Michael Hurley v. USA
Michael Hurley v. USA
Opinion
USCA11 Case: 24-11841 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 10/23/2025 Page: 1 of 5
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-11841 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________
MICHAEL HURLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF FLORIDA, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendants-Appellees. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 8:23-cv-00327-MSS-NHA ____________________
Before BRANCH, KIDD, and BLACK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: USCA11 Case: 24-11841 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 10/23/2025 Page: 2 of 5
2 Opinion of the Court 24-11841
Michael Hurley, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his amended complaint against the United States, the State of Florida, and the Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections (Defendants). Hurley contends the dis- trict court erred by dismissing his complaint with prejudice as barred by res judicata. 1 After review, we affirm. The doctrine of res judicata bars claims in a subsequent case that were or could have been raised in a prior proceeding when: (1) there was a final judgment on the merits; (2) a court of compe- tent jurisdiction rendered the judgment; (3) both suits involve iden- tical parties; and (4) both suits involve the same cause of action. Pleming v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 142 F.3d 1354, 1356 (11th Cir. 1998). This bar pertains to claims that were raised in the prior ac- tion and to claims that could have been raised previously. Davila v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1187 (11th Cir. 2003). A final
1 Hurley has abandoned any challenge to the only claim the district court de-
termined was not barred by res judicata—his challenge to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s three strikes provision. He does not men- tion the district court’s determination that he could have raised this claim in his fourth federal civil rights case or that the claim is barred by the four-year applicable statute of limitations in his brief. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating “a party fails to adequately brief a claim when he does not plainly and prominently raise it” and a party abandons a claim when he fails to brief it on appeal (quotation marks omitted)); Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating like other litigants, a pro se appellant abandons an issue by failing to address it in their opening brief). Likewise, Hurley abandoned any challenge to the district court’s denial of his post-judgment motion—construed as either a Rule 59 or Rule 60 motion— and motion to amend because he failed to address them in his brief. See id. USCA11 Case: 24-11841 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 10/23/2025 Page: 3 of 5
24-11841 Opinion of the Court 3
judgment precludes subsequent litigation of the same claim, re- gardless of whether re-litigation of the claim raises the same issues as the prior suit. Baloco v. Drummond Co., Inc., 767 F.3d 1229, 1246 (11th Cir. 2014). At all times, the burden of showing the later-filed suit is barred is on the party invoking the res judicata bar. Rode- maker v. City of Valdosta Bd. of Educ., 110 F.4th 1318, 1327 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2071 (2025). The district court did not err in dismissing Hurley’s amended complaint as barred by res judicata because Hurley pre- viously filed civil complaints, against the same Defendants, alleging identical claims about their acts in his criminal proceedings. See id. (stating except for the incorporated factual question of privity, which we review for clear error, we review de novo the district court’s application of the res judicata doctrine). It is undisputed that Hurley’s prior civil complaints, brought in the Middle and Northern Districts of Florida,2 were brought in courts of compe- tent jurisdiction, so the second element is satisfied. As to the first element, in Hurley I, the district court dis- missed Hurley’s amended complaint for failure to state a claim, which is a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes. N.A.A.C.P. v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1560 (11th Cir. 1990) (“The Su- preme Court has clearly stated that the dismissal for failure to state
2 Hurley v. Moore, N.D. Fla. Case No. 4:01-cv-00517-WS (Hurley I); Hurley v.
Florida, M.D. Fla. Case No. 5:03-cv-00108-WTH (Hurley II); Hurley v. Florida, M.D. Fla. Case. No. 5:05-cv-00212-WTH-GRJ (Hurley III); Hurley v. United States, N.D. Fla. Case No. 1:14-cv-00140-MW-GRJ (Hurley IV). USCA11 Case: 24-11841 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 10/23/2025 Page: 4 of 5
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a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is a judg- ment on the merits.” (quotation marks and alterations omitted)). Similarly, in Hurley II and Hurley III, the district courts both dis- missed Hurley’s complaint as frivolous with prejudice, which is a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes. See Hart v. Yamaha-Parts Distribs., Inc., 787 F.2d 1468, 1470 (11th Cir. 1986) (ex- plaining a dismissal with prejudice is a final judgment on the merits unless the court specifies otherwise). However, in Hurley IV, the district court dismissed Hurley’s complaint, without prejudice, pursuant to the three-strike provision under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Because a dismissal without prejudice does not constitute a final judgment on the merits, the district court’s dismissal without prej- udice in Hurley IV has no res judicata effect. See Pleming, 142 F.3d at 1356; Beach Blitz Co. v. City of Miami Beach, 13 F.4th 1289, 1300 (11th Cir. 2021) (stating “we usually understand ‘without prejudice’ to mean that a judgment is not claim-preclusive”). As to the third element, in Hurley I, Hurley II, Hurley III, and the instant complaint, Hurley pursued legal action against the United States, the State of Florida, and the Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections. See Pleming, 142 F.3d at 1356. Thus, the parties in the previous actions are the same in the instant case. Hunt, 891 F.2d at 1560 (explaining the parties must either be the same parties in the original action or in privity with those parties). As to the fourth element, Hurley’s most recent complaint involves the same causes of action as his previous civil complaints. See Pleming, 142 F.3d at 1356. Hurley’s complaints are based upon USCA11 Case: 24-11841 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 10/23/2025 Page: 5 of 5
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the same factual predicate, that the Defendants violated his consti- tutional right to access the courts, the trial judge in his state crimi- nal case failed to conduct a Faretta3 hearing, the Defendants failed to provide documents from the record on appeal, prior officials failed to provide an adequate prison law library, and he was erro- neously denied post-conviction relief. Baloco, 767 F.3d at 1247 (stat- ing both suits involve the same cause of action if the subsequent suit “arises out of the same nucleus of operative facts, or is based upon the same factual predicate,” as the prior suit (quotation marks omitted)). As the district court explained, while Hurley did not raise legal theories regarding facial and as-applied challenges to state and federal statutes, rules, and regulations in his prior com- plaints, those legal theories arise out of the same nucleus of opera- tive fact and could have been raised in the prior suits. See id. Be- cause all four elements are met, the district court did not err in dis- missing Hurley’s claims against the Defendants as barred by res ju- dicata. AFFIRMED.
3 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished