Tammy Watkins v. Officer Lawrence Davis

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit September 25, 2025

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 1 of 52 FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 23-13616 ____________________ TAMMY WATKINS, Plaintiﬀ-Appellee, versus OFFICER LAWRENCE DAVIS, OFFICER JOSHUA FAULKER, individually and in their oﬃcial capacities as oﬃcers of the Henry County Police Department; Defendants-Appellants, HENRY COUNTY, GEORGIA, by way of Henry County Police Department, et al., Defendants. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-04081-AT ____________________ Before ROSENBAUM, LAGOA, and WILSON, Circuit Judges. USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 2 of 52 2 Opinion of the Court 23-13616 ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge: An old saying observes that “the single biggest problem in communication is the illusion that it has taken place.” That was certainly the issue here. And in this case, that problem resulted in a near-tragedy. On a Saturday evening in the height of the pandemic, Tammy Watkins received a work call. The hospital had just dis- charged a COVID patient. He needed an oxygen concentrator, tanks, and supplies. And she was supposed to supply it. So Watkins drove to work to collect the equipment. She worked at a business at the bottom of a hill, located oﬀ a cul de sac. Because it was Saturday and the cul de sac housed businesses, no one else was around—including at Watkins’s employer. Watkins backed her car up to the building and loaded it. When she was done, she got into her car, looked up the patient’s address, and started to drive up the driveway. As Watkins drove up the driveway, out of the dark, she sud- denly saw two ﬂashlights coming down the driveway towards her. Alone in a desolate place, she feared for her safety. She thought the people approaching her were about to attack her. With only one way out of her workplace parking lot, Watkins accelerated up the driveway. Then Watkins was sure her worst fears were being con- ﬁrmed: the people approaching started shooting at Watkins. So Watkins ducked down in her car, somehow navigated the driveway, and turned to the right, away from the cul de sac. USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 3 of 52 23-13616 Opinion of the Court 3 To her great surprise, police cars were waiting there. Wat- kins immediately stopped her car. The oﬃcers yelled for her to get out. So Watkins did. Then the oﬃcers handcuﬀed her and put her in the back of a police cruiser, where she sat for three or four hours before the oﬃcers released her. Watkins was lucky. Her car, which the oﬃcers shot four times and totaled, was the only physical casualty. The shots did not hit Watkins, and she was not physically harmed in any way. Nor were the two people who approached Watkins. As it turned out, they were police oﬃcers—Oﬃcers Joshua Faulkner and Lawrence Davis. They were investigating a call about a possi- ble truck break-in at a diﬀerent address in the cul de sac. But as they descended upon Watkins, the oﬃcers never communicated that they were police. And in the darkness, Watkins could not see that they were. Watkins sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She alleged that the Oﬃcers violated her Fourth Amendment rights to be free from a “[s]eizure of [p]erson and [u]nlawful [d]etention,” excessive force, and property damage to her car. The district court denied the of- ﬁcers summary judgment on qualiﬁed-immunity grounds on all three claims. They appeal that order. After careful consideration and with the beneﬁt of oral ar- gument, we aﬃrm the district court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 4 of 52 4 Opinion of the Court 23-13616 I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background At around 6:45 p.m. on January 16, 2021, Henry County law enforcement received a call that two people carrying ﬂashlights were breaking into a black truck. The call reported that the truck was next to a yellow drilling rig at 11 Bellamy Place in Stockbridge, Georgia (“the dispatch location”). 11 Bellamy Place sits at the end of a cul-de-sac of commercial buildings. About 8 minutes after the call, Oﬃcers Davis and Faulkner reached the dispatch location. Arriving after sundown, the pair found a pitch-black scene. No streetlights lit the road or cul-de-sac. Oﬃcers Davis and Faulkner approached with their sirens and roof lights turned oﬀ, enveloped in the darkness. Then they parked about 50 yards up the road from the cul-de-sac. They planned to “sneak up on” any robbers. After leaving their cars, the oﬃcers walked quietly to the dis- patch location. They kept their ﬂashlights oﬀ. Oﬃcer Faulkner reported seeing movement “next to the yel- low rig” parked at the front of 11 Bellamy Place. About a minute after sweeping the property, he also radioed that he heard voices inside the building. Over the next few minutes, Oﬃcers Chresha Harris and Alan Yi each arrived separately. They too parked up the road from the cul-de-sac with their sirens and roof lights oﬀ and quietly ap- proached 11 Bellamy Place. There, they met Oﬃcers Faulkner and USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 5 of 52 23-13616 Opinion of the Court 5 Davis near the front of the property, where Faulkner repeated his observations. Suddenly, one of them whispered to turn oﬀ their ﬂash- lights. Oﬃcer Faulkner pointed at a “hatchback” at a diﬀerent property across the cul-de-sac—30 Bellamy Place. As the district court explained, “[w]hen the cul-de-sac is viewed from above like a clock face,” 11 Bellamy Place is located at the “one o’clock posi- tion” while 30 Bellamy Place is at the “eight o’clock position,” di- rectly left of the entry road. The two properties appear in the photo below, with 11 Bellamy Place labeled “Original Dispatch Lo- cation” and 30 Bellamy Place labeled “Suspicious Vehicle Loca- tion”: About a minute after pointing out the “hatchback,” Oﬃcer Faulkner repeated that he had seen suspects at 11 Bellamy Place USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 6 of 52 6 Opinion of the Court 23-13616 “between this black truck and that yellow rig.” No one disputes that this “black truck” that matched the description from the 911 call was a separate car from the “hatchback” the oﬃcers saw across the cul-de-sac at 30 Bellamy Place. At the time, Faulkner explained that he did not see where the suspects had gone. But he later testi- ﬁed he speculated they jumped the fence behind 11 Bellamy Place. Oﬃce Faulkner then returned his attention to the “hatch- back.” And he asked, “Where’s the hatchback at?” Suddenly, some- thing piqued his interest, and he exclaimed, “What do we got over there?” In response, all four oﬃcers quickly moved towards 30 Bel- lamy Place, the only well-lit property in the cul-de-sac. Oﬃcer Faulkner said he saw a lone woman close the hatchback and then get into the car. Surveillance footage from 30 Bellamy Place shows that per- son was Tammy Watkins, a woman who was then 47 years old. Once inside her car, the headlights went on. For the next about thirty seconds, the building’s surveillance video shows, Watkins sat there in the car. Watkins later testiﬁed that she was looking up directions to a COVID-19 patient to deliver medical equipment. And the surveillance footage conﬁrms that she was looking at her phone while she sat in the car. During this period, Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis began to walk down the downward-sloping driveway towards 30 Bellamy Place and Watkins. Oﬃcers Harris and Yi stayed behind. USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 7 of 52 23-13616 Opinion of the Court 7 Some dispute exists over how visible Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis were in the driveway. On the one hand, a surveillance cam- era (which was apparently designed to work in the dark) shows brighter-than-natural footage, in which they are visible. The weather was clear, and Watkins’s windshield was unobstructed. But as we’ve mentioned, it was dark outside, and though the building at 30 Bellamy Place was well-lit, the long driveway ap- proaching it had no lights. The oﬃcers were well camouﬂaged in black shoes, navy pants and jackets, and dark-colored hats. And Oﬃcer Davis also wore a black facemask and gloves. Plus, Wat- kins’s headlights were directed across the driveway, away from the oﬃcers. Oﬃcer Faulkner headed down the left side of the driveway while Oﬃcer Davis moved down the right. Near the top of the driveway, Oﬃcer Faulkner turned on his ﬂashlight, mounted on top of the barrel of his gun, and pointed it at Watkins’s car. Oﬃcer Davis kept his ﬂashlight oﬀ. Oﬃcer Faulkner’s ﬂashlight beam traveled up the parking- lot pavement onto the passenger side of Watkins’s vehicle about 36 seconds after she got into her car. At just about the same time, Watkins put down her phone and put the car in drive. At this point, the district court noted, Watkins’s car was about 78 to 110 feet from Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis. A second later, the hatchback rolled forward and quickly turned towards the gate leading from the parking lot to the start of the driveway. By now, Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis were about USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 8 of 52 8 Opinion of the Court 23-13616 a quarter of the way down the driveway, and Davis took a few steps to the left into the center of the driveway. The record doesn’t say why he did so, but the district court construed his actions to be “an apparent attempt to block the car’s path.” By contrast, Oﬃcer Faulkner moved towards the left edge of the driveway, away from the car’s trajectory. Three seconds after the car began moving, it reached the driveway gate, about 47 to 63 feet from the oﬃcers. Oﬃcer Davis stood silently in the right-center of the driveway, while Oﬃcer Faulkner exclaimed, “Uh-uh,” and raised his gun at the car. As the hatchback entered the driveway, Oﬃcer Davis turned on his ﬂashlight, and Oﬃcer Faulkner yelled, “Freeze!” Almost im- mediately, Oﬃcer Davis dropped his ﬂashlight, drew his gun, and swiftly moved back and to the left, across the driveway towards Of- ﬁcer Faulkner. Within a second, Oﬃcer Faulkner once more screamed, “Hey, stop, freeze!” Then Oﬃcer Davis ﬁred several shots into the front of Watkins’s SUV. At the same time, security footage of the driveway captured Oﬃcer Davis moving away from Watkins’s car to the left edge of the driveway. Still, it’s not clear from either se- curity or body-camera footage whether Oﬃcer Davis was ever in the path of Watkins’s SUV. When the car drew even with the oﬃcers, Oﬃcer Faulkner’s body-camera footage shows, Faulkner ﬁred at least one shot at the USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 9 of 52 23-13616 Opinion of the Court 9 front-right side of it. 1 The entire time the car traveled in a straight path. At no point did it swerve or otherwise change course as if to intentionally hit Oﬃcers Faulkner or Davis. Watkins later testiﬁed that although she didn’t hear anything until the gunshots, she ac- celerated up the driveway when she saw ﬂashlights walking to her because she thought someone was trying to attack her. While the car reached the end of the driveway, Oﬃcer Faulk- ner checked on Oﬃcer Davis, who fell into the grass behind him, next to the driveway. Oﬃcer Faulkner found Oﬃcer Davis un- harmed. Then the two ran after the car, which had left the drive- way. When the car drove about 50 yards up the road, it stopped near the oﬃcers’ parked cars. Watkins’s car never left the oﬃcers’ sight line and stopped less than 15 seconds after the oﬃcers shot. Oﬃcers Yi and Harris reached the SUV ﬁrst. They ordered Watkins to get out with her hands raised. For their parts, as Oﬃc- ers Faulkner and Davis approached, they kept their guns drawn. And Oﬃcer Davis also ordered Watkins to submit. As Watkins backed away from her car, she yelled, “Wait, wait, I work there! I work there!” 1 The parties dispute whether Officers Faulkner and Davis’s firing complied with Henry County Police Department policy. Official policy states that “shots will not be fired from or at moving vehicles, unless the occupants of the vehicle are using deadly force against the officer or another person, and it is the officer’s reasonable belief there are no other alternative means of protect- ing life.” USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 10 of 52 10 Opinion of the Court 23-13616 Upon learning this information, the oﬃcers began to reas- sure Watkins. Meanwhile, Oﬃcer Faulkner secured her and con- ﬁrmed that she was alone and not injured. Watkins explained that, as assistant manager of the business at 30 Bellamy Place, she was picking up oxygen tanks and equipment to deliver to a COVID pa- tient. She told the oﬃcers, “I didn’t know who y’all was—I was scared because I was down there by myself.” Oﬃcer Faulkner re- plied, “That’s understandable.” Later, Oﬃcer Harris echoed that sentiment. She testiﬁed that she didn’t believe Watkins could tell that oﬃcers were ap- proaching her when she ﬂed. And she didn’t think Watkins in- tended to aim her car at Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis. Back at the scene, Oﬃcer Yi led Watkins away from her car. Then Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis began inspecting it. The SUV had one bullet hole in the windshield, two in the hood, and one in the front passenger-side door. Oﬃcer Davis told Faulkner, “I thought she was going to fucking hit me.” And Davis replied, “Yeah, I did too. She was trying to.” Oﬃcer Yi returned to check on Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis. Oﬃcer Davis explained, “We were just going to talk to her because she was out there.’” Ultimately, Oﬃcer Yi separated Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis from the investigation about three-and-a-half minutes after Wat- kins got out of her car and about four minutes after they ﬁred shots. Meanwhile, Oﬃcer Harris secured Watkins in the back of her cruiser. The oﬃcers kept Watkins there, handcuﬀed, for three USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 11 of 52 23-13616 Opinion of the Court 11 to four hours before releasing her. At some point, an ambulance arrived at the scene. Medical personnel evaluated Watkins on site and determined she didn’t have any physical injuries. After the of- ﬁcers released Watkins, her mother and sister took her home. The police never charged Watkins with any crime. But that evening, the Georgia Bureau of Investigation took custody of Wat- kins’s car. Later, Watkins’s insurance company declared the SUV a total loss because of the gunshot damage. B. Procedural Background Watkins sued Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis (“Defendants” or “Oﬃcers”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She alleged they had subjected her to a “[s]eizure of [p]erson and [u]nlawful [d]etention,” excessive force, and property damage in violation of the Fourth Amend- ment. 2 She also raised some state-law claims. The Oﬃcers jointly moved for summary judgment. The district court granted their motion on Watkins’s state- law claims. It concluded that the Oﬃcers were entitled to oﬃcial immunity under Georgia’s constitution. But the court denied the Oﬃcers’ motion on Watkins’s § 1983 claims. The court determined that the oﬃcers had seized Watkins’s person because “Watkins stopped and submitted to po- lice authority shortly after, and because, the shots were ﬁred.” As 2 Watkins also initially sued Henry County and Chief of Police Mark Amerman but later abandoned her claims against them. USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 12 of 52 12 Opinion of the Court 23-13616 for Watkins’s “seizure of person and unlawful detention” claim, the district court construed it as an “unlawful investigatory stop” claim. And the court held that the oﬃcers were not entitled to qualiﬁed immunity on that claim. The court explained that “a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants did not have arguable reason- able suspicion that Watkins was involved in criminal activity when they seized her.” As to the excessive-force claim, the court held that “a reason- able jury could conclude that Defendants lacked probable cause to believe that [Watkins] was using her car as a dangerous weapon.” So, the court reasoned, “ﬁring on Watkins violated her clearly es- tablished rights to be free from excessive force.” Finally, on Watkins’s property claim, the court also denied qualiﬁed immunity. It held that “a reasonable police oﬃcer would have known that exigent circumstances did not permit the warrant- less seizure of Watkins’s car, and that eﬀecting such a seizure would violate clearly established law.” Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis now appeal the denial of their motion for summary judgment on all three of Watkins’s § 1983 claims. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment on qualiﬁed-immunity grounds. Fils v. City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272, 1287 (11th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is appropriate only when the moving party shows that no disputed issue of material fact exists. Gervin v. Florence, 139 F.4th 1236, 1245 USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 13 of 52 23-13616 Opinion of the Court 13 (11th Cir. 2025). On a motion for summary judgment based on qualiﬁed immunity, we “resolve all issues of material fact in favor of the [P]laintiﬀ, and then determine the legal question of whether the defendant is entitled to qualiﬁed immunity under that version of the facts.” Bashir v. Rockdale County, 445 F.3d 1323, 1326–27 (11th Cir. 2006). We don’t make credibility determinations or choose be- tween conﬂicting testimony. Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1267– 68 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). III. DISCUSSION Watkins alleges three violations of her Fourth Amendment rights: a “seizure of person and unlawful detention,” the use of ex- cessive force, and an unlawful seizure of her property. The Oﬃcers argue that they are entitled to qualiﬁed immunity on all three of Watkins’s claims because they say (1) they never seized her or her vehicle, (2) they did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and (3) they did not violate clearly established law. We begin by quickly reviewing the principles of qualiﬁed immunity. To invoke qualiﬁed immunity, an oﬃcial must ﬁrst show that he “was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority” when he engaged in the challenged acts. Alcocer v. Mills, 906 F.3d 944, 951 (11th Cir. 2018). Watkins concedes that the Oﬃcers did that. As a result, the burden shifts to Watkins to show that the Of- ﬁcers aren’t entitled to qualiﬁed immunity. Id. To do that, Watkins must establish “both that the [O]fficer[s’] conduct violated a constitutionally protected right and USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 14 of 52 14 Opinion of the Court 23-13616 that the right was clearly established at the time of the miscon- duct.” Id. Whether a right is “clearly established” raises an objec- tive question. Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1165 (11th Cir. 2000). And “a police officer is entitled to qualified immunity if a reasona- ble police officer could have believed his or her actions were lawful in light of clearly established law and the information possessed by the officer at the time the conduct occurred.” Id. Watkins can show the law was “clearly established” in any of three ways: (1) she can identify a qualifying case with “indistin- guishable facts,” (2) she can rely on “a broad statement of principle within the Constitution, statute, or case law,” or (3) she can show that the Officers’ behavior was “so egregious” that it was obvious “a constitutional right was clearly violated, even in the total ab- sence of case law.” Gervin, 139 F.4th at 1261. The caselaw she can cite to support this showing includes the “binding decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, this Court, and the highest court of” Georgia. Glasscox v. City of Argo, 903 F.3d 1207, 1217 (11th Cir. 2018). But we can also “consider persuasive out-of-circuit au- thority to determine whether a violation was of ‘obvious clarity.’” Gilmore v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 144 F.4th 1246, 1259 (11th Cir. 2025) (en banc). We analyze each Defendant’s actions and omissions sepa- rately when we consider whether Watkins carried her burden to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate. Alcocer, 906 F.3d at 951. USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 15 of 52 23-13616 Opinion of the Court 15 Watkins alleges Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis violated the Fourth Amendment. As relevant here, that amendment guaran- tees that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their per- sons . . . and eﬀects, against unreasonable . . . seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. “The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” Barnes v. Felix, 145 S. Ct. 1353, 1358 (2025) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Being a police oﬃcer is a hard job, and we are indebted to oﬃcers who regularly put their lives on the line to keep us safe. That said, oﬃcers have a responsibility to exercise their authority— especially when it’s obvious it could cause injury or death to civil- ians—reasonably and with common sense. When we view the ev- idence in the light most favorable to Watkins, we must conclude that a genuine question of fact exists here as to whether the Oﬃc- ers did that. Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis were assigned to respond to a report of two individuals breaking into a truck at 11 Bellamy Place. Yet they went to 30 Bellamy Place, where they saw a lone woman and a hatchback car (not a truck). They had no grounds to suspect her of any wrongdoing. Still, in darkness and eﬀectively camouﬂaged, they ap- proached her without identifying themselves. Then they de- manded that she, a woman driving alone on an isolated driveway, with only one way out, immediately stop for them. And when she tried to escape from what a reasonable person would have thought USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 16 of 52 16 Opinion of the Court 23-13616 was a dangerous situation, without any warning, they repeatedly ﬁred their weapons at her. As we explain below, a reasonable jury could conclude that no reasonable oﬃcer would have thought Watkins a threat, that no reasonable oﬃcer would have shot at her, and that no reasonable oﬃcer would have acted as Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis did. So we aﬃrm the denial of summary judgment on qualiﬁed-immunity grounds on all three of Watkins’s claims. We address each claim individually in turn. A. Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis seized Watkins’s person. Before we consider Watkins’s “seizure of person and unlaw- ful detention” and excessive-force claims, we must ﬁrst assess whether Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis seized Watkins’s person. That’s so because, as relevant here, the Fourth Amendment’s pro- tections kick in when an oﬃcer engages in a “seizure of the per- son.” See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 625 (1991). An oﬃcer may eﬀect a “seizure of the person” in one of two ways. He may either use physical force, or even with no force, he may seize a person by securing the person’s “submission to the as- sertion of authority.” Id. at 626 (emphasis altered). “[E]ach type of seizure enjoys a separate common law pedigree that gives rise to a separate rule.” Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306, 322 (2021). The Oﬃcers argue they never seized Watkins. Instead, they say, they “ﬁred in self-defense not in an eﬀort to detain [Watkins]” and “did not hit [Watkins].” Plus, they argue, “[Watkins] did not stop due to gunﬁre.” USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 17 of 52 23-13616 Opinion of the Court 17 But we disagree with the Oﬃcers’ assessment. Under both the physical-force and the submission-of-authority tests, Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis seized Watkins. 1. Physical Force We ﬁrst consider whether the Oﬃcers used physical force to seize Watkins. Everyone agrees on the basic facts that constrain our analysis. Together, the Oﬃcers intentionally shot Watkins’s car four times as she was driving it. Oﬃcer Davis hit the car three times, and Oﬃcer Faulkner hit the car once. But no bullet pierced Watkins’s ﬂesh. So we must determine whether intentionally ﬁring at and hitting Watkins’s car constituted a seizure of Watkins as the car’s driver. We hold that it did. We begin with Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306. In Torres, the Court considered what it means to seize a person using physical force. See id. Similarly to the facts here, in Torres, oﬃcers ﬁred their guns at Roxanne Torres as she drove her car away from them, mistakenly thinking they were carjackers. Id. at 30910. But unlike here, two of the oﬃcers’ thirteen shots hit Torres’s back. Id. at 310. She sought damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. To determine whether the oﬃcers seized Torres, the Su- preme Court “consult[ed] the common law of arrest, the ‘quintes- sential “seizure of the person” under our Fourth Amendment ju- risprudence.’” Id. at 311 (quoting Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 624). Not- ing that law enforcement didn’t carry ﬁrearms until the second half of the nineteenth century, the Court looked in the common law for USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 18 of 52 18 Opinion of the Court 23-13616 an analogy to the use of a bullet to seize a person. See id. at 315– 16. And it found one. In Countess of Rutland’s Case (1605), Co. Rep. 52b, 77 Eng. Rep. 332, serjeants-at-mace had to execute a writ for a judgment of debt against the Countess of Rutland. Torres, 592 U.S. at 315. To do so, they “shewed her their mace, and touching her body with it, said to her, we arrest you, madam.” Id. (quoting Countess of Rutland’s Case, 6 Co. Rep. at 54a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 336). The Court understood Countess “as an example of an arrest [or seizure] made by touching with an object . . . .” Id. And it found “no basis for drawing an artiﬁcial line between grasping with a hand and other means of applying physical force to eﬀect an arrest [seizure].” Id. at 316. So, the Court reasoned, “[t]he required ‘cor- poral seising or touching the defendant’s body’ can be as readily accomplished by a bullet as by the end of a ﬁnger.” Id. (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 228 (1768)). Indeed, the Court explained, “[w]e will not carve out this greater intrusion on personal security from the mere-touch rule just because founding-era courts did not confront apprehen- sion by ﬁrearm.” Id. Still, the Court cautioned, not every physical contact be- tween law enforcement and a member of the public amounts to a Fourth Amendment seizure. Id. at 317. Rather, two things are nec- essary for a Fourth Amendment seizure: (1) “the use of force with [(2)] intent to restrain.” Id. Indeed, the combination of these two USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 19 of 52 23-13616 Opinion of the Court 19 things eﬀects a seizure even when it does not manage to restrain the person. Id. at 313. We consider each requirement. First, “the use of force”: Torres and Countess teach that “a mere touch” can be enough “force” to eﬀect a seizure. See Torres, 592 U.S. at 317. And that “mere touch” may be indirect—through an object like a mace or a bullet. See id. at 316. But that’s not all. Torres ﬁnds more guidance in an analogy to common-law torts, speciﬁcally the tort of false imprisonment, to conclude “that the common law considered touching to be a sei- zure.” Id. at 320; cf. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (“[F]or most of our history the Fourth Amendment was under- stood to embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas” including “persons” that “it enumerates.”). As the Court explained, “false imprisonment required ‘conﬁne- ment’ . . . .” Torres, 592 U.S. at 320. But “conﬁnement,” in turn, consisted of “no more than that the defendant ‘had for one mo- ment taken possession of the plaintiﬀ’s person’—including, ‘for ex- ample, if he had tapped her on the shoulder, and said, “You are my prisoner.”’” Id. So we follow the Supreme Court’s lead and look to the com- mon law for guidance on the meaning of “touch” and “force” more generally. See id. at 314 (looking to the common-law meaning of “force” and noting that “‘[t]he least touching of another’s person’ could satisfy the common law deﬁnition of force to commit bat- tery, ‘for the law cannot draw the line between diﬀerent degrees of USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 20 of 52 20 Opinion of the Court 23-13616 violence’” (alteration in original) (quoting BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra, at 120); cf. Jones, 565 U.S. at 405–08 (“[O]ur Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law tres- pass, at least until the latter half of the 20th century,” and looking to common-law trespass for guidance in determining whether the use of a GPS tracking device was a search under the Fourth Amendment). The common law had much to say about the con- cept of “touch.” Indeed, common-law “touch” extended beyond just person-to-person contact. For example, the common law deﬁned the “crime of bat- tery” as the “intentional application of unlawful force against the person of another” with force “satisﬁed by even the slightest oﬀen- sive touching.” Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 139 (2010) (cit- ing BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra, at 120); cf. Torres, 592 U.S. at 314 (looking to the deﬁnition of “force” for battery actions to discern the “force” necessary to sustain an arrest). And that touch- ing extended to “anything attached to the person” that through its attachment “partakes of [a person’s] inviolability.” Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall) 111, 114 (O.T. Phila. 1784). So “[t]hough no great bodily pain is suﬀered by a blow on the palm of the hand, or the skirt of the coat, . . . these are clearly within the legal d[e]ﬁ- nition of Assault and Battery . . . .” Johnson, 559 U.S. at 146 (Alito, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (second altera- tion in original) (quoting Respublica, 1 U.S. at 114). But the concept of “touch” did not end with a person’s cloth- ing. Rather, as early as the seventeenth through nineteenth USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 21 of 52 23-13616 Opinion of the Court 21 centuries, courts and scholars evaluating assault-and-battery claims recognized that hitting a horse amounted to a strike upon its rider. See, e.g., Dodwell v. Burford (1669), 86 Eng. Rep. 703, 703; 1 Mod. 25, 25 (“The plaintiﬀs, in an action of battery declared, that the defend- ant struck the horse whereon the wife rode, so that the horse ran away with her, whereby she was thrown down, and another horse ran over her . . . .”); Bannister v. Fisher (1808), 127 Eng. Rep. 872, 872; 1 Taunt. 358, 358 (“The Defendant could not assault the horse while the man was on it, without assaulting the man.”); State v. Da- vis, 19 S.C.L. (1 Hill) 46, 47 (1833) (“It has been held that . . . striking violently . . . the horse on which [a person] rides, is an assault; The thing in th[is] instance[] partaking of the personal inviolability.”); ISAAC ESPINASSE, DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ACTIONS AND TRIALS AT NISI PRIUS 174 (3d ed. 1811) (“[I]f any person had whipped [a] horse, and made him runaway with the rider, and hurt . . . the rider him- self, he would be liable who had whipped the horse.” (emphasis omitted)); ARCHIBALD JOHN STEPHENS, LAW OF NISI PRIUS, EVIDENCE IN CIVIL ACTIONS, AND ARBITRATION & AWARDS 210–11 (1842) (recognizing a battery “where the plaintiﬀ declared that the defendant struck the horse whereon his wife rode, so that the horse ran away with her, whereby she was thrown down, and another horse ran over her”); FRANCIS WHARTON, TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW § 617 (9th ed. 1885) (“A battery is an assault in which force is applied, by material agencies, to the person of another, either me- diately or immediately . . . . The force may be applied through con- ductors more or less close. Thus to strike . . . the horse on which he is riding . . . may be as much a battery as to strike his face . . . .”); USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 22 of 52 22 Opinion of the Court 23-13616 cf. Storey v. Robinson (1795), 101 Eng. Rep. 476, 479; 6 T.R. 138, 139 (holding that it is illegal to distrain a horse with a rider on it). And that was so whether the victim rode on the horse’s back or inside a carriage that the horse pulled. Marentille v. Oliver, 2 N.J.L. 379, 380 (1808) (opinion of Pennington, J.) (“To attack and strike with a club, with violence, the horse before a carriage, in which a person is riding, strikes me as an assault on the person . . . .”); ESPINASSE, DIGEST, supra, at 173 (“Striking any thing attached to a person, . . . if intended as a rudeness and aﬀront, is a battery. So striking . . . horses before a carriage in which a person was riding, was held to be an assault upon the person. In [that] case[] the sub- ject partaking of the personal inviolability.”); HENRY G. COTTON, TREATISE ON THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE PEACE IN THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 220 (1845) (“Striking violently, with a club, horses before a carriage in which a person was riding, was held to be an assault upon the person.”). Similarly, courts held, and scholars recognized, that contact with a cart or wagon could support a claim of assault on a rider. See, e.g., Hopper v. Reeve (1817), 129 Eng. Rep. 278, 278; 7 Taunt. 699, 699 (“It is a direct trespass to injure the person of another by driving a carriage against the carriage wherein such person is sitting . . . .”); People v. Lee, 1 Wheeler Crim. Cas. 364, 365 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1823) (“[T]he conduct of the defendant, in attempting to run against the wagon of the prosecutor, was clearly an assault; his horse and cart was merely a machine, and could as well be directed against the prosecutor as any other inanimate object.”); ARCHIBALD JOHN USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 23 of 52 23-13616 Opinion of the Court 23 STEPHENS, LAW OF NISI PRIUS, supra, at 208 (“[U]psetting a carriage or chair in which a person is sitting, is a trespass against the per- son . . . .”); HENRY G. COTTON, TREATISE ON THE POWERS AND DUTIES, supra, at 220 (“It is an assault to attempt to run against the wagon of another person on the highway. The horse and cart of the defendant being merely a machine, could as well be directed against the prosecutor as an inanimate object.”). Put simply, then, at common law, touching a person’s horse or carriage—directly or indirectly—while the person rode amounted to touching their person. So under Torres’s rule, touch- ing a rider’s horse or carriage committed the necessary “force” to eﬀect a seizure because the common law understood the touch as a touch of the person. See Torres, 592 U.S. at 313–18, 325. We see no material diﬀerence from an oﬃcer’s bullet that strikes the car of a person driving it. Of course, we don’t see many horse-drawn carriages anymore. But that’s so because cars took their place. So if touching a carriage or the horse drawing it counted as the “force” necessary to eﬀect a seizure of the rider in- side the carriage, then touching a car with a driver inside it also amounts to the “force” necessary to eﬀect a seizure of the driver. And because Torres teaches that touching with a bullet is the same thing as touching with a hand, the Oﬃcers’ shots that hit Watkins’s car were the necessary “force” to satisfy the ﬁrst requirement of eﬀecting a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. That brings us to the second requirement for a seizure: “in- tent to restrain.” Torres, 592 U.S. at 317 (emphasis altered). We USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 24 of 52 24 Opinion of the Court 23-13616 assess whether the Oﬃcers intended to restrain by asking “whether the challenged conduct objectively manifests an intent to restrain.” Id. In conducting our analysis, we don’t consider “the subjective perceptions of the seized person.” Id. Once again, we look to Torres for guidance. There, the Court concluded that shooting at Torres’s car “objectively mani- fested an intent to restrain her from driving away.” Id. at 318. We discern no basis for distinguishing Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis’s shooting of Watkins’s car. So we conclude that the oﬃcers “in- ten[ded] to restrain” Watkins when they shot her car. Because Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis both used force to indi- rectly touch Watkins when they shot the car she was driving and they intended to restrain her at that time, they eﬀected a seizure by physical force of Watkins under the Fourth Amendment. We know some of our sister circuits have concluded that shooting a car to restrain the driver does not eﬀect a seizure by physical force. 3 But the courts decided each of these cases without 3 See Bella v. Chamberlain, 24 F.3d 1251, 1255–56 (10th Cir. 1994); Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1332–33 (8th Cir. 1993); Adams v. City of Auburn Hills, 336 F.3d 515, 519 (6th Cir. 2003). By contrast, the Fifth Circuit has held that in a case like this one, where an officer shot a car, damaged it, and caused the driver to exit to investigate the noise, the officer committed a seizure by physical force. Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 396–97 (5th Cir. 2004); cf. Schultz v. Braga, 455 F.3d 470, 483 (4th Cir. 2006) (refusing to follow Flores where a shot did not intentionally terminate the freedom of movement of a passenger plaintiff but declining to rule on whether “a suspect must be physically struck by a bullet (or any other object) to state a claim for excessive force”). USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 25 of 52 23-13616 Opinion of the Court 25 the beneﬁt of Torres’s guidance. 4 And now that we have that, Torres causes us to conclude that shooting a car to restrain the driver does eﬀect a seizure. Troupe v. Sarasota County, 419 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2005), does not require a diﬀerent answer. There, an oﬃcer attempted to “dis- able [a] car” by ﬁring “a single shot at a low angle, aiming for the lower portion of the tire.” Id. at 1164 (internal quotation marks omitted). But the oﬃcer “missed the tire and, apparently, did not strike anyone or anything.” Id. So we found no seizure. Id. at 1167. Though we decided Troupe years before the Supreme Court issued Torres, our answer makes sense even under Torres because no touch occurred when the bullet missed, so no “force” took place, as the common law understood that concept. 5 4 We similarly concluded in an unpublished opinion four years before the Su- preme Court issued Torres that shooting and hitting a car does not seize the driver. See Reed v. Clough, 694 F. App’x 716, 724 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (unpublished). But unpublished opinions are “not binding authority and . . . [are] persuasive only to the extent that a subsequent panel finds the rationale expressed in that opinion to be persuasive after an independent con- sideration of the legal issue.” United States v. Doe, 137 F.4th 1277, 1283 (11th Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because Torres re- quires a different analysis and answer than Reed, we don’t find Reed persuasive, so we do not follow it. 5 Troupe did hold that “stopping a vehicle’s driver does not constitute a seizure of a passenger.” 419 F.3d at 1167. There, a separate officer “fired two shots at the driver”; “[o]ne bullet struck the driver’s door just above the keyhole” and “[t]he other bullet went through the driver’s side window and hit [the driver] in the back.” See id. at 1164. Troupe found no seizure of the passengers. Id. at 1167. But the opinion did not address whether the driver, who was seized USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 26 of 52 26 Opinion of the Court 23-13616 In sum, we hold that Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis seized Watkins by physical force when they shot and hit her vehicle. 2. Show of Authority Besides seizing Watkins by physical force, the Oﬃcers sim- ultaneously seized her by a show of authority. The district court correctly deployed this framework in this exceptional case to hold that the Oﬃcers seized Watkins. A seizure based on a show of authority occurs “only when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.” Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S 593, 597 (1989); see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (“Whenever an oﬃcer restrains the freedom of a person to walk away, he has seized that person.”) “In determining whether the means that terminates the freedom of movement is the very means that the government intended we cannot draw too ﬁne a line . . . .” Brower, 489 U.S. at 598. It is “enough for a seizure that a person be when his body was hit, would have been seized had the officer hit only the car. And shooting at and hitting a car (but not the driver) effects a seizure of the driver but not the passenger because in the case of the driver, it satisfies both parts of the definition of “seizure”—(1) force and (2) intent to restrain— but in the case of the passenger, it satisfies only the first prong. Drivers steer vehicles; passengers don’t. So shooting a moving car objectively evidences an intent to restrain the driver, who controls the car. That same intent is not nec- essarily present to restrain the movement of a passenger, who sits passively in the hands of the driver and who the police may not even realize is in the vehi- cle. USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 27 of 52 23-13616 Opinion of the Court 27 stopped by the very instrumentality set in motion or put in place in order to achieve that result.” Id. at 599. For this kind of seizure, “[a] person has been seized . . . only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a rea- sonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 627–28 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he test for existence of a ‘show of authority’ is an objective one: not whether the citizen perceived that he was being ordered to restrict his movement, but whether the oﬃcer’s words and actions would have conveyed that to a reasonable per- son.” Id. at 628. In a canonical opinion, which the full Court has since em- braced, Justice Stewart oﬀered examples of facts “that might indi- cate a seizure.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (opinion of Stewart, J.); see also Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 627 (recognizing Justice Stewart’s “Mendenhall test” was “adopted by the Court in later cases”). For instance, he pointed to “the threatening presence of several oﬃc- ers, the display of a weapon by an oﬃcer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the oﬃcer’s request might be com- pelled.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (opinion of Stewart, J.); see also United States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 778 (11th Cir. 2006)) (to deter- mine “whether a seizure has occurred, we consider . . . ‘whether a citizen’s path is blocked or impeded; whether identiﬁcation is USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 28 of 52 28 Opinion of the Court 23-13616 retained; the suspect’s age, education and intelligence; the length of the suspect’s detention and questioning; the number of police oﬃcers present; the display of weapons; any physical touching of the suspect, and the language and tone of voice of the police’”). Our sister circuits have recognized that one kind of show- of-authority seizure occurs when an oﬃcer ﬁres his weapon, and the suspect stops and submits to police custody as a result. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of Detroit, 518 F.3d 398, 406 (6th Cir. 2008) (ﬁnding a seizure when an oﬃcer’s “ﬁring his weapon at [the suspect] was a show of authority that actually had the intended eﬀect of contrib- uting to [the suspect]’s immediate restraint.”); Flores v. City of Pala- cios, 381 F.3d 391, 396–97 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that a seizure oc- curred when an oﬃcer shot a suspect’s vehicle, and the suspect stopped and exited the vehicle to investigate the noise); Bella v. Chamberlain, 24 F.3d 1251, 1255 (10th Cir. 1994) (“[W]hen law en- forcement oﬃcers shoot at a ﬂeeing suspect, a ‘seizure’ occurs only if the shot strikes the ﬂeeing person or if the shot causes the ﬂeeing person to submit to this show of authority.”). After all, nothing can communicate more clearly to a suspect that she is not free to leave than the barrel of a ﬁred weapon. Cf. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (opinion of Stewart, J.); Jordan, 635 F.3d at 1186. Here, Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis shot at Watkins. So upon realizing that they were police oﬃcers, no reasonable person would have felt free to leave. The Oﬃcers also intended to seize Watkins when they ﬁred at her. Indeed, Oﬃcer Faulkner expressly directed Watkins to submit when he yelled, “Freeze! . . . Hey, stop, freeze!” USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 29 of 52 23-13616 Opinion of the Court 29 For these reasons, the Oﬃcers’ conduct satisﬁed this part of the show-of-authority test. That is, the Oﬃcers obviously made a show of authority. But the analysis does not end there. Unlike with a seizure by physical force, a seizure by a show of authority doesn’t happen unless the subject yields. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626. In other words, “[w]hen a suspect ﬂees from the police, he is not submitting to their authority and therefore is not seized.” Jordan, 635 F.3d at 1186. As a result, for a show-of-authority seizure to occur, ordinarily a suspect must submit immediately upon that showing to demon- strate he yields. Cf. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626 (The concept of a seizure “does not remotely apply . . . to the prospect of a police- man yelling ‘Stop, in the name of the law!’ at a ﬂeeing form that continues to ﬂee.”) Watkins didn’t stop immediately upon the Oﬃcers’ shoot- ing. And in almost all cases that would signal she didn’t submit to the show of authority. Cf. id. But this is a very unusual case. Based on the unique record before us, we conclude she did in fact submit to comply with the Oﬃcers’ intended seizure. The key point is that Watkins didn’t—and under the novel circumstances here, couldn’t—understand a show of authority oc- curred until she saw patrol cars and learned that Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis were oﬃcers. They approached her camouﬂaged in dark clothing under cover of darkness and oddly never identiﬁed them- selves before they shot at her. But when it became apparent that the Oﬃcers were oﬃcers—once Watkins saw their patrol vehicles USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 30 of 52 30 Opinion of the Court 23-13616 less than ﬁfteen seconds after the Oﬃcers ﬁred at her and while she remained in their eyesight—she immediately stopped to submit. At no point, the record makes clear, did Watkins ignore a known show of authority and refuse to submit. Rather, Watkins submit- ted in direct response to both Oﬃcers’ shooting. In short, the shooting caused Watkins’s submission. And Watkins was “stopped by the very instrumentality set in motion or put in place in order to achieve that result.” Brower, 489 U.S. at 599. We can contrast Watkins’s unusual case with that of the de- fendant in Hodari D. In Hodari D., an oﬃcer chased a defendant, but the defendant ignored the clearly identiﬁed oﬃcer’s show of authority. See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 623. Instead, “looking behind as he ran” and seeing an oﬃcer, the defendant “tossed away . . . a small rock” that turned out to be crack cocaine. Id. In other words, recognizing that law enforcement was after him, Watkins tried to discard incriminating evidence. Id. The Supreme Court concluded the defendant had not been seized at the time he threw away the drugs because at that point he had not yielded to the submission of authority. Id. at 626. Unlike Watkins, the Hodari D. defendant immediately recog- nized that oﬃcers were subjecting him to a show of authority. But he never yielded. See id. at 623. Rather, the oﬃcer had to tackle the defendant to stop him. See id. And the Hodari D. defendant’s eﬀort to rid himself of the incriminating evidence proved that he recognized the show of authority, even though he did not yield. USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 31 of 52 23-13616 Opinion of the Court 31 In contrast, the record here reﬂects that the Oﬃcers were camouﬂaged in dark clothing in a desolate and unlit area and they never announced that they were oﬃcers, even when they started ﬁring at Watkins. As a result, importantly, Watkins both had no reason to and did not recognize the Oﬃcers were police. So she was unaware that they had engaged in a show of authority until she saw the police cars once she left the cul de sac. Nor at any point did Watkins throw away illegal material or otherwise indicate she recognized the Oﬃcers were police and made a choice to ignore their commands. Had she done so, she, like the Hodari D. defend- ant would have proven by her conduct that she did recognize the Oﬃcers were police. Or if the Oﬃcers had simply announced that they were police, then we could conclude she should have recog- nized that they were Oﬃcers. But neither of those things hap- pened. Instead, at the ﬁrst opportunity Watkins reasonably had to submit to the show of force—when she realized the Oﬃcers were law enforcement upon seeing the police cars—she immediately submitted. To be sure, in Torres, the Supreme Court cautioned that a seizure is “a single act, and not a continuous fact.” Torres, 592 U.S. at 323 (quoting Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 625). And it declined to adopt a distinction for physical-force seizures when a seizure occurs after a gunshot wound if the suspect “stop[s] ‘maybe 50 feet’ or ‘half a block’ from the scene of the shooting to allow the oﬃcers to promptly acquire control.” Id. But in that case, the oﬃcers’ shots did not bring the suspect down immediately, and unlike here, the suspect never recognized the oﬃcers were police, so she never USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 32 of 52 32 Opinion of the Court 23-13616 chose to submit to the oﬃcers’ authority. Indeed, in contrast to Watkins’s case, the Torres suspect reasonably should have under- stood she was dealing with law enforcement. But she was experi- encing methamphetamine withdrawal during her interaction with police, so she didn’t notice that they were wearing tactical vests marked with police identiﬁcation. And as we’ve noted, in Torres, the Court also explained that a show-of-authority seizure “requires that ‘a person be stopped by the very instrumentality set in motion or put in place in order to achieve that result.’” Id. (quoting Brower, 489 U.S. at 599). That’s what happened here. A “single act”—the shooting—seized Wat- kins in fact. Watkins stopped solely and voluntarily because of the show of authority that the shooting represented; the Oﬃcers made no other shows of authority before she stopped. And she stopped immediately upon realizing the Oﬃcers were police and had made a show of authority—when she saw the police cars in the cul de sac. Not only that, but on this record, Watkins’s failure to recog- nize that the Oﬃcers were police and had engaged in a show of authority until she saw the police cars after leaving the cul de sac was reasonable. So at no point did Watkins choose to refuse police oﬃcers’ commands. Rather, she obeyed them as soon as she rea- sonably realized the Oﬃcers had engaged in a show of authority. We therefore conclude, based on this extraordinary record, that a show-of-authority seizure occurred. USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 33 of 52 23-13616 Opinion of the Court 33 In sum, under both the physical-force and show-of-authority tests for a seizure, Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis seized Watkins. As a result, the protections of the Fourth Amendment kicked in. B. The Oﬃcers are not entitled to qualiﬁed immunity on Wat- kins’s “seizure of person and unlawful detention” claim. Having established that the Oﬃcers seized Watkins, we turn to her “unlawful detention” claim. In her barebones complaint, Watkins labels her claim as being for “[s]eizure of [p]erson and [u]nlawful [d]etention.” The district court construed Watkins’s ar- gument to be “(1) that Defendants unlawfully seized her to conduct an investigative stop and (2) that the stop matured into an unlawful arrest during the several hours that she was detained.” Because Defendants were “separated from the investigation less than four minutes after Watkins was seized” and were “present for [only] the initial stop, questioning, and securing of Watkins,” the district court concluded that they could be liable for only the “investigative stop.” As a result, both parties focus their argument on whether the Oﬃcers conducted a lawful investigatory stop of Watkins. But we conclude that Defendants didn’t conduct just an in- vestigatory stop. Rather, they arrested Watkins. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), governs our inquiry into whether a suspect experienced only an investigatory stop or rather, an arrest. Under Terry, we must evaluate “whether the stop went too far and matured into arrest before there was probable cause . . . .” United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1145 (11th Cir. 2004). We employ “four non-exclusive factors” to “more USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 34 of 52 34 Opinion of the Court 23-13616 objectively draw[] the line between a Terry stop and an arrest in an individual case . . . .” Id. at 1146. Those factors include (1) “the law enforcement purposes served by the detention,” (2) “the diligence with which the police pursue the investigation,” (3) “the scope and intrusiveness of the detention,” and (4) “the duration of the deten- tion.” Id. (quoting United States v. Gil, 204 F.3d 1347, 1351 (11th Cir. 2000)(per curiam)). Here, the Oﬃcers interacted with Watkins for no more than four minutes. But Watkins’s full detention lasted several hours, be- ginning with her interaction with the Oﬃcers. And it’s hard to im- agine a more intrusive detention than one that began with a shoot- ing. After all, the Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he intru- siveness of a seizure by means of deadly force is unmatched.” Gar- ner, 471 U.S. at 9. Of course, we have recognized that when it comes to Terry stops, “oﬃcers may take reasonable steps to ensure their safety so long as they possess ‘an articulable and objectively reasonable be- lief that the suspect is potentially dangerous.’” Acosta, 363 F.3d at 1146 (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1983)). So, for instance, we’ve held that an oﬃcer drawing a weapon “does not necessarily convert an investigatory stop into an arrest.” United States v. Roper, 702 F.2d 984, 987 (11th Cir. 1983). But we have never suggested that an oﬃcer may discharge their weapon and still be engaged in simply an investigatory stop. Nor could we. After all, to evaluate whether the use of deadly force is lawful, we assess whether the oﬃcer “has probable USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 35 of 52 23-13616 Opinion of the Court 35 cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the oﬃcer or to others . . . .” Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. That is, to inﬂict deadly force, an oﬃcer must have at least “proba- ble cause” that the suspect has engaged in a crime—the same stand- ard for an arrest. See id.; Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1137 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[A]n oﬃcer who arrests an individual without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment.”). But an oﬃcer need have only “reasonable suspicion . . . [,] a less demanding stand- ard than probable cause . . . ,” to justify a Terry stop. Illinois v. Ward- low, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). So it would be odd to suggest a stop that involved a shooting by an oﬃcer could be supported just by reasonable suspicion. As for the purpose of the stop here, we see nothing investi- gatory about it. A Terry stop must be “justiﬁed at its incep- tion . . . .” Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. But the Oﬃcers’ ﬁrst contact with Watkins occurred when Oﬃcer Faulkner yelled “Freeze! . . . Hey, stop, freeze!” and both Oﬃcers began ﬁring. They now claim self- defense, not a need to have investigated Watkins for a crime. That is, the Oﬃcers responded with deadly force to what they said they thought was a threat to their lives. So we conclude Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis arrested Wat- kins, and their actions had to be supported by probable cause. Still, we acknowledge that the parties focus their arguments on whether the Oﬃcers had “reasonable suspicion” to support stopping Watkins in the ﬁrst place. And the parties dispute USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 36 of 52 36 Opinion of the Court 23-13616 whether the Oﬃcers were entitled to qualiﬁed immunity on that basis. So we also address those arguments. Construing the facts for Watkins, we conclude no reasona- ble oﬃcer could think Defendants even had reasonable suspicion. Because “reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause . . . ,” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123, no reasonable oﬃcer would think they had probable cause, either. “[R]easonable suspicion can be established with information that is diﬀerent in quantity or content than that required to estab- lish probable cause.” Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 380 (2020) (quot- ing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The standard ‘depends on the factual and practi- cal considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and pru- dent men, not legal technicians, act.’” Id. (quoting Navarette v. Cal- ifornia, 572 U.S. 393, 402 (2014)) (emphasis altered). And “[c]ourts ‘cannot reasonably demand scientiﬁc certainty . . . where none ex- ists.’” Id. at 380 (quoting Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125). Instead, courts “must permit oﬃcers to make ‘commonsense judgments and infer- ences about human behavior.’” Id. at 380–81. Even so, though, an “oﬃcer must be able to articulate more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch”’ of criminal activity.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123–24 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). Yet “the level of suspicion the standard requires is con- siderably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence . . . .” Glover, 589 U.S. at 380 (quoting Navarette, 572 U.S. at 397) (internal quotation marks omitted). USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 37 of 52 23-13616 Opinion of the Court 37 We must also remember that “[w]hen an oﬃcer asserts qual- iﬁed immunity, the issue is not whether reasonable suspicion ex- isted in fact, but whether the oﬃcer had ‘arguable’ reasonable sus- picion . . . .” Jackson, 206 F.3d at 1166. To satisfy “arguable reason- able suspicion,” we must evaluate whether “a reasonable oﬃcer could have believed that the [stop] comported with the Fourth Amendment.” Meshal v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 117 F.4th 1273, 1288 (11th Cir. 2024). In sum, “we ‘must examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether an oﬃcer had a ‘particularized and objective’ basis to support his suspicion. Whether the oﬃcer’s suspicion ends up being mistaken is immaterial so long as it was reasonable.’” Id. (quoting Whittier v. Kobayashi, 581 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)). This “‘totality of the circumstances inquiry’ . . . has no time limit.” Barnes, 145 S. Ct. at 1358. “The history of the interaction, as well as other past circumstances known to the oﬃcer, . . . inform the reasonableness of the [Oﬃcers’ actions].” Id. In other words, we can’t “put on chronological blinders” and assess the arguable reasonableness of a seizure without proper “consideration of prior events” that led to the interaction. See id. at 1359. With that in mind, we assess whether any reasonable oﬃcer could have had reasonable suspicion that Watkins was engaged in a crime. Construing the facts for Watkins, we think not. First, before the events on the driveway, Watkins did nothing suspicious. The Oﬃcers were dispatched to 11 Bellamy Place; USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 38 of 52 38 Opinion of the Court 23-13616 Watkins was on a separate property across the cul-de-sac (30 Bellamy Place). She was calmly loading her car at her place of employment. And the Oﬃcers identify no evidence in the record that Bellamy Place was a “high crime area.” On top of those facts, Oﬃcer Faulk- ner noticed separate suspects at 11 Bellamy Place near a diﬀerent black vehicle on that property. So from the Oﬃcers’ perspective, Watkins was not the suspect they were dispatched to confront. Second, on this record, Watkins’s ﬂight from the Oﬃcers’ approach cannot justify her stop. To be sure, the Supreme Court has recognized that “nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. And we have consistently recognized that ﬂight or otherwise-sus- picious behavior upon recognizing oﬃcers supports a ﬁnding of rea- sonable suspicion. See, e.g., United States v. Lindsey, 482 F.3d 1285, 1291 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Franklin, 323 F.3d 1298, 1301– 02 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Hunter, 291 F.3d 1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v. Gordon, 231 F.3d 750, 756 (11th Cir. 2000). But all bets are oﬀ when an oﬃcer fails to identify himself, and his status as an oﬃcer isn’t obvious. Indeed, the Supreme Court has “held that when an oﬃcer insuﬃciently or unclearly identiﬁes his oﬃce or his mission, the occupant’s ﬂight . . . must be regarded as ambiguous conduct.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 482 (1963). Consistently, we have clearly established that “oﬃcers cannot improperly provoke . . . a person into ﬂeeing and use the ﬂight to justify a stop.” Franklin, 323 F.3d at 1302; see also Jackson, 206 F.3d at 1166 (ﬁnding no arguable reasonable suspicion USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 39 of 52 23-13616 Opinion of the Court 39 where the plaintiﬀ ran when mistaking plain clothes oﬃcers for armed robbers). The touchstone for evaluating ﬂight is “whether a reasonable and innocent person facing this situation would have been caused to ﬂee in the same manner . . . .” Franklin, 323 F.3d at 1302. No reasonable oﬃcer could ﬁnd Watkins’s brief “ﬂight” sug- gested criminality. The Oﬃcers approached Watkins in complete darkness except for their ﬂashlights. They had entered the cul-de- sac with sirens oﬀ; they were on foot when they advanced on Wat- kins; and they wore dark clothing under cover of night. Oﬃcer Faulkner didn’t make his identity known any better when he yelled, “Freeze!” And both oﬃcers started shooting without announcing that they were oﬃcers. A reasonable person, especially a 47-year-old woman alone in a desolate place at night, would worry she was being attacked and ﬂee that scene. That’s not suspicious behavior; it’s survival instincts. And a reasonable oﬃcer would realize that. So even though the Oﬃcers may not have meant to provoke Wat- kins’s ﬂight, they still did exactly that. Cf. Jackson, 206 F.3d at 1166. And they cannot use her provoked ﬂight to justify the stop. Frank- lin, 323 F.3d at 1302. In one last try, the Oﬃcers argue that they had arguable rea- sonable suspicion to stop Watkins because they claim she almost hit Oﬃcer Davis with her car. They point out Georgia courts have upheld convictions for assault when a suspect has driven directly at an oﬃcer to avoid detention. