USCA11 Case: 25-12027 Document: 24-1 Date Filed: 09/15/2025 Page: 1 of 8

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-12027 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus

ANTHONY DEQUAN BUTLER, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cr-00046-AW-MAF-1 ____________________

Before JILL PRYOR, BRASHER, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Anthony Butler appeals his revocation of supervised release and sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment followed by 15 months’ supervised release, minus one day. He argues that the district court USCA11 Case: 25-12027 Document: 24-1 Date Filed: 09/15/2025 Page: 2 of 8

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plainly erred by considering retribution in imposing sentence at the revocation hearing, contrary to the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Esteras v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2031 (2025). After thorough review, we affirm. The relevant background is this. In August 2020, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Butler with theft of a firearm from a licensed firearm dealer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(u) and 924(i)(1); and possession of a stolen firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(j) and 924(a)(2). Butler pleaded guilty to both counts and was sentenced to 42 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release on each count, to be served concurrently. In March 2024, a petition alleging a violation of Butler’s su- pervised release was filed. It alleged that Butler had been charged with three new state law fraud-related violations; he had failed to notify the probation officer that he had been questioned by law en- forcement officials; and he had failed to submit a truthful and com- plete monthly report. An amended petition was filed in April 2024, adding another violation, this time for testing positive for mariju- ana. In June 2024, Butler admitted to the violations other than the new state law offenses and was sentenced to one day credit for time served to be followed by three years (minus one day) of supervised release. In October 2024, less than four months after the judgment on Butler’s prior violation, another petition was filed alleging new violations of the terms of his supervised release. The new petition charged that Butler tested positive again for marijuana (violation USCA11 Case: 25-12027 Document: 24-1 Date Filed: 09/15/2025 Page: 3 of 8

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one), committed a new state law violation for aggravated battery (violation two), and failed to make payments towards his location monitoring obligations (violation three). In December 2024, a fourth violation was added to the petition for committing the state law violation of criminal mischief. At a revocation hearing held in May 2025, Butler admitted to violation one and was found by the district court to have violated the fourth charge. In imposing sentence at the revocation hearing, the district court first discussed Butler’s criminal history and characteristics, explaining that it had sentenced him years ago “for a pretty serious offense, and [he] got a relatively low sentence given the nature of the conduct there.” The court said it had done so, “in part, based on what Mr. Butler had said at the sentencing about how he was going to turn over a new leaf, stay away from trouble.” But since then, the court observed, “there’s been a significant breach of the trust that goes along with that supervised release, and it keeps hap- pening,” including the preceding sentence of home detention the summer before for violations including drug possession. And, while he was on home detention, the court found, “we have this very serious episode here,” which involved a “domestic dispute and . . . broken windows,” and “do[ing] that while on supervision . . . is quite significant.” Turning to the penological interests in deterrence and pro- tecting the public, the district court explained that “[t]his is some- body who keeps engaging in unlawful conduct, and we haven’t seen [him] turn around” as had been expected. The district court USCA11 Case: 25-12027 Document: 24-1 Date Filed: 09/15/2025 Page: 4 of 8

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considered the types of sentences available and chose a prison term because Butler “needs supervision for all the reasons that I said.” The court added that Butler had “lied in his testimony today, and that’s certainly inconsistent with someone who would want to turn over a new leaf and put mistakes behind him and learn from it and move on.” The court concluded that “a guideline sentence would be insufficient,” and sentenced Butler to 12 months in prison fol- lowed by 15 months (minus one day) of supervision. This timely appeal follows. We typically review sentences imposed upon revocation of supervised release for reasonableness under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105, 1106–07 (11th Cir. 2006). However, we only review for plain error procedural sentencing issues raised for the first time on appeal. United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014). To establish plain error, the defendant must show (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affected his substantial rights. United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1276 (11th Cir. 2007). If the defendant satis- fies these conditions, we may exercise our discretion to recognize the error only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. Where the explicit language of a statute or rule does not spe- cifically resolve an issue, there can be no plain error if no precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court directly resolves it. United States v. Rodriguez, 75 F.4th 1231, 1241 (11th Cir. 2023). For an error to affect substantial rights, it must have been prejudicial, which USCA11 Case: 25-12027 Document: 24-1 Date Filed: 09/15/2025 Page: 5 of 8

