, 1340 (11th Cir. 2000). If so, we must direct a limited remand with instructions for the district court to “enter an amended judgment that conforms to its oral pronouncement.” United States v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305, 1316 (11th Cir. 2000). But when there is merely ambiguity, “as op- posed to a conflict between the oral pronouncement and the writ- ten judgment,” the written judgment governs. United States v. Pur- cell, 715 F.2d 561, 563 (11th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted). We eval- uate the district court’s intent “by reference to the entire record.” Id. III. USCA11 Case: 24-10614 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 09/10/2025 Page: 4 of 4

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The record here demonstrates that the district court erred in imposing a special condition related to the use of financial credit in its written judgment that was inconsistent with the oral pro- nouncement of the sentence. Thus, we direct a limited remand with instructions that the district court enter an amended judg- ment that conforms to its oral pronouncement at sentencing. VACATED AND REMANDED.

Reference

Status
Unpublished