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 833 S.E.2d 142 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019) (“[T]he evidence shows that [the suspect] drove USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 40 of 52 40 Opinion of the Court 23-13616 the stolen white van directly toward Deputies . . . when they at- tempted to detain him, only missing them when they dove out of the way.”). But when we construe the record for Watkins for the pur- poses of summary judgment, we can’t conclude that a reasonable oﬃcer would have suspected Watkins tried to hit Oﬃcer Davis with her car. To start, there’s a genuine question of material fact as to whether Officers Faulkner and Davis could have reasonably thought Officer Davis was visible to the naked eye in the center of the driveway. That is— there is a question as to whether a reason- able officer in Officer Faulkner and Davis’s shoes would think Wat- kins saw Davis with enough time for her to process his location and change course. The record contains several pieces of evidence that suggest no reasonable officer would think Davis visible. The driveway was covered in darkness. Officer Davis, wearing all black and a face- mask, did not initially shine his flashlight at Watkins’s car. Nor did he make so much as a peep. It was only Officer Faulkner who yelled. And as we’ve noted, he yelled only, “Hey, stop, freeze!”— which offered no indication of the location of Officer Davis. We must resolve this question of fact in favor of Watkins. So we must assess the claim to qualified immunity as though nei- ther Officer Faulkner nor Officer Davis could have reasonably thought Watkins could see Davis in the road. Besides that fact, Of- ficer Davis was only close to the car’s pathway because he USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 41 of 52 23-13616 Opinion of the Court 41 intentionally stepped in the center of the driveway that was the sole egress from 30 Bellamy Place. So under this version of the facts, Officer Davis alone caused any risk of a collision. And we think it common sense that an officer can’t step in the middle of oncoming traffic, taking drivers unaware, and reasonably claim to be the vic- tim of vehicular assault. Cf. Kirby v. Duva, 530 F.3d 475, 482–83 (6th Cir. 2008) (denying qualified immunity on an excessive-force claim and highlighting that an officer unreasonably “placed himself in po- tential danger by moving toward the rolling [car]”); Estate of Starks v. Enyart, 5 F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir. 1993) (“The key dispute for the factfinder will be whether [the officer] stepped in front of [the sus- pect’s] rapidly moving cab, leaving [the suspect] no time to brake. If he did, then [the officer] would have unreasonably created the encounter that ostensibly permitted the use of deadly force to pro- tect him, because the decedent would have been unable to react in order to avoid presenting a deadly threat to [the officer].”). Plus, Watkins engaged in no erratic driving behavior sug- gesting she was trying to hit Officer Davis. So with proper “consid- eration of prior events,” Barnes, 145 S. Ct. at 1359, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Watkins, we think no rea- sonable oﬃcer would conclude Watkins spontaneously decided to hit Oﬃcer Davis with her car. In fact, if Watkins had wanted to hit an oﬃcer, Oﬃcer Faulk- ner would have made the easier target—as any reasonable oﬃcer would’ve realized. He, unlike Oﬃcer Davis, revealed his location with his ﬂashlight before Watkins started driving. Yet Watkins USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 42 of 52 42 Opinion of the Court 23-13616 drove up the other side of the driveway, away from Oﬃcer Faulk- ner. It’s no wonder, then, that Oﬃcer Harris did not think Watkins intended to hit any oﬃcers. Then to top it all oﬀ, a genuine dispute of material fact exists over whether Watkins’s car even would have hit Oﬃcer Davis had he not moved. We must treat this dispute as though he would not have been hit by Watkins’s car. Yet even absent this dispute, a rea- sonable jury could find no reasonable officer would think Watkins attempted vehicular assault. But that finding is especially likely if the jury finds, as it may, that Davis was never in danger. At bottom, Watkins engaged in no behavior that a reasona- ble oﬃcer could ﬁnd suspicious. So the Oﬃcers had no arguable reasonable suspicion for conducting their stop. That means they also had no arguable probable cause, the standard the Oﬃcers had to meet to support a claim of qualiﬁed immunity for an unlawful arrest. See Skop, 485 F.3d at 1137 (explaining the standard of “argu- able probable cause,” which is whether “reasonable oﬃcers in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the De- fendant[] could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest.”); Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123 (explaining reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause). For these reasons, they are not entitled to qualiﬁed immunity on Watkins’s “seizure of per- son and unlawful detention” claim. USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 43 of 52 23-13616 Opinion of the Court 43 C. The Oﬃcers are not entitled to qualiﬁed immunity on Wat- kins’s excessive-force claim. We move next to Watkins’s excessive-force claim. The Of- ﬁcers argue that they are not liable on this claim for three reasons. First, they say that shots that miss a plaintiﬀ’s ﬂesh can’t sustain an excessive-force claim. Second, they assert they had probable cause to ﬁre at Watkins based on an imminent threat of deadly harm. And third, they contend their use of force did not violate clearly established law. We are not persuaded. We address the Oﬃcers’ ﬁrst argument summarily. All the cases the Oﬃcers cite to show a shot that misses a plaintiﬀ’s ﬂesh can’t sustain an excessive-force claim show only that a shoot–and– miss is not a physical-force seizure. See Torres, 592 U.S. at 318; Ham- mett v. Paulding County, 875 F.3d 1036, 1053 (11th Cir. 2017); Carr v. Tatangelo, 338 F.3d 1259, 1270–71 (11th Cir. 2003). They don’t speak to the underlying merits of an excessive-force claim. Cf. Flores, 381 F.3d at 396–98 (allowing an analogous excessive-force claim where oﬃcers shot a plaintiﬀ’s car to move forward). And as we’ve already explained, the Oﬃcers seized Watkins both by physical force and a show of authority. See Part III.A, supra. So we turn now to the merits of Watkins’s excessive-force claim and whether the Oﬃcers are entitled to qualiﬁed immunity on it. We conclude they don’t enjoy immunity against a claim that they unlawfully shot at her. We typically evaluate whether an oﬃcer has unlawfully used deadly force by evaluating the factors Tennessee v. Garner outlines. USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 44 of 52 44 Opinion of the Court 23-13616 See Powell v. Snook, 25 F.4th 912, 922 (11th Cir. 2022). There, the Supreme Court held that “a police oﬃcer may use deadly force to seize a ﬂeeing felony suspect when the oﬃcer: (1) ‘has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the oﬃcer or to others’ or ‘that he has committed a crime involving the inﬂiction or threatened inﬂiction of serious physical harm’; (2) reasonably believes that the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent escape; and (3) has given some warning about the possible use of deadly force, if feasible.” Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d at 1323, 1329–30 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Garner, 471 U.S. at 11–12) (emphasis altered). But “Garner did not establish a magical on/oﬀ switch that triggers rigid preconditions whenever an oﬃcer’s actions constitute ‘deadly force.’” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382 (2007). “The con- stitutional test for excessive force is necessarily fact speciﬁc.” McCullough v. Antolini, 559 F.3d 1201, 1206 (11th Cir. 2009). And “in the end we must still slosh our way through the factbound morass of ‘reasonableness.’” Scott, 550 U.S. at 383. In doing so, we again acknowledge the Supreme Court’s recent guidance: we can’t “put on chronological blinders” because “the history of the interaction, as well as other past circumstances known to the oﬃcer, . . . inform the reasonableness of the use of force.” Barnes, 145 S. Ct. at 1358– 59. We start with the ﬁrst Garner factor. From it, we have clearly established that “[a] police oﬃcer may not seize an unarmed, non- dangerous suspect by shooting him dead.” Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 45 of 52 23-13616 Opinion of the Court 45 For example, in Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, we held that an of- ﬁcer violated the Fourth Amendment when he used deadly force against an unarmed, intoxicated man who “did little to provoke the police oﬃcers to beat him.” 774 F.2d 1495, 1502 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). And in Lundgren v. McDaniel, we aﬃrmed a judgment where a reasonable jury could ﬁnd that oﬃcers used excessive force when “the oﬃcers without provocation shot at a nondangerous suspect.” 814 F.2d 600, 603 (11th Cir. 1987). Similarly, in Vaughan v. Cox, we explained that “[u]nder Garner, a police oﬃcer can use deadly force to prevent the escape of a ﬂeeing non-violent felony suspect only when the suspect poses an immediate threat of serious harm to police oﬃcers or others.” 343 F.3d at 1332. Still, this is a broad principle of clearly established law. Plum- hoﬀ v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014) (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004) (per curiam)) (“Garner . . . [is] ‘cast at a high level of generality’”). And we have explained that “[t]he more gen- eral the statement of law is that puts the oﬃcial on notice, the more egregious the violation must be before we will ﬁnd that the oﬃcial is not entitled to qualiﬁed immunity.” Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1330 (11th Cir. 2007); see also Echols v. Lawton, 913 F.3d 1313, 1324 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1353 (11th Cir. 2002)) (A broad “principle ‘must establish with obvious clarity that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness of the oﬃcial’s conduct is apparent.’”). USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 46 of 52 46 Opinion of the Court 23-13616 Yet the Oﬃcers’ actions here were particularly egregious. As we’ve explained, the Oﬃcers lacked even arguable reasonable suspi- cion to stop Watkins for any crime, let alone probable cause to shoot her as posing a threat of harm. See Part III.B, supra. And just as “Garner involved a ﬂeeing non-dangerous suspect in a non-vio- lent crime,” Powell, 25 F.4th at 923, here, Watkins was, at worst, also a non-dangerous suspect in a non-violent crime. In fact, we don’t even see a basis for characterizing her as a suspect for the crime the oﬃcers responded to. See Part III.B, supra. After all, the initial crime for which the oﬃcers were dispatched was breaking into an unattended vehicle on a diﬀerent property than Watkins’s place of business. The Oﬃcers also can’t claim any support from the second or third Garner factors. Because Watkins obviously committed no crimes, the Oﬃcers couldn’t have “reasonably believe[d] that the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent escape,” as the second factor instructs us to evaluate. Vaughan, 343 F.3d at 1329–30 (inter- nal quotation marks omitted). Nor did the Oﬃcers give any “warn- ing about the possible use of deadly force” to satisfy the third Gar- ner factor. Id. at 1330. Watkins’s alleged use of her car as a “weapon” also doesn’t justify the Oﬃcers’ shots on this record. True, we have before “up- held an oﬃcer’s use of force and granted qualiﬁed immunity in cases where the [plaintiﬀ] used or threatened to use his car as a weapon to endanger oﬃcers or civilians immediately preceding the oﬃcer’s use of deadly force.” McCullough, 559 F.3d at 1207. The USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 47 of 52 23-13616 Opinion of the Court 47 Oﬃcers oﬀer several cases to support that point. See Baxter v. San- tiago-Miranda, 121 F.4th 873 (11th Cir. 2024); Terrell v. Smith, 668 F.3d 1244, 1253 (11th Cir. 2012); McCullough, 559 F.3d at 1208; Sin- gletary v. Vargas, 804 F.3d 1174, 1182–83 (11th Cir. 2015); Troupe, 419 F.3d at 1168; Robinson v. Arrugueta, 415 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir. 2005); Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1282 (11th Cir. 2002); Clemons v. Knight, 662 F. App’x 725, 728 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished). But this case is nothing like any of those. Each of the cases the Oﬃcers cite involved a suspect who apparently disobeyed or- ders from clearly identiﬁed oﬃcers. Baxter, 121 F. 4th at 880–81; Terrell, 668 F.3d at 1249; McCullough, 559 F.3d at 1207–08; Singletary, 804 F.3d at 1177–78, Troupe, 419 F.3d at 1168; Robinson, 415 F.3d at 1254; Pace, 283 F.3d at 1277–78; Clemons, 662 F. App’x at 726–27. Again, though, the Oﬃcers here never identiﬁed themselves. And they purposely chose to stealthily approach a person who was by herself in a dark, desolate area with only one means of egress. Be- cause on this record, no reasonable oﬃcer could have believed that Watkins was disobeying orders from clearly identiﬁed oﬃcers when she ﬂed, these cases don’t help the Oﬃcers. Similarly, no reasonable oﬃcer could have believed that Wat- kins was using or intended to use her car as a weapon as she tried to escape what looked like a dangerous situation. For that reason, the Oﬃcers also violated another principle of clearly established law in this circuit. “[W]here the plaintiﬀ did not use or did not threaten to use his car as a weapon, we have rejected an oﬃcer’s USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 48 of 52 48 Opinion of the Court 23-13616 use of deadly force.” Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1283 (11th Cir. 2013). That’s why in Morton v. Kirkwood, we denied qualiﬁed im- munity on an excessive-force claim. There, the plaintiﬀ was “an unarmed man in a stationary vehicle while [the oﬃcer had] no rea- son to believe that the man would place anyone’s safety in danger.” 707 F.3d at 1282. And in Vaughan v. Cox, we denied qualiﬁed im- munity when the plaintiﬀ claimed the driver of a stolen vehicle ﬂed at 15 miles above the speed limit but otherwise did not drive errat- ically. 343 F.3d at 1326–27, 1330–33. Watkins’s case falls neatly within this line of our precedent. Watkins did not drive erratically but in a straight line out her only escape path. Cf. Vaughan, 343 F.3d at 1330 (“[T]he truck’s lane was clear of traﬃc and [the suspect] made no aggressive moves to change lanes before [the oﬃcer] ﬁred.”). And she acted as any rea- sonable person in her position would have—she sought to get away from two men who were camouﬂaged in dark clothing and ap- proached her in an isolated place without identifying themselves. She was not a suspect in any crime. Cf. Morton, 707 F.3d at 1283 (“In Vaughan, the driver was suspected of car theft; Morton was suspected of no crime.”). And as we’ve explained, we must resolve the dispute of fact as to whether Oﬃcer Davis was ever even in the path of Watkins’s car in Watkins’s favor. Under that version of the facts, no one’s life was at risk. Cf. Vaughan, 343 F.3d at 1330 (“[T]he record [doesn’t] reﬂect that the suspects had menaced or were likely to menace others on the highway at the time of the USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 49 of 52 23-13616 Opinion of the Court 49 shooting.”); Morton, 707 F.3d at 1283 (“Morton presented less of a safety and ﬂight risk than the driver in Vaughan or the suspect in Garner.”). So at bottom, no reasonable oﬃcer could have be- lieved it necessary to shoot Watkins to protect anyone from harm.6 Because the Oﬃcers’ actions, in the light most favorable to Watkins, violated two principles of clearly established law in this circuit, they aren’t entitled to qualiﬁed immunity on Watkins’s ex- cessive-force claim. D. The Oﬃcers are not entitled to qualiﬁed immunity on Wat- kins’s unlawful-seizure-of-property claim. Next, we consider Watkins’s claim for the unlawful seizure of property. Watkins asserts that the Oﬃcers unlawfully damaged her car when they shot it four times. The Oﬃcers argue that they are entitled to qualiﬁed immunity for three reasons. First, they say they did not seize Watkins’s car. Second, the Oﬃcers assert that, in any case, they had probable cause to ﬁre on Watkins’s vehicle. 6 The Officers also assert that “a plaintiff ‘cannot establish a Fourth Amend- ment violation based merely on bad tactics that result in a deadly confronta- tion that could have been avoided.’” See Powell, 25 F.4th at 922 (quoting City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 615 (2015)). But “bad tactics” are different from unreasonable actions. And here, for the reasons we’ve ex- plained, no reasonable officer would have done what the Officers did. With- out identifying themselves as officers or warning they would use deadly force, they approached a person who was alone in a dark and desolate place and started shooting when she fled. That’s not a poor strategic decision in the heat of confronting a threat. Rather, it’s reckless and unreasonable. USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 50 of 52 50 Opinion of the Court 23-13616 And third, they contend they didn’t violate clearly established law. We disagree with each argument. To begin, the Oﬃcers seized Watkins’s SUV. A “seizure” of property “occurs when ‘there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.’” Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)). And in dicta, the Supreme Court has ex- plained that “when speaking of property, ‘[f ]rom the time of the founding to the present, the word ‘seizure’ has meant a ‘taking pos- session.’” Torres, 592 U.S. at 312 (quoting Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 624) (alteration in original). We need not and do not decide whether oﬃcers seize a ve- hicle when they shoot it but do not fully wrest possession of it from its owner. That’s so because here, the Oﬃcers separated Watkins from her car and took possession of it. As Watkins stopped her SUV and exited to submit to the Oﬃcers’ authority, Oﬃcer Davis ordered Watkins to get down. And Oﬃcer Faulkner secured her person. In doing so, the Oﬃcers separated Watkins from her car and seized it. To their credit, even the Oﬃcers concede that Watkins’s car was seized. But they say the Georgia Bureau of Investigation seized it. And because Oﬃcers Yi and Harris separated the Oﬃcers from the investigation after four minutes from the initiation of the seizure, the Oﬃcers argue they did not seize the car. USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 51 of 52 23-13616 Opinion of the Court 51 We disagree. The Oﬃcers were involved with the interac- tion long enough to separate Watkins from her car, so they seized it. Because the Oﬃcers seized Watkins’s car, we must consider whether they violated clearly established law in doing so. “Gener- ally, the seizure of personal property is per se unreasonable when not pursuant to a warrant issued upon probable cause.” Crocker v. Beatty, 886 F.3d 1132, 1136 (11th Cir. 2018). But “[s]everal excep- tions . . . exist to this general rule.” Id. One exception, which Defendants do not argue applies, is an “investigative detention” or Terry stop. “The bounds of investiga- tive detention of personal property are deﬁned by the limits appli- cable to the detention of a person.” United States v. Virden, 488 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2007). So “the factors used to determine whether a Terry stop has matured into an arrest are also useful in evaluating whether a seizure of property required probable cause.” Id. But we’ve already explained why the Terry factors don’t support finding an investigatory stop here. See Part III.B., supra. The Officers instead rely on another exception to the war- rant requirement. They argue the exigent-circumstances excep- tion applies. As its name suggests, “[t]he exigent-circumstances excep- tion” allows for the seizure of property without a warrant “when certain exigencies exist . . . .” Crocker, 886 F.3d at 1136. “The most urgent of these exigencies is ‘the need to protect or preserve life’ in an emergency situation.” United States v. Timmann, 741 F.3d 1170, USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 52 of 52 52 Opinion of the Court 23-13616 1178 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1335 (11th Cir. 2002)). But the same old problem prevents the Oﬃcers from being able to rely on the exigent-circumstances exception. When we view the evidence in the light most favorable to Watkins, she never put the Oﬃcers at risk of serious injury. See Part III.B & C, supra. That means the Oﬃcers seized Watkins’s SUV without an applica- ble exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. As a result, they violated clearly established law. We have recognized that “[t]he right to be free from warrantless seizures of personal property, absent an applicable exception, was clearly es- tablished to the point of obvious clarity [as early as] 2012.” Crocker, 886 F.3d at 1138. And “[t]he exigent circumstances exception was similarly clearly established . . . .” Id. So we are bound to deny qualiﬁed immunity to oﬃcers who seize property without such an exception “[e]ven in ‘novel factual situations . . . .’” Id. (quoting Jones v. Fransen, 857 F.3d 843, 852 (11th Cir. 2017)). This is such a case. So we aﬃrm the district court’s denial of qualiﬁed immunity to the Oﬃcers on Watkins’s property-damage claim. IV. CONCLUSION For these reasons, we aﬃrm the denial of summary judg- ment on qualiﬁed-immunity grounds and remand for further pro- ceedings consistent with this opinion. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 1 of 52

FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 23-13616 ____________________

TAMMY WATKINS, Plaintiﬀ-Appellee, versus

OFFICER LAWRENCE DAVIS, OFFICER JOSHUA FAULKER, individually and in their oﬃcial capacities as oﬃcers of the Henry County Police Department; Defendants-Appellants, HENRY COUNTY, GEORGIA, by way of Henry County Police Department, et al., Defendants. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-04081-AT ____________________

Before ROSENBAUM, LAGOA, and WILSON, Circuit Judges. USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 2 of 52

2 Opinion of the Court 23-13616

ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge: An old saying observes that “the single biggest problem in communication is the illusion that it has taken place.” That was certainly the issue here. And in this case, that problem resulted in a near-tragedy. On a Saturday evening in the height of the pandemic, Tammy Watkins received a work call. The hospital had just dis- charged a COVID patient. He needed an oxygen concentrator, tanks, and supplies. And she was supposed to supply it. So Watkins drove to work to collect the equipment. She worked at a business at the bottom of a hill, located oﬀ a cul de sac. Because it was Saturday and the cul de sac housed businesses, no one else was around—including at Watkins’s employer. Watkins backed her car up to the building and loaded it. When she was done, she got into her car, looked up the patient’s address, and started to drive up the driveway. As Watkins drove up the driveway, out of the dark, she sud- denly saw two ﬂashlights coming down the driveway towards her. Alone in a desolate place, she feared for her safety. She thought the people approaching her were about to attack her. With only one way out of her workplace parking lot, Watkins accelerated up the driveway. Then Watkins was sure her worst fears were being con- ﬁrmed: the people approaching started shooting at Watkins. So Watkins ducked down in her car, somehow navigated the driveway, and turned to the right, away from the cul de sac. USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 3 of 52

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To her great surprise, police cars were waiting there. Wat- kins immediately stopped her car. The oﬃcers yelled for her to get out. So Watkins did. Then the oﬃcers handcuﬀed her and put her in the back of a police cruiser, where she sat for three or four hours before the oﬃcers released her. Watkins was lucky. Her car, which the oﬃcers shot four times and totaled, was the only physical casualty. The shots did not hit Watkins, and she was not physically harmed in any way. Nor were the two people who approached Watkins. As it turned out, they were police oﬃcers—Oﬃcers Joshua Faulkner and Lawrence Davis. They were investigating a call about a possi- ble truck break-in at a diﬀerent address in the cul de sac. But as they descended upon Watkins, the oﬃcers never communicated that they were police. And in the darkness, Watkins could not see that they were. Watkins sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She alleged that the Oﬃcers violated her Fourth Amendment rights to be free from a “[s]eizure of [p]erson and [u]nlawful [d]etention,” excessive force, and property damage to her car. The district court denied the of- ﬁcers summary judgment on qualiﬁed-immunity grounds on all three claims. They appeal that order. After careful consideration and with the beneﬁt of oral ar- gument, we aﬃrm the district court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 4 of 52

4 Opinion of the Court 23-13616

I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background At around 6:45 p.m. on January 16, 2021, Henry County law enforcement received a call that two people carrying ﬂashlights were breaking into a black truck. The call reported that the truck was next to a yellow drilling rig at 11 Bellamy Place in Stockbridge, Georgia (“the dispatch location”). 11 Bellamy Place sits at the end of a cul-de-sac of commercial buildings. About 8 minutes after the call, Oﬃcers Davis and Faulkner reached the dispatch location. Arriving after sundown, the pair found a pitch-black scene. No streetlights lit the road or cul-de-sac. Oﬃcers Davis and Faulkner approached with their sirens and roof lights turned oﬀ, enveloped in the darkness. Then they parked about 50 yards up the road from the cul-de-sac. They planned to “sneak up on” any robbers. After leaving their cars, the oﬃcers walked quietly to the dis- patch location. They kept their ﬂashlights oﬀ. Oﬃcer Faulkner reported seeing movement “next to the yel- low rig” parked at the front of 11 Bellamy Place. About a minute after sweeping the property, he also radioed that he heard voices inside the building. Over the next few minutes, Oﬃcers Chresha Harris and Alan Yi each arrived separately. They too parked up the road from the cul-de-sac with their sirens and roof lights oﬀ and quietly ap- proached 11 Bellamy Place. There, they met Oﬃcers Faulkner and USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 5 of 52

23-13616 Opinion of the Court 5

Davis near the front of the property, where Faulkner repeated his observations. Suddenly, one of them whispered to turn oﬀ their ﬂash- lights. Oﬃcer Faulkner pointed at a “hatchback” at a diﬀerent property across the cul-de-sac—30 Bellamy Place. As the district court explained, “[w]hen the cul-de-sac is viewed from above like a clock face,” 11 Bellamy Place is located at the “one o’clock posi- tion” while 30 Bellamy Place is at the “eight o’clock position,” di- rectly left of the entry road. The two properties appear in the photo below, with 11 Bellamy Place labeled “Original Dispatch Lo- cation” and 30 Bellamy Place labeled “Suspicious Vehicle Loca- tion”:

About a minute after pointing out the “hatchback,” Oﬃcer Faulkner repeated that he had seen suspects at 11 Bellamy Place USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 6 of 52

6 Opinion of the Court 23-13616

“between this black truck and that yellow rig.” No one disputes that this “black truck” that matched the description from the 911 call was a separate car from the “hatchback” the oﬃcers saw across the cul-de-sac at 30 Bellamy Place. At the time, Faulkner explained that he did not see where the suspects had gone. But he later testi- ﬁed he speculated they jumped the fence behind 11 Bellamy Place. Oﬃce Faulkner then returned his attention to the “hatch- back.” And he asked, “Where’s the hatchback at?” Suddenly, some- thing piqued his interest, and he exclaimed, “What do we got over there?” In response, all four oﬃcers quickly moved towards 30 Bel- lamy Place, the only well-lit property in the cul-de-sac. Oﬃcer Faulkner said he saw a lone woman close the hatchback and then get into the car. Surveillance footage from 30 Bellamy Place shows that per- son was Tammy Watkins, a woman who was then 47 years old. Once inside her car, the headlights went on. For the next about thirty seconds, the building’s surveillance video shows, Watkins sat there in the car. Watkins later testiﬁed that she was looking up directions to a COVID-19 patient to deliver medical equipment. And the surveillance footage conﬁrms that she was looking at her phone while she sat in the car. During this period, Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis began to walk down the downward-sloping driveway towards 30 Bellamy Place and Watkins. Oﬃcers Harris and Yi stayed behind. USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 7 of 52

23-13616 Opinion of the Court 7

Some dispute exists over how visible Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis were in the driveway. On the one hand, a surveillance cam- era (which was apparently designed to work in the dark) shows brighter-than-natural footage, in which they are visible. The weather was clear, and Watkins’s windshield was unobstructed. But as we’ve mentioned, it was dark outside, and though the building at 30 Bellamy Place was well-lit, the long driveway ap- proaching it had no lights. The oﬃcers were well camouﬂaged in black shoes, navy pants and jackets, and dark-colored hats. And Oﬃcer Davis also wore a black facemask and gloves. Plus, Wat- kins’s headlights were directed across the driveway, away from the oﬃcers. Oﬃcer Faulkner headed down the left side of the driveway while Oﬃcer Davis moved down the right. Near the top of the driveway, Oﬃcer Faulkner turned on his ﬂashlight, mounted on top of the barrel of his gun, and pointed it at Watkins’s car. Oﬃcer Davis kept his ﬂashlight oﬀ. Oﬃcer Faulkner’s ﬂashlight beam traveled up the parking- lot pavement onto the passenger side of Watkins’s vehicle about 36 seconds after she got into her car. At just about the same time, Watkins put down her phone and put the car in drive. At this point, the district court noted, Watkins’s car was about 78 to 110 feet from Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis. A second later, the hatchback rolled forward and quickly turned towards the gate leading from the parking lot to the start of the driveway. By now, Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis were about USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 8 of 52

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a quarter of the way down the driveway, and Davis took a few steps to the left into the center of the driveway. The record doesn’t say why he did so, but the district court construed his actions to be “an apparent attempt to block the car’s path.” By contrast, Oﬃcer Faulkner moved towards the left edge of the driveway, away from the car’s trajectory. Three seconds after the car began moving, it reached the driveway gate, about 47 to 63 feet from the oﬃcers. Oﬃcer Davis stood silently in the right-center of the driveway, while Oﬃcer Faulkner exclaimed, “Uh-uh,” and raised his gun at the car. As the hatchback entered the driveway, Oﬃcer Davis turned on his ﬂashlight, and Oﬃcer Faulkner yelled, “Freeze!” Almost im- mediately, Oﬃcer Davis dropped his ﬂashlight, drew his gun, and swiftly moved back and to the left, across the driveway towards Of- ﬁcer Faulkner. Within a second, Oﬃcer Faulkner once more screamed, “Hey, stop, freeze!” Then Oﬃcer Davis ﬁred several shots into the front of Watkins’s SUV. At the same time, security footage of the driveway captured Oﬃcer Davis moving away from Watkins’s car to the left edge of the driveway. Still, it’s not clear from either se- curity or body-camera footage whether Oﬃcer Davis was ever in the path of Watkins’s SUV. When the car drew even with the oﬃcers, Oﬃcer Faulkner’s body-camera footage shows, Faulkner ﬁred at least one shot at the USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 9 of 52

23-13616 Opinion of the Court 9

front-right side of it. 1 The entire time the car traveled in a straight path. At no point did it swerve or otherwise change course as if to intentionally hit Oﬃcers Faulkner or Davis. Watkins later testiﬁed that although she didn’t hear anything until the gunshots, she ac- celerated up the driveway when she saw ﬂashlights walking to her because she thought someone was trying to attack her. While the car reached the end of the driveway, Oﬃcer Faulk- ner checked on Oﬃcer Davis, who fell into the grass behind him, next to the driveway. Oﬃcer Faulkner found Oﬃcer Davis un- harmed. Then the two ran after the car, which had left the drive- way. When the car drove about 50 yards up the road, it stopped near the oﬃcers’ parked cars. Watkins’s car never left the oﬃcers’ sight line and stopped less than 15 seconds after the oﬃcers shot. Oﬃcers Yi and Harris reached the SUV ﬁrst. They ordered Watkins to get out with her hands raised. For their parts, as Oﬃc- ers Faulkner and Davis approached, they kept their guns drawn. And Oﬃcer Davis also ordered Watkins to submit. As Watkins backed away from her car, she yelled, “Wait, wait, I work there! I work there!”

1 The parties dispute whether Officers Faulkner and Davis’s firing complied

with Henry County Police Department policy. Official policy states that “shots will not be fired from or at moving vehicles, unless the occupants of the vehicle are using deadly force against the officer or another person, and it is the officer’s reasonable belief there are no other alternative means of protect- ing life.” USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 10 of 52

10 Opinion of the Court 23-13616

Upon learning this information, the oﬃcers began to reas- sure Watkins. Meanwhile, Oﬃcer Faulkner secured her and con- ﬁrmed that she was alone and not injured. Watkins explained that, as assistant manager of the business at 30 Bellamy Place, she was picking up oxygen tanks and equipment to deliver to a COVID pa- tient. She told the oﬃcers, “I didn’t know who y’all was—I was scared because I was down there by myself.” Oﬃcer Faulkner re- plied, “That’s understandable.” Later, Oﬃcer Harris echoed that sentiment. She testiﬁed that she didn’t believe Watkins could tell that oﬃcers were ap- proaching her when she ﬂed. And she didn’t think Watkins in- tended to aim her car at Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis. Back at the scene, Oﬃcer Yi led Watkins away from her car. Then Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis began inspecting it. The SUV had one bullet hole in the windshield, two in the hood, and one in the front passenger-side door. Oﬃcer Davis told Faulkner, “I thought she was going to fucking hit me.” And Davis replied, “Yeah, I did too. She was trying to.” Oﬃcer Yi returned to check on Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis. Oﬃcer Davis explained, “We were just going to talk to her because she was out there.’” Ultimately, Oﬃcer Yi separated Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis from the investigation about three-and-a-half minutes after Wat- kins got out of her car and about four minutes after they ﬁred shots. Meanwhile, Oﬃcer Harris secured Watkins in the back of her cruiser. The oﬃcers kept Watkins there, handcuﬀed, for three USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 11 of 52

23-13616 Opinion of the Court 11

to four hours before releasing her. At some point, an ambulance arrived at the scene. Medical personnel evaluated Watkins on site and determined she didn’t have any physical injuries. After the of- ﬁcers released Watkins, her mother and sister took her home. The police never charged Watkins with any crime. But that evening, the Georgia Bureau of Investigation took custody of Wat- kins’s car. Later, Watkins’s insurance company declared the SUV a total loss because of the gunshot damage. B. Procedural Background

Watkins sued Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis (“Defendants” or “Oﬃcers”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She alleged they had subjected her to a “[s]eizure of [p]erson and [u]nlawful [d]etention,” excessive force, and property damage in violation of the Fourth Amend- ment. 2 She also raised some state-law claims. The Oﬃcers jointly moved for summary judgment. The district court granted their motion on Watkins’s state- law claims. It concluded that the Oﬃcers were entitled to oﬃcial immunity under Georgia’s constitution. But the court denied the Oﬃcers’ motion on Watkins’s § 1983 claims. The court determined that the oﬃcers had seized Watkins’s person because “Watkins stopped and submitted to po- lice authority shortly after, and because, the shots were ﬁred.” As

2 Watkins also initially sued Henry County and Chief of Police Mark Amerman

but later abandoned her claims against them. USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 12 of 52

12 Opinion of the Court 23-13616

for Watkins’s “seizure of person and unlawful detention” claim, the district court construed it as an “unlawful investigatory stop” claim. And the court held that the oﬃcers were not entitled to qualiﬁed immunity on that claim. The court explained that “a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants did not have arguable reason- able suspicion that Watkins was involved in criminal activity when they seized her.” As to the excessive-force claim, the court held that “a reason- able jury could conclude that Defendants lacked probable cause to believe that [Watkins] was using her car as a dangerous weapon.” So, the court reasoned, “ﬁring on Watkins violated her clearly es- tablished rights to be free from excessive force.” Finally, on Watkins’s property claim, the court also denied qualiﬁed immunity. It held that “a reasonable police oﬃcer would have known that exigent circumstances did not permit the warrant- less seizure of Watkins’s car, and that eﬀecting such a seizure would violate clearly established law.” Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis now appeal the denial of their motion for summary judgment on all three of Watkins’s § 1983 claims. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment on qualiﬁed-immunity grounds. Fils v. City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272, 1287 (11th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is appropriate only when the moving party shows that no disputed issue of material fact exists. Gervin v. Florence, 139 F.4th 1236, 1245 USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 13 of 52

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(11th Cir. 2025). On a motion for summary judgment based on qualiﬁed immunity, we “resolve all issues of material fact in favor of the [P]laintiﬀ, and then determine the legal question of whether the defendant is entitled to qualiﬁed immunity under that version of the facts.” Bashir v. Rockdale County, 445 F.3d 1323, 1326–27 (11th Cir. 2006). We don’t make credibility determinations or choose be- tween conﬂicting testimony. Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1267– 68 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). III. DISCUSSION Watkins alleges three violations of her Fourth Amendment rights: a “seizure of person and unlawful detention,” the use of ex- cessive force, and an unlawful seizure of her property. The Oﬃcers argue that they are entitled to qualiﬁed immunity on all three of Watkins’s claims because they say (1) they never seized her or her vehicle, (2) they did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and (3) they did not violate clearly established law. We begin by quickly reviewing the principles of qualiﬁed immunity. To invoke qualiﬁed immunity, an oﬃcial must ﬁrst show that he “was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority” when he engaged in the challenged acts. Alcocer v. Mills, 906 F.3d 944, 951 (11th Cir. 2018). Watkins concedes that the Oﬃcers did that. As a result, the burden shifts to Watkins to show that the Of- ﬁcers aren’t entitled to qualiﬁed immunity. Id. To do that, Watkins must establish “both that the [O]fficer[s’] conduct violated a constitutionally protected right and USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 14 of 52

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that the right was clearly established at the time of the miscon- duct.” Id. Whether a right is “clearly established” raises an objec- tive question. Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1165 (11th Cir. 2000). And “a police officer is entitled to qualified immunity if a reasona- ble police officer could have believed his or her actions were lawful in light of clearly established law and the information possessed by the officer at the time the conduct occurred.” Id. Watkins can show the law was “clearly established” in any of three ways: (1) she can identify a qualifying case with “indistin- guishable facts,” (2) she can rely on “a broad statement of principle within the Constitution, statute, or case law,” or (3) she can show that the Officers’ behavior was “so egregious” that it was obvious “a constitutional right was clearly violated, even in the total ab- sence of case law.” Gervin, 139 F.4th at 1261. The caselaw she can cite to support this showing includes the “binding decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, this Court, and the highest court of” Georgia. Glasscox v. City of Argo, 903 F.3d 1207, 1217 (11th Cir. 2018). But we can also “consider persuasive out-of-circuit au- thority to determine whether a violation was of ‘obvious clarity.’” Gilmore v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 144 F.4th 1246, 1259 (11th Cir. 2025) (en banc). We analyze each Defendant’s actions and omissions sepa- rately when we consider whether Watkins carried her burden to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate. Alcocer, 906 F.3d at 951. USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 15 of 52

23-13616 Opinion of the Court 15

Watkins alleges Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis violated the Fourth Amendment. As relevant here, that amendment guaran- tees that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their per- sons . . . and eﬀects, against unreasonable . . . seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. “The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” Barnes v. Felix, 145 S. Ct. 1353, 1358 (2025) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Being a police oﬃcer is a hard job, and we are indebted to oﬃcers who regularly put their lives on the line to keep us safe. That said, oﬃcers have a responsibility to exercise their authority— especially when it’s obvious it could cause injury or death to civil- ians—reasonably and with common sense. When we view the ev- idence in the light most favorable to Watkins, we must conclude that a genuine question of fact exists here as to whether the Oﬃc- ers did that. Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis were assigned to respond to a report of two individuals breaking into a truck at 11 Bellamy Place. Yet they went to 30 Bellamy Place, where they saw a lone woman and a hatchback car (not a truck). They had no grounds to suspect her of any wrongdoing. Still, in darkness and eﬀectively camouﬂaged, they ap- proached her without identifying themselves. Then they de- manded that she, a woman driving alone on an isolated driveway, with only one way out, immediately stop for them. And when she tried to escape from what a reasonable person would have thought USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 16 of 52

16 Opinion of the Court 23-13616

was a dangerous situation, without any warning, they repeatedly ﬁred their weapons at her. As we explain below, a reasonable jury could conclude that no reasonable oﬃcer would have thought Watkins a threat, that no reasonable oﬃcer would have shot at her, and that no reasonable oﬃcer would have acted as Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis did. So we aﬃrm the denial of summary judgment on qualiﬁed-immunity grounds on all three of Watkins’s claims. We address each claim individually in turn. A. Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis seized Watkins’s person. Before we consider Watkins’s “seizure of person and unlaw- ful detention” and excessive-force claims, we must ﬁrst assess whether Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis seized Watkins’s person. That’s so because, as relevant here, the Fourth Amendment’s pro- tections kick in when an oﬃcer engages in a “seizure of the per- son.” See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 625 (1991). An oﬃcer may eﬀect a “seizure of the person” in one of two ways. He may either use physical force, or even with no force, he may seize a person by securing the person’s “submission to the as- sertion of authority.” Id. at 626 (emphasis altered). “[E]ach type of seizure enjoys a separate common law pedigree that gives rise to a separate rule.” Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306, 322 (2021). The Oﬃcers argue they never seized Watkins. Instead, they say, they “ﬁred in self-defense not in an eﬀort to detain [Watkins]” and “did not hit [Watkins].” Plus, they argue, “[Watkins] did not stop due to gunﬁre.” USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 17 of 52

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But we disagree with the Oﬃcers’ assessment. Under both the physical-force and the submission-of-authority tests, Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis seized Watkins. 1. Physical Force We ﬁrst consider whether the Oﬃcers used physical force to seize Watkins. Everyone agrees on the basic facts that constrain our analysis. Together, the Oﬃcers intentionally shot Watkins’s car four times as she was driving it. Oﬃcer Davis hit the car three times, and Oﬃcer Faulkner hit the car once. But no bullet pierced Watkins’s ﬂesh. So we must determine whether intentionally ﬁring at and hitting Watkins’s car constituted a seizure of Watkins as the car’s driver. We hold that it did. We begin with Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306. In Torres, the Court considered what it means to seize a person using physical force. See id. Similarly to the facts here, in Torres, oﬃcers ﬁred their guns at Roxanne Torres as she drove her car away from them, mistakenly thinking they were carjackers. Id. at 30910. But unlike here, two of the oﬃcers’ thirteen shots hit Torres’s back. Id. at 310. She sought damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. To determine whether the oﬃcers seized Torres, the Su- preme Court “consult[ed] the common law of arrest, the ‘quintes- sential “seizure of the person” under our Fourth Amendment ju- risprudence.’” Id. at 311 (quoting Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 624). Not- ing that law enforcement didn’t carry ﬁrearms until the second half of the nineteenth century, the Court looked in the common law for USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 18 of 52

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an analogy to the use of a bullet to seize a person. See id. at 315– 16. And it found one. In Countess of Rutland’s Case (1605), Co. Rep. 52b, 77 Eng. Rep. 332, serjeants-at-mace had to execute a writ for a judgment of debt against the Countess of Rutland. Torres, 592 U.S. at 315. To do so, they “shewed her their mace, and touching her body with it, said to her, we arrest you, madam.” Id. (quoting Countess of Rutland’s Case, 6 Co. Rep. at 54a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 336). The Court understood Countess “as an example of an arrest [or seizure] made by touching with an object . . . .” Id. And it found “no basis for drawing an artiﬁcial line between grasping with a hand and other means of applying physical force to eﬀect an arrest [seizure].” Id. at 316. So, the Court reasoned, “[t]he required ‘cor- poral seising or touching the defendant’s body’ can be as readily accomplished by a bullet as by the end of a ﬁnger.” Id. (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 228 (1768)). Indeed, the Court explained, “[w]e will not carve out this greater intrusion on personal security from the mere-touch rule just because founding-era courts did not confront apprehen- sion by ﬁrearm.” Id. Still, the Court cautioned, not every physical contact be- tween law enforcement and a member of the public amounts to a Fourth Amendment seizure. Id. at 317. Rather, two things are nec- essary for a Fourth Amendment seizure: (1) “the use of force with [(2)] intent to restrain.” Id. Indeed, the combination of these two USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 19 of 52

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things eﬀects a seizure even when it does not manage to restrain the person. Id. at 313. We consider each requirement. First, “the use of force”: Torres and Countess teach that “a mere touch” can be enough “force” to eﬀect a seizure. See Torres, 592 U.S. at 317. And that “mere touch” may be indirect—through an object like a mace or a bullet. See id. at 316. But that’s not all. Torres ﬁnds more guidance in an analogy to common-law torts, speciﬁcally the tort of false imprisonment, to conclude “that the common law considered touching to be a sei- zure.” Id. at 320; cf. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (“[F]or most of our history the Fourth Amendment was under- stood to embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas” including “persons” that “it enumerates.”). As the Court explained, “false imprisonment required ‘conﬁne- ment’ . . . .” Torres, 592 U.S. at 320. But “conﬁnement,” in turn, consisted of “no more than that the defendant ‘had for one mo- ment taken possession of the plaintiﬀ’s person’—including, ‘for ex- ample, if he had tapped her on the shoulder, and said, “You are my prisoner.”’” Id. So we follow the Supreme Court’s lead and look to the com- mon law for guidance on the meaning of “touch” and “force” more generally. See id. at 314 (looking to the common-law meaning of “force” and noting that “‘[t]he least touching of another’s person’ could satisfy the common law deﬁnition of force to commit bat- tery, ‘for the law cannot draw the line between diﬀerent degrees of USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 20 of 52

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violence’” (alteration in original) (quoting BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra, at 120); cf. Jones, 565 U.S. at 405–08 (“[O]ur Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law tres- pass, at least until the latter half of the 20th century,” and looking to common-law trespass for guidance in determining whether the use of a GPS tracking device was a search under the Fourth Amendment). The common law had much to say about the con- cept of “touch.” Indeed, common-law “touch” extended beyond just person-to-person contact. For example, the common law deﬁned the “crime of bat- tery” as the “intentional application of unlawful force against the person of another” with force “satisﬁed by even the slightest oﬀen- sive touching.” Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 139 (2010) (cit- ing BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra, at 120); cf. Torres, 592 U.S. at 314 (looking to the deﬁnition of “force” for battery actions to discern the “force” necessary to sustain an arrest). And that touch- ing extended to “anything attached to the person” that through its attachment “partakes of [a person’s] inviolability.” Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall) 111, 114 (O.T. Phila. 1784). So “[t]hough no great bodily pain is suﬀered by a blow on the palm of the hand, or the skirt of the coat, . . . these are clearly within the legal d[e]ﬁ- nition of Assault and Battery . . . .” Johnson, 559 U.S. at 146 (Alito, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (second altera- tion in original) (quoting Respublica, 1 U.S. at 114). But the concept of “touch” did not end with a person’s cloth- ing. Rather, as early as the seventeenth through nineteenth USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 21 of 52

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centuries, courts and scholars evaluating assault-and-battery claims recognized that hitting a horse amounted to a strike upon its rider. See, e.g., Dodwell v. Burford (1669), 86 Eng. Rep. 703, 703; 1 Mod. 25, 25 (“The plaintiﬀs, in an action of battery declared, that the defend- ant struck the horse whereon the wife rode, so that the horse ran away with her, whereby she was thrown down, and another horse ran over her . . . .”); Bannister v. Fisher (1808), 127 Eng. Rep. 872, 872; 1 Taunt. 358, 358 (“The Defendant could not assault the horse while the man was on it, without assaulting the man.”); State v. Da- vis, 19 S.C.L. (1 Hill) 46, 47 (1833) (“It has been held that . . . striking violently . . . the horse on which [a person] rides, is an assault; The thing in th[is] instance[] partaking of the personal inviolability.”); ISAAC ESPINASSE, DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ACTIONS AND TRIALS AT NISI PRIUS 174 (3d ed. 1811) (“[I]f any person had whipped [a] horse, and made him runaway with the rider, and hurt . . . the rider him- self, he would be liable who had whipped the horse.” (emphasis omitted)); ARCHIBALD JOHN STEPHENS, LAW OF NISI PRIUS, EVIDENCE IN CIVIL ACTIONS, AND ARBITRATION & AWARDS 210–11 (1842) (recognizing a battery “where the plaintiﬀ declared that the defendant struck the horse whereon his wife rode, so that the horse ran away with her, whereby she was thrown down, and another horse ran over her”); FRANCIS WHARTON, TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW § 617 (9th ed. 1885) (“A battery is an assault in which force is applied, by material agencies, to the person of another, either me- diately or immediately . . . . The force may be applied through con- ductors more or less close. Thus to strike . . . the horse on which he is riding . . . may be as much a battery as to strike his face . . . .”); USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 22 of 52

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cf. Storey v. Robinson (1795), 101 Eng. Rep. 476, 479; 6 T.R. 138, 139 (holding that it is illegal to distrain a horse with a rider on it). And that was so whether the victim rode on the horse’s back or inside a carriage that the horse pulled. Marentille v. Oliver, 2 N.J.L. 379, 380 (1808) (opinion of Pennington, J.) (“To attack and strike with a club, with violence, the horse before a carriage, in which a person is riding, strikes me as an assault on the person . . . .”); ESPINASSE, DIGEST, supra, at 173 (“Striking any thing attached to a person, . . . if intended as a rudeness and aﬀront, is a battery. So striking . . . horses before a carriage in which a person was riding, was held to be an assault upon the person. In [that] case[] the sub- ject partaking of the personal inviolability.”); HENRY G. COTTON, TREATISE ON THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE PEACE IN THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 220 (1845) (“Striking violently, with a club, horses before a carriage in which a person was riding, was held to be an assault upon the person.”). Similarly, courts held, and scholars recognized, that contact with a cart or wagon could support a claim of assault on a rider. See, e.g., Hopper v. Reeve (1817), 129 Eng. Rep. 278, 278; 7 Taunt. 699, 699 (“It is a direct trespass to injure the person of another by driving a carriage against the carriage wherein such person is sitting . . . .”); People v. Lee, 1 Wheeler Crim. Cas. 364, 365 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1823) (“[T]he conduct of the defendant, in attempting to run against the wagon of the prosecutor, was clearly an assault; his horse and cart was merely a machine, and could as well be directed against the prosecutor as any other inanimate object.”); ARCHIBALD JOHN USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 23 of 52

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STEPHENS, LAW OF NISI PRIUS, supra, at 208 (“[U]psetting a carriage or chair in which a person is sitting, is a trespass against the per- son . . . .”); HENRY G. COTTON, TREATISE ON THE POWERS AND DUTIES, supra, at 220 (“It is an assault to attempt to run against the wagon of another person on the highway. The horse and cart of the defendant being merely a machine, could as well be directed against the prosecutor as an inanimate object.”). Put simply, then, at common law, touching a person’s horse or carriage—directly or indirectly—while the person rode amounted to touching their person. So under Torres’s rule, touch- ing a rider’s horse or carriage committed the necessary “force” to eﬀect a seizure because the common law understood the touch as a touch of the person. See Torres, 592 U.S. at 313–18, 325. We see no material diﬀerence from an oﬃcer’s bullet that strikes the car of a person driving it. Of course, we don’t see many horse-drawn carriages anymore. But that’s so because cars took their place. So if touching a carriage or the horse drawing it counted as the “force” necessary to eﬀect a seizure of the rider in- side the carriage, then touching a car with a driver inside it also amounts to the “force” necessary to eﬀect a seizure of the driver. And because Torres teaches that touching with a bullet is the same thing as touching with a hand, the Oﬃcers’ shots that hit Watkins’s car were the necessary “force” to satisfy the ﬁrst requirement of eﬀecting a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. That brings us to the second requirement for a seizure: “in- tent to restrain.” Torres, 592 U.S. at 317 (emphasis altered). We USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 24 of 52

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assess whether the Oﬃcers intended to restrain by asking “whether the challenged conduct objectively manifests an intent to restrain.” Id. In conducting our analysis, we don’t consider “the subjective perceptions of the seized person.” Id. Once again, we look to Torres for guidance. There, the Court concluded that shooting at Torres’s car “objectively mani- fested an intent to restrain her from driving away.” Id. at 318. We discern no basis for distinguishing Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis’s shooting of Watkins’s car. So we conclude that the oﬃcers “in- ten[ded] to restrain” Watkins when they shot her car. Because Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis both used force to indi- rectly touch Watkins when they shot the car she was driving and they intended to restrain her at that time, they eﬀected a seizure by physical force of Watkins under the Fourth Amendment. We know some of our sister circuits have concluded that shooting a car to restrain the driver does not eﬀect a seizure by physical force. 3 But the courts decided each of these cases without

3 See Bella v. Chamberlain, 24 F.3d 1251, 1255–56 (10th Cir. 1994); Cole v. Bone,

993 F.2d 1328, 1332–33 (8th Cir. 1993); Adams v. City of Auburn Hills, 336 F.3d 515, 519 (6th Cir. 2003). By contrast, the Fifth Circuit has held that in a case like this one, where an officer shot a car, damaged it, and caused the driver to exit to investigate the noise, the officer committed a seizure by physical force. Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 396–97 (5th Cir. 2004); cf. Schultz v. Braga, 455 F.3d 470, 483 (4th Cir. 2006) (refusing to follow Flores where a shot did not intentionally terminate the freedom of movement of a passenger plaintiff but declining to rule on whether “a suspect must be physically struck by a bullet (or any other object) to state a claim for excessive force”). USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 25 of 52

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the beneﬁt of Torres’s guidance. 4 And now that we have that, Torres causes us to conclude that shooting a car to restrain the driver does eﬀect a seizure. Troupe v. Sarasota County, 419 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2005), does not require a diﬀerent answer. There, an oﬃcer attempted to “dis- able [a] car” by ﬁring “a single shot at a low angle, aiming for the lower portion of the tire.” Id. at 1164 (internal quotation marks omitted). But the oﬃcer “missed the tire and, apparently, did not strike anyone or anything.” Id. So we found no seizure. Id. at 1167. Though we decided Troupe years before the Supreme Court issued Torres, our answer makes sense even under Torres because no touch occurred when the bullet missed, so no “force” took place, as the common law understood that concept. 5

4 We similarly concluded in an unpublished opinion four years before the Su-

preme Court issued Torres that shooting and hitting a car does not seize the driver. See Reed v. Clough, 694 F. App’x 716, 724 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (unpublished). But unpublished opinions are “not binding authority and . . . [are] persuasive only to the extent that a subsequent panel finds the rationale expressed in that opinion to be persuasive after an independent con- sideration of the legal issue.” United States v. Doe, 137 F.4th 1277, 1283 (11th Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because Torres re- quires a different analysis and answer than Reed, we don’t find Reed persuasive, so we do not follow it. 5 Troupe did hold that “stopping a vehicle’s driver does not constitute a seizure

of a passenger.” 419 F.3d at 1167. There, a separate officer “fired two shots at the driver”; “[o]ne bullet struck the driver’s door just above the keyhole” and “[t]he other bullet went through the driver’s side window and hit [the driver] in the back.” See id. at 1164. Troupe found no seizure of the passengers. Id. at 1167. But the opinion did not address whether the driver, who was seized USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 26 of 52

26 Opinion of the Court 23-13616

In sum, we hold that Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis seized Watkins by physical force when they shot and hit her vehicle. 2. Show of Authority Besides seizing Watkins by physical force, the Oﬃcers sim- ultaneously seized her by a show of authority. The district court correctly deployed this framework in this exceptional case to hold that the Oﬃcers seized Watkins. A seizure based on a show of authority occurs “only when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.” Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S 593, 597 (1989); see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (“Whenever an oﬃcer restrains the freedom of a person to walk away, he has seized that person.”) “In determining whether the means that terminates the freedom of movement is the very means that the government intended we cannot draw too ﬁne a line . . . .” Brower, 489 U.S. at 598. It is “enough for a seizure that a person be

when his body was hit, would have been seized had the officer hit only the car. And shooting at and hitting a car (but not the driver) effects a seizure of the driver but not the passenger because in the case of the driver, it satisfies both parts of the definition of “seizure”—(1) force and (2) intent to restrain— but in the case of the passenger, it satisfies only the first prong. Drivers steer vehicles; passengers don’t. So shooting a moving car objectively evidences an intent to restrain the driver, who controls the car. That same intent is not nec- essarily present to restrain the movement of a passenger, who sits passively in the hands of the driver and who the police may not even realize is in the vehi- cle. USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 27 of 52

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stopped by the very instrumentality set in motion or put in place in order to achieve that result.” Id. at 599. For this kind of seizure, “[a] person has been seized . . . only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a rea- sonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 627–28 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he test for existence of a ‘show of authority’ is an objective one: not whether the citizen perceived that he was being ordered to restrict his movement, but whether the oﬃcer’s words and actions would have conveyed that to a reasonable per- son.” Id. at 628. In a canonical opinion, which the full Court has since em- braced, Justice Stewart oﬀered examples of facts “that might indi- cate a seizure.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (opinion of Stewart, J.); see also Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 627 (recognizing Justice Stewart’s “Mendenhall test” was “adopted by the Court in later cases”). For instance, he pointed to “the threatening presence of several oﬃc- ers, the display of a weapon by an oﬃcer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the oﬃcer’s request might be com- pelled.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (opinion of Stewart, J.); see also United States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 778 (11th Cir. 2006)) (to deter- mine “whether a seizure has occurred, we consider . . . ‘whether a citizen’s path is blocked or impeded; whether identiﬁcation is USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 28 of 52

