Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Cliffton L. Sneed
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Cliffton L. Sneed
Opinion
USCA11 Case: 25-10569 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 1 of 6
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-10569
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
WELLS FARGO BANK N.A.,
As Trustee for Banc of America Funding Corporation Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-5,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
12757 INVESTMENTGROUP LLC, et al,
Defendants,
CLIFFTON L. SNEED,
a.k.a. Clifton Sneed,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 0:24-cv-60163-RS
____________________
Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
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2 Opinion of the Court 25-10569
PER CURIAM:
This appeal arises from a state-court lawsuit filed by
Appellee Wells Fargo Bank N.A. against Appellant Cliffton Sneed
and other defendants. Sneed removed the action to federal court
based on diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), but failed to
sufficiently allege the parties’ citizenship in the notice of removal.
As a result, the district court sua sponte ordered Sneed to correct the
deficiencies in an amended notice of removal.
When Sneed missed the initial, tight deadline to amend the
notice of removal, the district court remanded the case to state
court for lack of jurisdiction and failure to comply with a court
order. But the court later granted Sneed’s motion for
reconsideration and gave him an additional month to file the
amended notice. Sneed again missed the deadline, so the court
again remanded the action for lack of jurisdiction and failure to
comply with a court order. Sneed timely moved for
reconsideration and submitted an amended notice of removal, but
the court denied the motion, explaining that Sneed had been “given
multiple opportunities to cure his pleadings and failed to do so.”
The court noted that the amended notice still failed to establish the
citizenship of the defendants. Sneed now appeals.
We review de novo questions of federal subject-matter
jurisdiction, Justice Cometh, Ltd. v. Lambert, 426 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th
Cir. 2005), and of statutory interpretation, Corporate Mgmt. Advisors,
Inc. v. Artjen Complexus, Inc., 561 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2009).
We ordinarily review the imposition of sanctions under the district
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25-10569 Opinion of the Court 3
court’s inherent power for an abuse of discretion. See Martin v.
Automobili Lamborghini Exclusive, Inc., 307 F.3d 1332, 1336–37 (11th
Cir. 2002); Betty K Agencies, Ltd., 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir.
2005).
“Because this case was originally filed in state court and
removed to federal court by [Sneed], [Sneed] bears the burden of
proving that federal jurisdiction exists.” Williams v. Best Buy Co.,
Inc., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001). “[W]hen federal
jurisdiction is invoked based upon diversity,” the relevant pleading
“must include the citizenship of each party, so that the court is
satisfied that no plaintiff is a citizen of the same state as any
defendant.” Travaglio v. Am. Exp. Co., 735 F.3d 1266, 1268 (11th Cir.
2013). A conclusory allegation in the notice of removal that
diversity requirements are satisfied, “without setting forth the
underlying facts supporting such an assertion, is insufficient to
meet the defendant’s burden.” Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319.
Nonetheless, “the failure to establish a party’s citizenship at
the time of filing the removal notice is a procedural, rather than
jurisdictional, defect.” Corporate Mgmt. Advisors, 561 F.3d at 1296
(quotation marks omitted). That distinction is important. If a
district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, it “may remand a
case sua sponte . . . at any time.” 1 Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at
1 Moreover, by statute, we lack jurisdiction to review “a remand order based
on subject matter jurisdiction.” Corporate Mgmt. Advisors, Inc. v. Artjen Com-
plexus, Inc., 561 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2009). Nonetheless, we retain juris-
diction “to review whether the district court exceeded its authority under §
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4 Opinion of the Court 25-10569
any time before final judgment it appears that the district court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”). But
§ 1447(c) “does not authorize any sua sponte remand order not
based on subject matter jurisdiction.” Whole Health Chiropractic &
Wellness, Inc. v. Humana Med. Plan, Inc., 254 F.3d 1317, 1319 (11th
Cir. 2001). In other words, a court exceeds its authority by
remanding a case sua sponte “due to a defect in the removal
process.” Id.at 1319–20; see also In re Bethesda Mem’l Hosp., Inc.,123 F.3d 1407, 1410-11
(11th Cir. 1997) (“The court acted outside of its
statutory authority by remanding for a procedural defect after
thirty days of the notice of removal.”).
Here, the district court exceeded its authority by remanding
the state case sua sponte based solely on procedural defects. Citing
its inherent authority to manage its docket, the court ordered the
sua sponte remand based on deficient citizenship allegations in
Sneed’s notice of removal and Sneed’s failure to timely correct such
allegations. But we have made clear that “the failure to establish a
party’s citizenship at the time of filing the removal notice is a
procedural, rather than jurisdictional, defect.” Corporate Mgmt.
Advisors, 561 F.3d at 1296.
That procedural defect in removal, without more, cannot
support a sua sponte remand.2 See Whole Health, 254 F.3d at 1319;
1447(c) by remanding this case [sua sponte] because of a perceived procedural
defect in the removal process.” Id.
2 As the district court noted, its inherent power to manage its docket includes
the power to dismiss an action as a sanction for a plaintiff’s failure to prosecute
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25-10569 Opinion of the Court 5
Wilson v. Hearos, LLC, 128 F.4th 1254, 1260 (11th Cir. 2025) (“[A]
defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction can only be
raised through a party’s motion and not sua sponte by the district
court.”). And despite labeling its order as “jurisdiction[al]” in part,
the court made no ruling about whether diversity jurisdiction in
fact existed, or whether the case “could have been originally filed
in federal court.” Wilson, 128 F.4th at 1260. The record is
otherwise inconclusive as to whether the parties are of diverse
citizenship. See Williams, Inc., 269 F.3d at 1320 (“Where the
pleading are inadequate, we may review the record to find
evidence that diversity jurisdiction exists.”).
Because the record is inconclusive as to whether diversity
jurisdiction existed, we remand this case to the district court for the
“purpose of determining the citizenships of the parties, consistent
with this opinion.” Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v. Comcast SCH
Holdings L.L.C., 374 F.3d 1020, 1023 (11th Cir. 2004). We reiterate
that Sneed bears the burden of proving the existence of federal
jurisdiction. See Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319. That means
affirmatively showing the citizenship of the respective parties so
or to comply with court orders. See Foudy v. Indian River Cnty. Sheriff’s Office,
845 F.3d 1117, 1126 (11th Cir. 2017). But the court did not identify any author-
ity authorizing remand as a sanction for a defendant’s failure to establish citi-
zenship in a notice of removal, even in circumstances where the court may
have diversity jurisdiction. And we have held that the failure to adequately
plead citizenship is a procedural defect, which cannot support the court’s stat-
utory sua sponte remand authority. See Wilson v. Hearos, LLC, 128 F.4th 1254,
1260 (11th Cir. 2025); Whole Health Chiropractic & Wellness, Inc. v. Humana Med.
Plan, Inc., 254 F.3d 1317, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001).
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6 Opinion of the Court 25-10569
that the court “is satisfied that no plaintiff is a citizen of the same
state as any defendant.” Travaglio, 735 F.3d at 1268. A conclusory
allegation that the defendants do not share the plaintiff’s
citizenship, “without setting forth the underlying facts supporting
such an assertion, is insufficient to meet the defendant’s burden.”
Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319. “If [Sneed] fails, and there is no diversity
of citizenship, then the district court should remand the case to
state court for want of federal jurisdiction.” Rolling Greens, 374 F.3d
at 1023.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished