United States v. Quavon Hires
United States v. Quavon Hires
Opinion
USCA11 Case: 25-12400 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 10/09/2025 Page: 1 of 5
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-12400 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus QUAVON HIRES, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cr-20712-KMM-1 ____________________ Before JILL PRYOR, BRASHER, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Quavon Hires appeals his 11-month imprisonment sentence for the revocation of his supervised release for associating with a person who was a convicted felon without permission. He asserts USCA11 Case: 25-12400 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 10/09/2025 Page: 2 of 5
The district court stated “the only thing I’m relying on is what he pled guilty to . . . . That’s it, short and sweet.” The district court
USCA11 Case: 25-12400 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 10/09/2025 Page: 3 of 5
25-12400 Opinion of the Court 3 should be taken at its word. See United States v. Curtin, 78 F.4th 1299, 1313 (11th Cir. 2023) (stating when a district court expressly disclaims reliance on a fact at sentencing, we take the district court at its word). As to the other statements Hires complains of, such as the comments about his inability to not commit crimes while out of prison and his “affection for firearms”—these are not facts.
Rather, these were characterizations the court provided to express its perspectives on the case.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the court relied on erroneous facts, the error was harmless because it did not substantially affect the ultimate sentence imposed. See id. (explaining a district court’s consideration of an impermissible factor at sentencing is harmless if the record as a whole shows the error did not substantially affect the selection of the sentence imposed). There was evidence of Hires’ extensive criminal history before the court at sentencing, and several § 3553(a) 2 factors require its weighing, independent of
2 Section 3583(e) of Title 18 governs the discretionary revocation of supervised release and permits the district court to revoke a term of supervised release after considering the factors set forth in § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7). 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). These purposes include the need to deter criminal conduct and protect the public from the defendant’s future crimes. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(C). In imposing a par- ticular sentence, the court must also consider the offense’s nature and circum- stances, the defendant’s history and characteristics, the applicable Guidelines range, Sentencing Commission policy statements, the need to avoid unwar- ranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct, and the need to provide restitution to any of the defendant’s victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (4)–(7).
USCA11 Case: 25-12400 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 10/09/2025 Page: 4 of 5
B. Substantive Reasonableness We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence un- der a deferential abuse of discretion standard considering the total- ity of the circumstances. United States v. King, 57 F.4th 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2023). The party challenging the sentence bears the bur- den of establishing that it is unreasonable based on the facts of the case and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Id. at 1337-38. A district court abuses its considerable discretion and imposes a substantively unreasonable sentence only when it “(1) fails to afford considera- tion to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) com- mits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.” Id. at 1338 (quotations and alterations omitted). We give due def- erence to the district court’s consideration and weighing of the rel- evant sentencing factors. Id. As to the weighing of Hires’ criminal history, it was not sub- stantively unreasonable because it was within the district court’s considerable discretion. Several § 3553(a) factors the court must consider directly implicate criminal history. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (defendant’s history and characteristics); § 3553(a)(2)(B) (affording adequate deterrence); § 3553(a)(2)(C) (protecting the public from further crimes of defendant); see also United States v. Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105, 1106-07 (11th Cir. 2005) USCA11 Case: 25-12400 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 10/09/2025 Page: 5 of 5
25-12400 Opinion of the Court 5 (holding the district court properly considered defendant’s criminal history and his threat to the public in arriving at his revocation sen- tence). The court noted its specific concerns about protecting the public from a defendant who appeared to be a consistent recidivist any time he was not incarcerated, specifically pointing to the § 3553(a)(1) factor of the history and characteristics of the defend- ant. Thus, Hires fails to show how the district court gave signifi- cant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor when it weighed his criminal history. Hires’ sentence is not substantively unreason- able.
AFFIRMED.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.