28 Opinion of the Court 23-13616

retained; the suspect’s age, education and intelligence; the length of the suspect’s detention and questioning; the number of police oﬃcers present; the display of weapons; any physical touching of the suspect, and the language and tone of voice of the police’”). Our sister circuits have recognized that one kind of show- of-authority seizure occurs when an oﬃcer ﬁres his weapon, and the suspect stops and submits to police custody as a result. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of Detroit, 518 F.3d 398, 406 (6th Cir. 2008) (ﬁnding a seizure when an oﬃcer’s “ﬁring his weapon at [the suspect] was a show of authority that actually had the intended eﬀect of contrib- uting to [the suspect]’s immediate restraint.”); Flores v. City of Pala- cios, 381 F.3d 391, 396–97 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that a seizure oc- curred when an oﬃcer shot a suspect’s vehicle, and the suspect stopped and exited the vehicle to investigate the noise); Bella v. Chamberlain, 24 F.3d 1251, 1255 (10th Cir. 1994) (“[W]hen law en- forcement oﬃcers shoot at a ﬂeeing suspect, a ‘seizure’ occurs only if the shot strikes the ﬂeeing person or if the shot causes the ﬂeeing person to submit to this show of authority.”). After all, nothing can communicate more clearly to a suspect that she is not free to leave than the barrel of a ﬁred weapon. Cf. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (opinion of Stewart, J.); Jordan, 635 F.3d at 1186. Here, Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis shot at Watkins. So upon realizing that they were police oﬃcers, no reasonable person would have felt free to leave. The Oﬃcers also intended to seize Watkins when they ﬁred at her. Indeed, Oﬃcer Faulkner expressly directed Watkins to submit when he yelled, “Freeze! . . . Hey, stop, freeze!” USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 29 of 52

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For these reasons, the Oﬃcers’ conduct satisﬁed this part of the show-of-authority test. That is, the Oﬃcers obviously made a show of authority. But the analysis does not end there. Unlike with a seizure by physical force, a seizure by a show of authority doesn’t happen unless the subject yields. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626. In other words, “[w]hen a suspect ﬂees from the police, he is not submitting to their authority and therefore is not seized.” Jordan, 635 F.3d at 1186. As a result, for a show-of-authority seizure to occur, ordinarily a suspect must submit immediately upon that showing to demon- strate he yields. Cf. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626 (The concept of a seizure “does not remotely apply . . . to the prospect of a police- man yelling ‘Stop, in the name of the law!’ at a ﬂeeing form that continues to ﬂee.”) Watkins didn’t stop immediately upon the Oﬃcers’ shoot- ing. And in almost all cases that would signal she didn’t submit to the show of authority. Cf. id. But this is a very unusual case. Based on the unique record before us, we conclude she did in fact submit to comply with the Oﬃcers’ intended seizure. The key point is that Watkins didn’t—and under the novel circumstances here, couldn’t—understand a show of authority oc- curred until she saw patrol cars and learned that Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis were oﬃcers. They approached her camouﬂaged in dark clothing under cover of darkness and oddly never identiﬁed them- selves before they shot at her. But when it became apparent that the Oﬃcers were oﬃcers—once Watkins saw their patrol vehicles USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 30 of 52

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less than ﬁfteen seconds after the Oﬃcers ﬁred at her and while she remained in their eyesight—she immediately stopped to submit. At no point, the record makes clear, did Watkins ignore a known show of authority and refuse to submit. Rather, Watkins submit- ted in direct response to both Oﬃcers’ shooting. In short, the shooting caused Watkins’s submission. And Watkins was “stopped by the very instrumentality set in motion or put in place in order to achieve that result.” Brower, 489 U.S. at 599. We can contrast Watkins’s unusual case with that of the de- fendant in Hodari D. In Hodari D., an oﬃcer chased a defendant, but the defendant ignored the clearly identiﬁed oﬃcer’s show of authority. See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 623. Instead, “looking behind as he ran” and seeing an oﬃcer, the defendant “tossed away . . . a small rock” that turned out to be crack cocaine. Id. In other words, recognizing that law enforcement was after him, the Hodari D. de- fendant tried to discard incriminating evidence. Id. The Supreme Court concluded the defendant had not been seized at the time he threw away the drugs because at that point he had not yielded to the submission of authority. Id. at 626. Unlike Watkins, the Hodari D. defendant immediately recog- nized that oﬃcers were subjecting him to a show of authority. But he never yielded. See id. at 623. Rather, the oﬃcer had to tackle the defendant to stop him. See id. And the Hodari D. defendant’s eﬀort to rid himself of the incriminating evidence proved that he recognized the show of authority, even though he did not yield. USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 31 of 52

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In contrast, the record here reﬂects that the Oﬃcers were camouﬂaged in dark clothing in a desolate and unlit area and they never announced that they were oﬃcers, even when they started ﬁring at Watkins. As a result, importantly, Watkins both had no reason to and did not recognize the Oﬃcers were police. So she was unaware that they had engaged in a show of authority until she saw the police cars once she left the cul de sac. Nor at any point did Watkins throw away illegal material or otherwise indicate she recognized the Oﬃcers were police and made a choice to ignore their commands. Had she done so, she, like the Hodari D. defend- ant would have proven by her conduct that she did recognize the Oﬃcers were police. Or if the Oﬃcers had simply announced that they were police, then we could conclude she should have recog- nized that they were Oﬃcers. But neither of those things hap- pened. Instead, at the ﬁrst opportunity Watkins reasonably had to submit to the show of force—when she realized the Oﬃcers were law enforcement upon seeing the police cars—she immediately submitted. To be sure, in Torres, the Supreme Court cautioned that a seizure is “a single act, and not a continuous fact.” Torres, 592 U.S. at 323 (quoting Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 625). And it declined to adopt a distinction for physical-force seizures when a seizure occurs after a gunshot wound if the suspect “stop[s] ‘maybe 50 feet’ or ‘half a block’ from the scene of the shooting to allow the oﬃcers to promptly acquire control.” Id. But in that case, the oﬃcers’ shots did not bring the suspect down immediately, and unlike here, the suspect never recognized the oﬃcers were police, so she never USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 32 of 52

32 Opinion of the Court 23-13616

chose to submit to the oﬃcers’ authority. Indeed, in contrast to Watkins’s case, the Torres suspect reasonably should have under- stood she was dealing with law enforcement. But she was experi- encing methamphetamine withdrawal during her interaction with police, so she didn’t notice that they were wearing tactical vests marked with police identiﬁcation. And as we’ve noted, in Torres, the Court also explained that a show-of-authority seizure “requires that ‘a person be stopped by the very instrumentality set in motion or put in place in order to achieve that result.’” Id. (quoting Brower, 489 U.S. at 599). That’s what happened here. A “single act”—the shooting—seized Wat- kins in fact. Watkins stopped solely and voluntarily because of the show of authority that the shooting represented; the Oﬃcers made no other shows of authority before she stopped. And she stopped immediately upon realizing the Oﬃcers were police and had made a show of authority—when she saw the police cars in the cul de sac. Not only that, but on this record, Watkins’s failure to recog- nize that the Oﬃcers were police and had engaged in a show of authority until she saw the police cars after leaving the cul de sac was reasonable. So at no point did Watkins choose to refuse police oﬃcers’ commands. Rather, she obeyed them as soon as she rea- sonably realized the Oﬃcers had engaged in a show of authority. We therefore conclude, based on this extraordinary record, that a show-of-authority seizure occurred. USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 33 of 52

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In sum, under both the physical-force and show-of-authority tests for a seizure, Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis seized Watkins. As a result, the protections of the Fourth Amendment kicked in. B. The Oﬃcers are not entitled to qualiﬁed immunity on Wat- kins’s “seizure of person and unlawful detention” claim. Having established that the Oﬃcers seized Watkins, we turn to her “unlawful detention” claim. In her barebones complaint, Watkins labels her claim as being for “[s]eizure of [p]erson and [u]nlawful [d]etention.” The district court construed Watkins’s ar- gument to be “(1) that Defendants unlawfully seized her to conduct an investigative stop and (2) that the stop matured into an unlawful arrest during the several hours that she was detained.” Because Defendants were “separated from the investigation less than four minutes after Watkins was seized” and were “present for [only] the initial stop, questioning, and securing of Watkins,” the district court concluded that they could be liable for only the “investigative stop.” As a result, both parties focus their argument on whether the Oﬃcers conducted a lawful investigatory stop of Watkins. But we conclude that Defendants didn’t conduct just an in- vestigatory stop. Rather, they arrested Watkins. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), governs our inquiry into whether a suspect experienced only an investigatory stop or rather, an arrest. Under Terry, we must evaluate “whether the stop went too far and matured into arrest before there was probable cause . . . .” United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1145 (11th Cir. 2004). We employ “four non-exclusive factors” to “more USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 34 of 52

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objectively draw[] the line between a Terry stop and an arrest in an individual case . . . .” Id. at 1146. Those factors include (1) “the law enforcement purposes served by the detention,” (2) “the diligence with which the police pursue the investigation,” (3) “the scope and intrusiveness of the detention,” and (4) “the duration of the deten- tion.” Id. (quoting United States v. Gil, 204 F.3d 1347, 1351 (11th Cir. 2000)(per curiam)). Here, the Oﬃcers interacted with Watkins for no more than four minutes. But Watkins’s full detention lasted several hours, be- ginning with her interaction with the Oﬃcers. And it’s hard to im- agine a more intrusive detention than one that began with a shoot- ing. After all, the Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he intru- siveness of a seizure by means of deadly force is unmatched.” Gar- ner, 471 U.S. at 9. Of course, we have recognized that when it comes to Terry stops, “oﬃcers may take reasonable steps to ensure their safety so long as they possess ‘an articulable and objectively reasonable be- lief that the suspect is potentially dangerous.’” Acosta, 363 F.3d at 1146 (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1983)). So, for instance, we’ve held that an oﬃcer drawing a weapon “does not necessarily convert an investigatory stop into an arrest.” United States v. Roper, 702 F.2d 984, 987 (11th Cir. 1983). But we have never suggested that an oﬃcer may discharge their weapon and still be engaged in simply an investigatory stop. Nor could we. After all, to evaluate whether the use of deadly force is lawful, we assess whether the oﬃcer “has probable USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 35 of 52

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cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the oﬃcer or to others . . . .” Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. That is, to inﬂict deadly force, an oﬃcer must have at least “proba- ble cause” that the suspect has engaged in a crime—the same stand- ard for an arrest. See id.; Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1137 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[A]n oﬃcer who arrests an individual without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment.”). But an oﬃcer need have only “reasonable suspicion . . . [,] a less demanding stand- ard than probable cause . . . ,” to justify a Terry stop. Illinois v. Ward- low, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). So it would be odd to suggest a stop that involved a shooting by an oﬃcer could be supported just by reasonable suspicion. As for the purpose of the stop here, we see nothing investi- gatory about it. A Terry stop must be “justiﬁed at its incep- tion . . . .” Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. But the Oﬃcers’ ﬁrst contact with Watkins occurred when Oﬃcer Faulkner yelled “Freeze! . . . Hey, stop, freeze!” and both Oﬃcers began ﬁring. They now claim self- defense, not a need to have investigated Watkins for a crime. That is, the Oﬃcers responded with deadly force to what they said they thought was a threat to their lives. So we conclude Oﬃcers Faulkner and Davis arrested Wat- kins, and their actions had to be supported by probable cause. Still, we acknowledge that the parties focus their arguments on whether the Oﬃcers had “reasonable suspicion” to support stopping Watkins in the ﬁrst place. And the parties dispute USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 36 of 52

36 Opinion of the Court 23-13616

whether the Oﬃcers were entitled to qualiﬁed immunity on that basis. So we also address those arguments. Construing the facts for Watkins, we conclude no reasona- ble oﬃcer could think Defendants even had reasonable suspicion. Because “reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause . . . ,” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123, no reasonable oﬃcer would think they had probable cause, either. “[R]easonable suspicion can be established with information that is diﬀerent in quantity or content than that required to estab- lish probable cause.” Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 380 (2020) (quot- ing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The standard ‘depends on the factual and practi- cal considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and pru- dent men, not legal technicians, act.’” Id. (quoting Navarette v. Cal- ifornia, 572 U.S. 393, 402 (2014)) (emphasis altered). And “[c]ourts ‘cannot reasonably demand scientiﬁc certainty . . . where none ex- ists.’” Id. at 380 (quoting Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125). Instead, courts “must permit oﬃcers to make ‘commonsense judgments and infer- ences about human behavior.’” Id. at 380–81. Even so, though, an “oﬃcer must be able to articulate more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch”’ of criminal activity.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123–24 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). Yet “the level of suspicion the standard requires is con- siderably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence . . . .” Glover, 589 U.S. at 380 (quoting Navarette, 572 U.S. at 397) (internal quotation marks omitted). USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 37 of 52

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We must also remember that “[w]hen an oﬃcer asserts qual- iﬁed immunity, the issue is not whether reasonable suspicion ex- isted in fact, but whether the oﬃcer had ‘arguable’ reasonable sus- picion . . . .” Jackson, 206 F.3d at 1166. To satisfy “arguable reason- able suspicion,” we must evaluate whether “a reasonable oﬃcer could have believed that the [stop] comported with the Fourth Amendment.” Meshal v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 117 F.4th 1273, 1288 (11th Cir. 2024). In sum, “we ‘must examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether an oﬃcer had a ‘particularized and objective’ basis to support his suspicion. Whether the oﬃcer’s suspicion ends up being mistaken is immaterial so long as it was reasonable.’” Id. (quoting Whittier v. Kobayashi, 581 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)). This “‘totality of the circumstances inquiry’ . . . has no time limit.” Barnes, 145 S. Ct. at 1358. “The history of the interaction, as well as other past circumstances known to the oﬃcer, . . . inform the reasonableness of the [Oﬃcers’ actions].” Id. In other words, we can’t “put on chronological blinders” and assess the arguable reasonableness of a seizure without proper “consideration of prior events” that led to the interaction. See id. at 1359. With that in mind, we assess whether any reasonable oﬃcer could have had reasonable suspicion that Watkins was engaged in a crime. Construing the facts for Watkins, we think not. First, before the events on the driveway, Watkins did nothing suspicious. The Oﬃcers were dispatched to 11 Bellamy Place; USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 38 of 52

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Watkins was on a separate property across the cul-de-sac (30 Bellamy Place). She was calmly loading her car at her place of employment. And the Oﬃcers identify no evidence in the record that Bellamy Place was a “high crime area.” On top of those facts, Oﬃcer Faulk- ner noticed separate suspects at 11 Bellamy Place near a diﬀerent black vehicle on that property. So from the Oﬃcers’ perspective, Watkins was not the suspect they were dispatched to confront. Second, on this record, Watkins’s ﬂight from the Oﬃcers’ approach cannot justify her stop. To be sure, the Supreme Court has recognized that “nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. And we have consistently recognized that ﬂight or otherwise-sus- picious behavior upon recognizing oﬃcers supports a ﬁnding of rea- sonable suspicion. See, e.g., United States v. Lindsey, 482 F.3d 1285, 1291 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Franklin, 323 F.3d 1298, 1301– 02 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Hunter, 291 F.3d 1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v. Gordon, 231 F.3d 750, 756 (11th Cir. 2000). But all bets are oﬀ when an oﬃcer fails to identify himself, and his status as an oﬃcer isn’t obvious. Indeed, the Supreme Court has “held that when an oﬃcer insuﬃciently or unclearly identiﬁes his oﬃce or his mission, the occupant’s ﬂight . . . must be regarded as ambiguous conduct.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 482 (1963). Consistently, we have clearly established that “oﬃcers cannot improperly provoke . . . a person into ﬂeeing and use the ﬂight to justify a stop.” Franklin, 323 F.3d at 1302; see also Jackson, 206 F.3d at 1166 (ﬁnding no arguable reasonable suspicion USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 39 of 52

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where the plaintiﬀ ran when mistaking plain clothes oﬃcers for armed robbers). The touchstone for evaluating ﬂight is “whether a reasonable and innocent person facing this situation would have been caused to ﬂee in the same manner . . . .” Franklin, 323 F.3d at 1302. No reasonable oﬃcer could ﬁnd Watkins’s brief “ﬂight” sug- gested criminality. The Oﬃcers approached Watkins in complete darkness except for their ﬂashlights. They had entered the cul-de- sac with sirens oﬀ; they were on foot when they advanced on Wat- kins; and they wore dark clothing under cover of night. Oﬃcer Faulkner didn’t make his identity known any better when he yelled, “Freeze!” And both oﬃcers started shooting without announcing that they were oﬃcers. A reasonable person, especially a 47-year-old woman alone in a desolate place at night, would worry she was being attacked and ﬂee that scene. That’s not suspicious behavior; it’s survival instincts. And a reasonable oﬃcer would realize that. So even though the Oﬃcers may not have meant to provoke Wat- kins’s ﬂight, they still did exactly that. Cf. Jackson, 206 F.3d at 1166. And they cannot use her provoked ﬂight to justify the stop. Frank- lin, 323 F.3d at 1302. In one last try, the Oﬃcers argue that they had arguable rea- sonable suspicion to stop Watkins because they claim she almost hit Oﬃcer Davis with her car. They point out Georgia courts have upheld convictions for assault when a suspect has driven directly at an oﬃcer to avoid detention. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 833 S.E.2d 142 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019) (“[T]he evidence shows that [the suspect] drove USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 40 of 52

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the stolen white van directly toward Deputies . . . when they at- tempted to detain him, only missing them when they dove out of the way.”). But when we construe the record for Watkins for the pur- poses of summary judgment, we can’t conclude that a reasonable oﬃcer would have suspected Watkins tried to hit Oﬃcer Davis with her car. To start, there’s a genuine question of material fact as to whether Officers Faulkner and Davis could have reasonably thought Officer Davis was visible to the naked eye in the center of the driveway. That is— there is a question as to whether a reason- able officer in Officer Faulkner and Davis’s shoes would think Wat- kins saw Davis with enough time for her to process his location and change course. The record contains several pieces of evidence that suggest no reasonable officer would think Davis visible. The driveway was covered in darkness. Officer Davis, wearing all black and a face- mask, did not initially shine his flashlight at Watkins’s car. Nor did he make so much as a peep. It was only Officer Faulkner who yelled. And as we’ve noted, he yelled only, “Hey, stop, freeze!”— which offered no indication of the location of Officer Davis. We must resolve this question of fact in favor of Watkins. So we must assess the claim to qualified immunity as though nei- ther Officer Faulkner nor Officer Davis could have reasonably thought Watkins could see Davis in the road. Besides that fact, Of- ficer Davis was only close to the car’s pathway because he USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 41 of 52

