USCA11 Case: 23-12686 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 10/20/2025 Page: 1 of 6

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 23-12686 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus

OSWALDO GONZALEZ, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cr-20005-RKA-2 ____________________

Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Oswaldo Gonzalez appeals his conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, 46 U.S.C. USCA11 Case: 23-12686 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 10/20/2025 Page: 2 of 6

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§§ 70503(a)(1), 70506(b). On appeal, Gonzalez raises several chal- lenges to his underlying statutes of conviction, which are part of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”), arguing that the MDLEA is unconstitutional, both in general and as applied, and that the district court lacked jurisdiction in this case. Gonzalez concedes we have rejected these challenges in other published de- cisions but maintains his position in this appeal for the purpose of seeking further review. We generally review constitutional, jurisdictional, and stat- utory interpretation questions de novo. United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815, 820 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 2025 WL 1426696 (May 19, 2025) (mem.), and cert. denied, 2025 WL 1426697 (May 19, 2025) (mem.); United States v. Gruezo, 66 F.4th 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 2023). Under our prior panel precedent rule, we are bound to fol- low prior binding precedent until it is overruled by the Supreme Court or this Court sitting en banc. United States v. White, 837 F.3d 1225, 1228 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Lee, 886 F.3d 1161, 1163 n.3 (11th Cir. 2018). The MDLEA makes it a crime to “knowingly or intention- ally . . . possess with intent to manufacture or distribute, a con- trolled substance” on board “a [covered] vessel subject to the juris- diction of the United States,” and to conspire to do the same. 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1), (e)(1), 70506(b). The statute defines a “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” as including “a vessel without nationality.” Id. § 70502(c)(1)(A). In turn, a “ves- sel without nationality” is defined to include “a vessel aboard USCA11 Case: 23-12686 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 10/20/2025 Page: 3 of 6

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which the master or individual in charge makes a claim of registry and for which the claimed nation of registry does not affirmatively and unequivocally assert that the vessel is of its nationality.” Id. § 70502(d)(1)(C). The MDLEA “applies even though the act is committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” Id. § 70503(b); see also Alfonso, 104 F.4th at 820. “Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 of the Constitution” gives Congress “‘three distinct grants of power: (1) the power to define and punish piracies, (the Piracies Clause); (2) the power to define and punish felonies committed on the high Seas, (the Felonies Clause); and (3) the power to define and punish offenses against the law of nations (the Offences Clause).’” Alfonso, 104 F.4th at 820 (quoting United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245, 1248 (11th Cir. 2012)); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. “We repeatedly have upheld the MDLEA as a valid exercise of Congress’s power ‘to define and punish . . . Felonies on the high Seas.’” Alfonso, 104 F.4th at 820 (quoting United States v. Estupinan, 453 F.3d 1336, 1338–39 (11th Cir. 2006)); see also United States v. Hernandez, 864 F.3d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[W]e [have] held that the MDLEA [i]s a constitutional exercise of Congressional authority under the Felonies Clause, and that the conduct proscribed by the MDLEA need not have a nexus to the United States.” (citing United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802, 809–10 (11th Cir. 2017) and United States v. Wilchombe, 838 F.3d 1179, 1186 (11th Cir. 2016))); United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567, 587 (11th Cir. 2020) (reject- ing an as-applied constitutional challenge to the application of the USCA11 Case: 23-12686 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 10/20/2025 Page: 4 of 6

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MDLEA to vessels on the high seas engaged in drug-trafficking crimes without a nexus to the United States). In Alfonso, several defendants appealed their convictions un- der the MDLEA that arose from an incident where the United States Coast Guard seized a vessel bearing no indicia of nationality from within the Dominican Republic’s EEZ.1 104 F.4th at 818–20. The defendants argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the EEZ was not part of the “high seas.” Id. We held that “international law does not limit the Felonies Clause.” Id. at 826. We also held that a nation’s EEZ is “part of the ‘high seas’ for purposes of the Felonies Clause in Article I of the Constitution,” and thus, “enforcement of the MDLEA in EEZs is proper.” Id. at 823, 827. We reaffirmed and built on this holding in United States v. Canario-Vilomar, in which two appellants—one seized in a vessel 37 nautical miles north of Panama, the other seized in a vessel 145 nautical miles north of Colombia—chal- lenged the district court’s jurisdiction, arguing that the MDLEA ex- ceeds Congress’s authority under the Felonies Clause, and that one appellant’s arrest did not occur on the high seas because he was arrested in Colombia’s EEZ. 128 F.4th 1374, 1376–78 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, __U.S.__, 2025 WL 2824488 (Oct. 6, 2025) (mem.). We relied on Alfonso and similarly concluded that Congress was not constrained by international law in crafting the MDLEA. Id. at

1 “[T]he EEZ” constitutes “the waters extending 200 nautical miles seaward of

and adjacent to the territorial sea of a nation.” Alfonso, 104 F.4th at 818; see also id. at 821; United States v. Rioseco, 845 F.2d 299, 300 n.1 (11th Cir. 1988). USCA11 Case: 23-12686 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 10/20/2025 Page: 5 of 6

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1381 (“[W]e reject [appellants’] contention that Congress was con- strained by international law in crafting its definition of a stateless vessel or in defining the boundaries of the high seas.”). We rejected the argument “that Congress could not reach [an appellant] merely because he chose to traffic drugs in Colombia’s EEZ rather than farther out into the open ocean.” Id. at 1382. As Gonzalez concedes, our prior cases foreclose each of his arguments on appeal. Gonzalez argues that the MDLEA is uncon- stitutional as applied here because Congress’s authority “to define and punish offenses on the high seas is limited by customary inter- national law” and that “the scope of the ‘high Seas’ under the Fel- onies Clause must be similarly construed.” He then contends that, “under customary international law, the ‘high seas’ excludes the EEZ,” which is where his offense occurred. Yet, we have rejected this same argument and held enforcement of the MDLEA is proper as to vessels found in EEZs. See Alfonso, 104 F.4th at 823, 826–27; Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th at 1381–82. We have also rejected Gon- zalez’s argument that Congress was constrained by international law when crafting the MDLEA. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th at 1381– 82. Finally, we have rejected Gonzalez’s final argument, that is that “[d]ue process requires a nexus between the United States and a de- fendant’s activities.” Hernandez, 864 F.3d at 1303; Campbell, 743 F.3d at 809–10; Wilchombe, 838 F.3d at 1186. We must apply these published decisions here, as they have not been abrogated or over- ruled by the Supreme Court or this Court sitting en banc. White, USCA11 Case: 23-12686 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 10/20/2025 Page: 6 of 6

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837 F.3d at 1228; Lee, 886 F.3d at 1163 n.3. Accordingly, we affirm Gonzalez’s conviction. AFFIRMED.