USCA11 Case: 24-12827 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 10/23/2025 Page: 1 of 4

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-12827 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus

BURNETT GODBEE, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 0:13-cr-60167-KMM-2 ____________________

Before NEWSOM, KIDD, and BLACK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Burnett Godbee, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, ap- peals the district court’s denial of his motion for compassionate re- lease pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). In his motion, Godbee USCA11 Case: 24-12827 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 10/23/2025 Page: 2 of 4

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asserted that United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019), and United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022), were a change in law that sat- isfied an “extraordinary and compelling reason” to reduce his sen- tence for his 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) conviction under the newly imple- mented amendments to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6). Godbee asserts the district court applied an incorrect legal standard when consid- ering his compassionate-release claim, as it set its own criteria and prohibitions, rather than relying on the text of § 1B1.13(b)(6). 1 He asserts that, under the definitions in subsection (b)(6), the change in law he identifies qualifies as an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for his release, as he has shown a gross disparity between his actual sentence and the sentence he would receive if he were sentenced today. “[A] § 2255 motion is the exclusive remedy for a federal pris- oner to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence, except in the rare cases where it is inadequate to do so.” Antonelli v. Warden, U.S.P. Atlanta, 542 F.3d 1348, 1352 n.1 (11th Cir. 2008). In United States v. Handlon, an appeal from the denial of a compassionate-re- lease motion, Handlon argued before us that he was factually inno- cent of the underlying charges. 97 F.4th 829, 834 n.2 (11th Cir.

1 The Sentencing Commission defined “extraordinary and compelling” rea-

sons in a policy statement to § 3582(c)(1)(A) in the Sentencing Guidelines, and such reasons include an “unusually long sentence.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6). A sentence is unusually long if “after full consideration of the defendant’s indi- vidualized circumstances,” a court determines that a “change in the law . . . produce[d] a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sen- tence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed.” Id. USCA11 Case: 24-12827 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 10/23/2025 Page: 3 of 4

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2024). We stated in a footnote that “Handlon’s argument that he was improperly convicted is not a recognized extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction, nor a proper basis for seeking relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).” Id. (citations omit- ted). We cited Antonelli for the proposition that a § 2255 motion is the exclusive remedy for a federal prisoner to collaterally attack a conviction, and noted that, because Handlon already had filed an unsuccessful § 2255 motion, he needed to first get our authoriza- tion if he wanted to attempt to file a second or successive § 2255 motion. Id. The district court did not err in denying Godbee’s motion for compassionate release. See United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021) (reviewing “de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)”). Godbee’s sole argument for release, even when his brief is con- strued liberally, is that Davis and Taylor are new changes in law that undermine his § 924(c) conviction. See In re Ellingsworth Residential Cmty. Ass’n, Inc., 125 F.4th 1365, 1377 (11th Cir. 2025) (stating we liberally construe pro se filings, but we do not have the license to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading to sustain an action). The district court did not err in determining that a motion for compas- sionate release was not the proper vehicle for Godbee’s claims as this Court has stated that § 2255 is the exclusive remedy for claims collaterally attacking a conviction and sentence. See Antonelli, 542 F.3d at 1352 n.1; Handlon, 97 F.4th at 834 n.2. Notably, Godbee has already filed an unsuccessful § 2255 motion, and this Court has since denied multiple successive applications in which Godbee USCA11 Case: 24-12827 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 10/23/2025 Page: 4 of 4

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sought this Court’s permission to raise proposed claims based on Davis and Taylor. As such, Godbee’s current use of § 3582(c)(1)(A) to pursue a Davis and Taylor claim is an improper attempt to cir- cumvent the restrictions against successive § 2255 motions. See An- tonelli, 542 F.3d at 1352 n.1; Handlon, 97 F.4th at 834 n.2. Accord- ingly, we affirm.2 AFFIRMED.

2 Because the district court did not err in denying Godbee’s motion, this Court

need not reach the Government’s argument the Sentencing Commission ex- ceeded its Congressional authority in enacting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6).