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intentionally stepped in the center of the driveway that was the sole egress from 30 Bellamy Place. So under this version of the facts, Officer Davis alone caused any risk of a collision. And we think it common sense that an officer can’t step in the middle of oncoming traffic, taking drivers unaware, and reasonably claim to be the vic- tim of vehicular assault. Cf. Kirby v. Duva, 530 F.3d 475, 482–83 (6th Cir. 2008) (denying qualified immunity on an excessive-force claim and highlighting that an officer unreasonably “placed himself in po- tential danger by moving toward the rolling [car]”); Estate of Starks v. Enyart, 5 F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir. 1993) (“The key dispute for the factfinder will be whether [the officer] stepped in front of [the sus- pect’s] rapidly moving cab, leaving [the suspect] no time to brake. If he did, then [the officer] would have unreasonably created the encounter that ostensibly permitted the use of deadly force to pro- tect him, because the decedent would have been unable to react in order to avoid presenting a deadly threat to [the officer].”). Plus, Watkins engaged in no erratic driving behavior sug- gesting she was trying to hit Officer Davis. So with proper “consid- eration of prior events,” Barnes, 145 S. Ct. at 1359, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Watkins, we think no rea- sonable oﬃcer would conclude Watkins spontaneously decided to hit Oﬃcer Davis with her car. In fact, if Watkins had wanted to hit an oﬃcer, Oﬃcer Faulk- ner would have made the easier target—as any reasonable oﬃcer would’ve realized. He, unlike Oﬃcer Davis, revealed his location with his ﬂashlight before Watkins started driving. Yet Watkins USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 42 of 52

42 Opinion of the Court 23-13616

drove up the other side of the driveway, away from Oﬃcer Faulk- ner. It’s no wonder, then, that Oﬃcer Harris did not think Watkins intended to hit any oﬃcers. Then to top it all oﬀ, a genuine dispute of material fact exists over whether Watkins’s car even would have hit Oﬃcer Davis had he not moved. We must treat this dispute as though he would not have been hit by Watkins’s car. Yet even absent this dispute, a rea- sonable jury could find no reasonable officer would think Watkins attempted vehicular assault. But that finding is especially likely if the jury finds, as it may, that Davis was never in danger. At bottom, Watkins engaged in no behavior that a reasona- ble oﬃcer could ﬁnd suspicious. So the Oﬃcers had no arguable reasonable suspicion for conducting their stop. That means they also had no arguable probable cause, the standard the Oﬃcers had to meet to support a claim of qualiﬁed immunity for an unlawful arrest. See Skop, 485 F.3d at 1137 (explaining the standard of “argu- able probable cause,” which is whether “reasonable oﬃcers in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the De- fendant[] could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest.”); Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123 (explaining reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause). For these reasons, they are not entitled to qualiﬁed immunity on Watkins’s “seizure of per- son and unlawful detention” claim. USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 43 of 52

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C. The Oﬃcers are not entitled to qualiﬁed immunity on Wat- kins’s excessive-force claim. We move next to Watkins’s excessive-force claim. The Of- ﬁcers argue that they are not liable on this claim for three reasons. First, they say that shots that miss a plaintiﬀ’s ﬂesh can’t sustain an excessive-force claim. Second, they assert they had probable cause to ﬁre at Watkins based on an imminent threat of deadly harm. And third, they contend their use of force did not violate clearly established law. We are not persuaded. We address the Oﬃcers’ ﬁrst argument summarily. All the cases the Oﬃcers cite to show a shot that misses a plaintiﬀ’s ﬂesh can’t sustain an excessive-force claim show only that a shoot–and– miss is not a physical-force seizure. See Torres, 592 U.S. at 318; Ham- mett v. Paulding County, 875 F.3d 1036, 1053 (11th Cir. 2017); Carr v. Tatangelo, 338 F.3d 1259, 1270–71 (11th Cir. 2003). They don’t speak to the underlying merits of an excessive-force claim. Cf. Flores, 381 F.3d at 396–98 (allowing an analogous excessive-force claim where oﬃcers shot a plaintiﬀ’s car to move forward). And as we’ve already explained, the Oﬃcers seized Watkins both by physical force and a show of authority. See Part III.A, supra. So we turn now to the merits of Watkins’s excessive-force claim and whether the Oﬃcers are entitled to qualiﬁed immunity on it. We conclude they don’t enjoy immunity against a claim that they unlawfully shot at her. We typically evaluate whether an oﬃcer has unlawfully used deadly force by evaluating the factors Tennessee v. Garner outlines. USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 44 of 52

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See Powell v. Snook, 25 F.4th 912, 922 (11th Cir. 2022). There, the Supreme Court held that “a police oﬃcer may use deadly force to seize a ﬂeeing felony suspect when the oﬃcer: (1) ‘has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the oﬃcer or to others’ or ‘that he has committed a crime involving the inﬂiction or threatened inﬂiction of serious physical harm’; (2) reasonably believes that the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent escape; and (3) has given some warning about the possible use of deadly force, if feasible.” Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d at 1323, 1329–30 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Garner, 471 U.S. at 11–12) (emphasis altered). But “Garner did not establish a magical on/oﬀ switch that triggers rigid preconditions whenever an oﬃcer’s actions constitute ‘deadly force.’” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382 (2007). “The con- stitutional test for excessive force is necessarily fact speciﬁc.” McCullough v. Antolini, 559 F.3d 1201, 1206 (11th Cir. 2009). And “in the end we must still slosh our way through the factbound morass of ‘reasonableness.’” Scott, 550 U.S. at 383. In doing so, we again acknowledge the Supreme Court’s recent guidance: we can’t “put on chronological blinders” because “the history of the interaction, as well as other past circumstances known to the oﬃcer, . . . inform the reasonableness of the use of force.” Barnes, 145 S. Ct. at 1358– 59. We start with the ﬁrst Garner factor. From it, we have clearly established that “[a] police oﬃcer may not seize an unarmed, non- dangerous suspect by shooting him dead.” Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 45 of 52

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For example, in Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, we held that an of- ﬁcer violated the Fourth Amendment when he used deadly force against an unarmed, intoxicated man who “did little to provoke the police oﬃcers to beat him.” 774 F.2d 1495, 1502 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). And in Lundgren v. McDaniel, we aﬃrmed a judgment where a reasonable jury could ﬁnd that oﬃcers used excessive force when “the oﬃcers without provocation shot at a nondangerous suspect.” 814 F.2d 600, 603 (11th Cir. 1987). Similarly, in Vaughan v. Cox, we explained that “[u]nder Garner, a police oﬃcer can use deadly force to prevent the escape of a ﬂeeing non-violent felony suspect only when the suspect poses an immediate threat of serious harm to police oﬃcers or others.” 343 F.3d at 1332. Still, this is a broad principle of clearly established law. Plum- hoﬀ v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014) (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004) (per curiam)) (“Garner . . . [is] ‘cast at a high level of generality’”). And we have explained that “[t]he more gen- eral the statement of law is that puts the oﬃcial on notice, the more egregious the violation must be before we will ﬁnd that the oﬃcial is not entitled to qualiﬁed immunity.” Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1330 (11th Cir. 2007); see also Echols v. Lawton, 913 F.3d 1313, 1324 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1353 (11th Cir. 2002)) (A broad “principle ‘must establish with obvious clarity that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness of the oﬃcial’s conduct is apparent.’”). USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 46 of 52

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Yet the Oﬃcers’ actions here were particularly egregious. As we’ve explained, the Oﬃcers lacked even arguable reasonable suspi- cion to stop Watkins for any crime, let alone probable cause to shoot her as posing a threat of harm. See Part III.B, supra. And just as “Garner involved a ﬂeeing non-dangerous suspect in a non-vio- lent crime,” Powell, 25 F.4th at 923, here, Watkins was, at worst, also a non-dangerous suspect in a non-violent crime. In fact, we don’t even see a basis for characterizing her as a suspect for the crime the oﬃcers responded to. See Part III.B, supra. After all, the initial crime for which the oﬃcers were dispatched was breaking into an unattended vehicle on a diﬀerent property than Watkins’s place of business. The Oﬃcers also can’t claim any support from the second or third Garner factors. Because Watkins obviously committed no crimes, the Oﬃcers couldn’t have “reasonably believe[d] that the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent escape,” as the second factor instructs us to evaluate. Vaughan, 343 F.3d at 1329–30 (inter- nal quotation marks omitted). Nor did the Oﬃcers give any “warn- ing about the possible use of deadly force” to satisfy the third Gar- ner factor. Id. at 1330. Watkins’s alleged use of her car as a “weapon” also doesn’t justify the Oﬃcers’ shots on this record. True, we have before “up- held an oﬃcer’s use of force and granted qualiﬁed immunity in cases where the [plaintiﬀ] used or threatened to use his car as a weapon to endanger oﬃcers or civilians immediately preceding the oﬃcer’s use of deadly force.” McCullough, 559 F.3d at 1207. The USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 47 of 52

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Oﬃcers oﬀer several cases to support that point. See Baxter v. San- tiago-Miranda, 121 F.4th 873 (11th Cir. 2024); Terrell v. Smith, 668 F.3d 1244, 1253 (11th Cir. 2012); McCullough, 559 F.3d at 1208; Sin- gletary v. Vargas, 804 F.3d 1174, 1182–83 (11th Cir. 2015); Troupe, 419 F.3d at 1168; Robinson v. Arrugueta, 415 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir. 2005); Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1282 (11th Cir. 2002); Clemons v. Knight, 662 F. App’x 725, 728 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished). But this case is nothing like any of those. Each of the cases the Oﬃcers cite involved a suspect who apparently disobeyed or- ders from clearly identiﬁed oﬃcers. Baxter, 121 F. 4th at 880–81; Terrell, 668 F.3d at 1249; McCullough, 559 F.3d at 1207–08; Singletary, 804 F.3d at 1177–78, Troupe, 419 F.3d at 1168; Robinson, 415 F.3d at 1254; Pace, 283 F.3d at 1277–78; Clemons, 662 F. App’x at 726–27. Again, though, the Oﬃcers here never identiﬁed themselves. And they purposely chose to stealthily approach a person who was by herself in a dark, desolate area with only one means of egress. Be- cause on this record, no reasonable oﬃcer could have believed that Watkins was disobeying orders from clearly identiﬁed oﬃcers when she ﬂed, these cases don’t help the Oﬃcers. Similarly, no reasonable oﬃcer could have believed that Wat- kins was using or intended to use her car as a weapon as she tried to escape what looked like a dangerous situation. For that reason, the Oﬃcers also violated another principle of clearly established law in this circuit. “[W]here the plaintiﬀ did not use or did not threaten to use his car as a weapon, we have rejected an oﬃcer’s USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 48 of 52

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use of deadly force.” Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1283 (11th Cir. 2013). That’s why in Morton v. Kirkwood, we denied qualiﬁed im- munity on an excessive-force claim. There, the plaintiﬀ was “an unarmed man in a stationary vehicle while [the oﬃcer had] no rea- son to believe that the man would place anyone’s safety in danger.” 707 F.3d at 1282. And in Vaughan v. Cox, we denied qualiﬁed im- munity when the plaintiﬀ claimed the driver of a stolen vehicle ﬂed at 15 miles above the speed limit but otherwise did not drive errat- ically. 343 F.3d at 1326–27, 1330–33. Watkins’s case falls neatly within this line of our precedent. Watkins did not drive erratically but in a straight line out her only escape path. Cf. Vaughan, 343 F.3d at 1330 (“[T]he truck’s lane was clear of traﬃc and [the suspect] made no aggressive moves to change lanes before [the oﬃcer] ﬁred.”). And she acted as any rea- sonable person in her position would have—she sought to get away from two men who were camouﬂaged in dark clothing and ap- proached her in an isolated place without identifying themselves. She was not a suspect in any crime. Cf. Morton, 707 F.3d at 1283 (“In Vaughan, the driver was suspected of car theft; Morton was suspected of no crime.”). And as we’ve explained, we must resolve the dispute of fact as to whether Oﬃcer Davis was ever even in the path of Watkins’s car in Watkins’s favor. Under that version of the facts, no one’s life was at risk. Cf. Vaughan, 343 F.3d at 1330 (“[T]he record [doesn’t] reﬂect that the suspects had menaced or were likely to menace others on the highway at the time of the USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 49 of 52

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shooting.”); Morton, 707 F.3d at 1283 (“Morton presented less of a safety and ﬂight risk than the driver in Vaughan or the suspect in Garner.”). So at bottom, no reasonable oﬃcer could have be- lieved it necessary to shoot Watkins to protect anyone from harm.6 Because the Oﬃcers’ actions, in the light most favorable to Watkins, violated two principles of clearly established law in this circuit, they aren’t entitled to qualiﬁed immunity on Watkins’s ex- cessive-force claim. D. The Oﬃcers are not entitled to qualiﬁed immunity on Wat- kins’s unlawful-seizure-of-property claim. Next, we consider Watkins’s claim for the unlawful seizure of property. Watkins asserts that the Oﬃcers unlawfully damaged her car when they shot it four times. The Oﬃcers argue that they are entitled to qualiﬁed immunity for three reasons. First, they say they did not seize Watkins’s car. Second, the Oﬃcers assert that, in any case, they had probable cause to ﬁre on Watkins’s vehicle.

6 The Officers also assert that “a plaintiff ‘cannot establish a Fourth Amend-

ment violation based merely on bad tactics that result in a deadly confronta- tion that could have been avoided.’” See Powell, 25 F.4th at 922 (quoting City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 615 (2015)). But “bad tactics” are different from unreasonable actions. And here, for the reasons we’ve ex- plained, no reasonable officer would have done what the Officers did. With- out identifying themselves as officers or warning they would use deadly force, they approached a person who was alone in a dark and desolate place and started shooting when she fled. That’s not a poor strategic decision in the heat of confronting a threat. Rather, it’s reckless and unreasonable. USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 50 of 52

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And third, they contend they didn’t violate clearly established law. We disagree with each argument. To begin, the Oﬃcers seized Watkins’s SUV. A “seizure” of property “occurs when ‘there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.’” Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)). And in dicta, the Supreme Court has ex- plained that “when speaking of property, ‘[f ]rom the time of the founding to the present, the word ‘seizure’ has meant a ‘taking pos- session.’” Torres, 592 U.S. at 312 (quoting Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 624) (alteration in original). We need not and do not decide whether oﬃcers seize a ve- hicle when they shoot it but do not fully wrest possession of it from its owner. That’s so because here, the Oﬃcers separated Watkins from her car and took possession of it. As Watkins stopped her SUV and exited to submit to the Oﬃcers’ authority, Oﬃcer Davis ordered Watkins to get down. And Oﬃcer Faulkner secured her person. In doing so, the Oﬃcers separated Watkins from her car and seized it. To their credit, even the Oﬃcers concede that Watkins’s car was seized. But they say the Georgia Bureau of Investigation seized it. And because Oﬃcers Yi and Harris separated the Oﬃcers from the investigation after four minutes from the initiation of the seizure, the Oﬃcers argue they did not seize the car. USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 51 of 52

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We disagree. The Oﬃcers were involved with the interac- tion long enough to separate Watkins from her car, so they seized it. Because the Oﬃcers seized Watkins’s car, we must consider whether they violated clearly established law in doing so. “Gener- ally, the seizure of personal property is per se unreasonable when not pursuant to a warrant issued upon probable cause.” Crocker v. Beatty, 886 F.3d 1132, 1136 (11th Cir. 2018). But “[s]everal excep- tions . . . exist to this general rule.” Id. One exception, which Defendants do not argue applies, is an “investigative detention” or Terry stop. “The bounds of investiga- tive detention of personal property are deﬁned by the limits appli- cable to the detention of a person.” United States v. Virden, 488 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2007). So “the factors used to determine whether a Terry stop has matured into an arrest are also useful in evaluating whether a seizure of property required probable cause.” Id. But we’ve already explained why the Terry factors don’t support finding an investigatory stop here. See Part III.B., supra. The Officers instead rely on another exception to the war- rant requirement. They argue the exigent-circumstances excep- tion applies. As its name suggests, “[t]he exigent-circumstances excep- tion” allows for the seizure of property without a warrant “when certain exigencies exist . . . .” Crocker, 886 F.3d at 1136. “The most urgent of these exigencies is ‘the need to protect or preserve life’ in an emergency situation.” United States v. Timmann, 741 F.3d 1170, USCA11 Case: 23-13616 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 52 of 52

52 Opinion of the Court 23-13616

1178 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1335 (11th Cir. 2002)). But the same old problem prevents the Oﬃcers from being able to rely on the exigent-circumstances exception. When we view the evidence in the light most favorable to Watkins, she never put the Oﬃcers at risk of serious injury. See Part III.B & C, supra. That means the Oﬃcers seized Watkins’s SUV without an applica- ble exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. As a result, they violated clearly established law. We have recognized that “[t]he right to be free from warrantless seizures of personal property, absent an applicable exception, was clearly es- tablished to the point of obvious clarity [as early as] 2012.” Crocker, 886 F.3d at 1138. And “[t]he exigent circumstances exception was similarly clearly established . . . .” Id. So we are bound to deny qualiﬁed immunity to oﬃcers who seize property without such an exception “[e]ven in ‘novel factual situations . . . .’” Id. (quoting Jones v. Fransen, 857 F.3d 843, 852 (11th Cir. 2017)). This is such a case. So we aﬃrm the district court’s denial of qualiﬁed immunity to the Oﬃcers on Watkins’s property-damage claim. IV. CONCLUSION For these reasons, we aﬃrm the denial of summary judg- ment on qualiﬁed-immunity grounds and remand for further pro- ceedings consistent with this opinion. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

Reference

Status: Published