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means that it must have affected the outcome of the trial court pro- ceedings. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). Finally, to satisfy the fourth prong of plain error review, a court must find that the error seriously affected a judicial proceeding on “a case-specific and fact-intensive basis.” Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 142 (2009). Section 3583(e) of Title 18 governs permissive release revo- cation. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Under the statute, a district court may, upon finding by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant has violated a condition of supervised release, revoke the term of supervised release and impose a term of imprisonment after con- sidering some, but not all, factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id. The § 3553(a) factors require the sentencing court to consider (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense, (2) the history and characteristics of the defendant, (3) the applicable guideline range, and (4) the need to provide the defendant with needed training, medical care, or correctional treatment. Id. §§ 3553(a)(1), (2)(D), (4); 3583(e). Additional factors include pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; protecting the public from the de- fendant’s future criminal conduct; avoiding unwarranted sentenc- ing disparities; and restitution to the victims. Id. §§ 3553(a)(2)(B), (C), (5)–(7); 3583(e). Notably, § 3583(e) does not include 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), which provides that the district court consider “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punish- ment for the offense.” Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A). The weight given to each factor lies within the district court’s sound discretion, and it USCA11 Case: 25-12027 Document: 24-1 Date Filed: 09/15/2025 Page: 6 of 8

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may reasonably attach great weight to a single factor. United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir. 2013). In Esteras v. United States, a district court found that the de- fendant violated his terms of supervised release and ordered 24 months’ re-imprisonment along with three more years of super- vised release, pursuant to § 3583(e). 145 S. Ct. at 2037. The trial court cited the need to “promote respect for the law” under § 3553(a)(2)(A) as a reason for its decision. Id. On appeal, the Su- preme Court presented the following question: “In determining whether to revoke a defendant’s term of supervised release (per § 3583(e)), may a district court account for the need to exact retri- bution for the defendant’s underlying crime (per § 3553(a)(2)(A))?” Id. at 2040. It noted that, “[b]ecause § 3553(a)(2)(A) speaks only to the ‘offense,’ and ‘offense’ here can mean only the underlying crim- inal conviction, [the Court was] address[ing] only whether § 3583(e) precludes the [sentencing] court from considering retri- bution for the underlying criminal conviction.” Id. at 2040 n.5. It declined to take a position on the Sentencing Commission’s view that “the sentence imposed upon revocation [is] intended to sanc- tion the violator for failing to abide by the conditions of the court- ordered supervision.” Id. Resolving a circuit split, the Supreme Court concluded that district courts cannot consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking su- pervised release. Id. at 2037–38, 2040. It reasoned that, when a defendant violates the conditions of his supervised release, it makes sense that a court “must consider the forward-looking ends of USCA11 Case: 25-12027 Document: 24-1 Date Filed: 09/15/2025 Page: 7 of 8

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sentencing (deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation), but may not consider the backward-looking purpose of retribution.” Id. at 2041. The Court explained that a sentencing court “may con- sider the nature and circumstances of the offense as relevant for the considerations set forth in §§ 3553(a)(2)(B), (C), and (D) -- namely, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation -- but a court cannot consider the nature and circumstances of the offense as relevant to § 3553(a)(2)(A)’s retributive focus.” Id. at 2043. As for the government’s concerns that appellate courts could have difficulty determining if a court impermissibly relied on § 3553(a)(2)(A) in applying § 3583(e), the Court noted that much will turn on whether the defendant objects, thus giving the district court an opportunity to correct any error and clarify that it is not relying on the factors in § 3553(a)(2)(A), or whether plain-error re- view applies. Id. at 2045. For instance, a district court may “explain that a stray reference to a § 3553(a)(2)(A) factor was intended to bear on another § 3553(a) factor or merely prefatory.” Id. Where a defendant does not object, “the district court’s order revoking su- pervised release and requiring reimprisonment will be affirmed un- less it is ‘clear’ or ‘obvious’ that the district court actually relied on § 3553(a)(2)(A).” Id. Here, because Butler did not object on Esteras grounds at his second revocation hearing, we review only for plain error and can find none. For starters, the Supreme Court’s holding in Esteras was limited to a district’s consideration of § 3553(a)(2)(A) for the de- fendant’s underlying crime. See 145 S. Ct. at 2040 & n.5. Butler, by USCA11 Case: 25-12027 Document: 24-1 Date Filed: 09/15/2025 Page: 8 of 8

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contrast, is challenging the district court’s consideration of his “breach of trust” after the underlying offense. Moreover, the district court in Esteras expressly considered retribution -- specifically the need to “promote respect for the law” under § 3553(a)(2)(A). Id. at 2037. In Butler’s case, however, the district court did not consider retribution; instead, it focused on Butler’s history and characteristics, deterrence, the need to protect the public from Butler’s further crimes, and the kinds of sentences available. In attaching significant weight to Butler’s history and characteristics while under supervision, which happened to reflect his ongoing unwillingness to comply with the conditions of super- vision, the district court acted well within its discretion. See Kuhlman, 711 F.3d at 1327. On this record, there is no evidence that the district court relied on retribution in fashioning its sentence. And, Butler never suggested otherwise at the hearing. The long and short of it is that we can discern no error, let alone plain error. Accordingly, we af- firm. AFFIRMED.