U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 2025

United States v. Karron L. Shuman

United States v. Karron L. Shuman
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Decided October 1, 2025

United States v. Karron L. Shuman

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-10069 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 10/01/2025 Page: 1 of 3

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-10069 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus KARRON L. SHUMAN, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 4:23-cr-00049-LGW-BWC-1 ____________________ Before ROSENBAUM, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: Karron Leonard Shuman, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for compassion- ate release, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). On appeal, he USCA11 Case: 25-10069 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 10/01/2025 Page: 2 of 3

2 Opinion of the Court 25-10069 argues that the court erred in requiring exhaustion of administra- tive remedies. Second, he argues that an amendment to U.S.S.G.

§ 5H1.1 and his youthful status during prior convictions used to en- hance his current 86-month sentence are extraordinary and com- pelling reasons to reduce his sentence.

It is well established that a district court has no inherent au- thority to modify a defendant’s sentence and may do so “only when authorized by a statute or rule.” United States v. Puentes, 803 F.3d 597, 605-06 (11th Cir. 2015). Section 3582(c)(1)(A) of Title 18 of the U.S. Code allows a district court to reduce a prisoner’s term of im- prisonment upon motion of the Board of Prisons (“BOP”) or the defendant, if the court finds that extraordinary and compelling rea- sons warrant such a reduction. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). How- ever, a court may only grant a defendant’s motion after he has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the BOP to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf, or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier. Id. We have clarified that § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement is a non-jurisdictional, claim-processing rule. United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021). A prisoner must submit a § 3582(c)(1)(A) request to the warden of his facility, and, if the warden denies the request, the prisoner may administratively appeal to the BOP Regional Di- rector and then the BOP General Counsel. 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.15, 571.61(a), 571.63(a). A decision of either the Director of the BOP or the General Counsel is a final administrative decision. Id. § 571.63(b)-(d).

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25-10069 Opinion of the Court 3 Here, the record evidence shows that Shuman brought his request for sentence reduction, or compassionate release, before the warden on November 18, 2024, and it was denied on December 2, 2024. As the warden’s denial explained, Shuman was required to appeal through the Administrative Remedy Program if he was dis- satisfied with the denial. 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.15, 571.61(a), 571.63(a).

Because the record evidence does not show any appeal, and, in turn, no final administrative decision, the district court correctly found that Shuman’s motion for compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A) was unexhausted. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); 28 C.F.R. § 571.63(b) (d). The district court may only grant a motion for com- passionate release after full exhaustion, and, so, the court was not obligated to consider whether Shuman had presented an extraordi- nary and compelling reason for a sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Accordingly, this Court affirms the district court’s denial of Shuman’s § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion.

AFFIRMED.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.