USCA11 Case: 25-11314 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 11/07/2025 Page: 1 of 7

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-11314 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus

DANNY VARELA, a.k.a. D.V., Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 9:06-cr-80171-BB-1 ____________________

Before LAGOA, LUCK, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Danny Varela, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for compassionate release under 18 USCA11 Case: 25-11314 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 11/07/2025 Page: 2 of 7

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U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The government, in turn, moves for sum- mary affirmance. Summary disposition is appropriate either where time is of the essence, such as “situations where important public policy is- sues are involved or those where rights delayed are rights denied,” or where “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a mat- ter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the out- come of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the ap- peal is frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1161-62 (5th Cir. 1969). A motion for summary affirmance post- pones the due date for the filing of any remaining brief until we rule on the motion. 11th Cir. R. 31-1(c). We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a sen- tence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A). United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021). After eligibility is established, we will review the district court’s denial of a prisoner’s § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for an abuse of discretion. Id. District courts lack the inherent authority to modify a de- fendant’s sentence and “may do so only when authorized by a stat- ute or rule.” United States v. Puentes, 803 F.3d 597, 606 (11th Cir. 2015). In 2018, however, Congress enacted the First Step Act, which, in part, amended § 3582(c)(1)(A) to increase the use and transparency of compassionate release of federal prisoners. See First Step Act § 603, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (Dec. 21, 2018). Under the statute, a “court may not modify a term USCA11 Case: 25-11314 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 11/07/2025 Page: 3 of 7

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of imprisonment once it has been imposed” except under certain circumstances. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). In the context of compassionate release, the statute provides that: [T]he court, upon . . . motion of the defendant . . . may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . after con- sidering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C.] sec- tion 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that— . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction. Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The district court need not conduct the compassionate re- lease analysis in any particular order. United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2021). A district court may grant compassionate release if: (1) an extraordinary and compelling rea- son exists; (2) a sentencing reduction would be consistent with U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 in that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of another person or the community; and (3) the § 3553(a) factors weigh in favor of compassionate release. Id. All of these necessary conditions must be satisfied before it can grant a reduction. Id. Therefore, the absence of even one condition forecloses a sentence reduction. Id. at 1237-38; see also Giron, 15 F.4th at 1347 (holding that a district court does not abuse its discretion in denying com- passionate release after analyzing only one of the three statutory requirements under § 3582(c)(1)(A)). USCA11 Case: 25-11314 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 11/07/2025 Page: 4 of 7

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The policy statement applicable to § 3582(c)(1)(A) is at § 1B1.13. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. Section 1B1.13 states that a de- fendant’s sentence may be reduced, upon motion of the defendant, if extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the reduction, the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g), and the court con- siders the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id. § 1B1.13(a). In the 2023 version of the Sentencing Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission amended § 1B1.13, renaming the initial section as subsection (a), adding to the new subsection (a) that a motion for reduction in a prison term may be brought by a defendant, and adding subsec- tions (b)-(e). Compare U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (2018), with U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (2023). Subsection (b) provides that an extraordinary and compelling reason exists under any of the following circumstances or a combination thereof: the medical circumstances of the defend- ant, the age of the defendant, the family circumstances of the de- fendant, if the defendant was the victim of abuse while serving a term of incarceration, or if the defendant received an “unusually long sentence.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)-(4), (6). Under the “unusu- ally long sentence” provision, in cases where a defendant “received an unusually long sentence and has served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment,” a district court may consider “a change in the law . . . [that would] produce a gross disparity between the sen- tence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed” in deciding “whether the defendant pre- sents an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduc- tion,” though the change in law must be considered in light of all USCA11 Case: 25-11314 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 11/07/2025 Page: 5 of 7

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“the defendant’s individualized circumstances.” Id. § 1B1.13(b)(6). Section 1B1.13(b) also contains a catch-all provision for “other rea- sons,” which provides that a prisoner may be eligible for a sentence reduction if he “presents any other circumstance or combination of circumstances that, when considered by themselves or together with any of the reasons described [above], are similar in gravity” to the other examples listed. Id. § 1B1.13(b)(5). Section 3142(g) of Title 18 of the U.S. Code lists several fac- tors for the district court to consider in determining whether a de- fendant is a danger to another person or the community, including: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense involved a firearm; (2) the weight of the evi- dence against the person; (3) the history and characteristics of the person, including their criminal history and whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the person was on probation, on pa- role, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or com- pletion of sentence for an offense; and (4) the nature and serious- ness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person’s release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(1)-(4). Relevant § 3553(a) factors include the nature and circum- stances of the offense; the defendant’s history and characteristics; and the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A)-(B). Generally, the weight given to each § 3553(a) factor is “committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” United USCA11 Case: 25-11314 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 11/07/2025 Page: 6 of 7

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States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2022). “A district court need not exhaustively analyze every factor in its order, but it must provide enough analysis that meaningful appellate review of the factors’ application can take place.” United States v. Cook, 998 F.3d 1180, 1184 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotations omitted). Here, summary affirmance is warranted because the district court, through the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, stated that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors and indicated that it was affording more weight to some factors than others. Cook, 998 F.3d at 1184. The magistrate judge explicitly stated that he had considered the § 3553(a) factors, as well as Varela’s mitigating fac- tors, namely, his “laudable” rehabilitative efforts, and the district court adopted this report as its final order. The magistrate judge specifically noted the offense conduct, which involved the death of four individuals, as well as Varela’s escalating criminal history. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A). The district court was well within its discretion to decide how much weight to afford the relevant § 3553(a) factors. Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355. Whether Varela actually demonstrated “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for release under § 1B1.13(b)(5) or (b)(6) is im- material because the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the § 3553(a) factors did not warrant early release, and that finding alone was sufficient to preclude relief. Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1238; Giron, 15 F.4th at 1347. USCA11 Case: 25-11314 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 11/07/2025 Page: 7 of 7

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Accordingly, because the government’s position is clearly correct as a matter of law, we GRANT the government’s motion for summary affirmance. Groendyke Transp., Inc., 406 F.2d at 1162.