Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Cliffton L. Sneed

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Cliffton L. Sneed

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-10569        Document: 21-1        Date Filed: 12/16/2025     Page: 1 of 6




                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION


                                          In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                             For the Eleventh Circuit
                                 ____________________
                                        No. 25-10569
                                   Non-Argument Calendar
                                 ____________________

       WELLS FARGO BANK N.A.,
         As Trustee for Banc of America Funding Corporation Mortgage
         Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-5,
                                                                Plaintiff-Appellee,
       versus

       12757 INVESTMENTGROUP LLC, et al,
                                                                      Defendants,
       CLIFFTON L. SNEED,
         a.k.a. Clifton Sneed,
                                                            Defendant-Appellant.
                                 ____________________
                       Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the Southern District of Florida
                            D.C. Docket No. 0:24-cv-60163-RS
                                 ____________________

       Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
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       2                       Opinion of the Court                  25-10569

       PER CURIAM:
               This appeal arises from a state-court lawsuit filed by
       Appellee Wells Fargo Bank N.A. against Appellant Cliffton Sneed
       and other defendants. Sneed removed the action to federal court
       based on diversity jurisdiction, see 
28 U.S.C. § 1332
(a), but failed to
       sufficiently allege the parties’ citizenship in the notice of removal.
       As a result, the district court sua sponte ordered Sneed to correct the
       deficiencies in an amended notice of removal.
              When Sneed missed the initial, tight deadline to amend the
       notice of removal, the district court remanded the case to state
       court for lack of jurisdiction and failure to comply with a court
       order.    But the court later granted Sneed’s motion for
       reconsideration and gave him an additional month to file the
       amended notice. Sneed again missed the deadline, so the court
       again remanded the action for lack of jurisdiction and failure to
       comply with a court order.             Sneed timely moved for
       reconsideration and submitted an amended notice of removal, but
       the court denied the motion, explaining that Sneed had been “given
       multiple opportunities to cure his pleadings and failed to do so.”
       The court noted that the amended notice still failed to establish the
       citizenship of the defendants. Sneed now appeals.
               We review de novo questions of federal subject-matter
       jurisdiction, Justice Cometh, Ltd. v. Lambert, 
426 F.3d 1342, 1343
 (11th
       Cir. 2005), and of statutory interpretation, Corporate Mgmt. Advisors,
       Inc. v. Artjen Complexus, Inc., 
561 F.3d 1294, 1296
 (11th Cir. 2009).
       We ordinarily review the imposition of sanctions under the district
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       25-10569                   Opinion of the Court                                3

       court’s inherent power for an abuse of discretion. See Martin v.
       Automobili Lamborghini Exclusive, Inc., 
307 F.3d 1332
, 1336–37 (11th
       Cir. 2002); Betty K Agencies, Ltd., 
432 F.3d 1333, 1337
 (11th Cir.
       2005).
               “Because this case was originally filed in state court and
       removed to federal court by [Sneed], [Sneed] bears the burden of
       proving that federal jurisdiction exists.” Williams v. Best Buy Co.,
       Inc., 
269 F.3d 1316, 1319
 (11th Cir. 2001). “[W]hen federal
       jurisdiction is invoked based upon diversity,” the relevant pleading
       “must include the citizenship of each party, so that the court is
       satisfied that no plaintiff is a citizen of the same state as any
       defendant.” Travaglio v. Am. Exp. Co., 
735 F.3d 1266, 1268
 (11th Cir.
       2013). A conclusory allegation in the notice of removal that
       diversity requirements are satisfied, “without setting forth the
       underlying facts supporting such an assertion, is insufficient to
       meet the defendant’s burden.” Williams, 
269 F.3d at 1319
.
               Nonetheless, “the failure to establish a party’s citizenship at
       the time of filing the removal notice is a procedural, rather than
       jurisdictional, defect.” Corporate Mgmt. Advisors, 
561 F.3d at 1296
       (quotation marks omitted). That distinction is important. If a
       district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, it “may remand a
       case sua sponte . . . at any time.” 1 Id.; see 
28 U.S.C. § 1447
(c) (“If at


       1 Moreover, by statute, we lack jurisdiction to review “a remand order based

       on subject matter jurisdiction.” Corporate Mgmt. Advisors, Inc. v. Artjen Com-
       plexus, Inc., 
561 F.3d 1294, 1296
 (11th Cir. 2009). Nonetheless, we retain juris-
       diction “to review whether the district court exceeded its authority under §
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       4                          Opinion of the Court                         25-10569

       any time before final judgment it appears that the district court
       lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”). But
       § 1447(c) “does not authorize any sua sponte remand order not
       based on subject matter jurisdiction.” Whole Health Chiropractic &
       Wellness, Inc. v. Humana Med. Plan, Inc., 
254 F.3d 1317, 1319
 (11th
       Cir. 2001). In other words, a court exceeds its authority by
       remanding a case sua sponte “due to a defect in the removal
       process.” 
Id.
 at 1319–20; see also In re Bethesda Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 
123 F.3d 1407, 1410-11
 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The court acted outside of its
       statutory authority by remanding for a procedural defect after
       thirty days of the notice of removal.”).
              Here, the district court exceeded its authority by remanding
       the state case sua sponte based solely on procedural defects. Citing
       its inherent authority to manage its docket, the court ordered the
       sua sponte remand based on deficient citizenship allegations in
       Sneed’s notice of removal and Sneed’s failure to timely correct such
       allegations. But we have made clear that “the failure to establish a
       party’s citizenship at the time of filing the removal notice is a
       procedural, rather than jurisdictional, defect.” Corporate Mgmt.
       Advisors, 
561 F.3d at 1296
.
             That procedural defect in removal, without more, cannot
       support a sua sponte remand.2 See Whole Health, 
254 F.3d at 1319
;


       1447(c) by remanding this case [sua sponte] because of a perceived procedural
       defect in the removal process.” 
Id.
       2 As the district court noted, its inherent power to manage its docket includes

       the power to dismiss an action as a sanction for a plaintiff’s failure to prosecute
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       25-10569                   Opinion of the Court                                5

       Wilson v. Hearos, LLC, 
128 F.4th 1254, 1260
 (11th Cir. 2025) (“[A]
       defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction can only be
       raised through a party’s motion and not sua sponte by the district
       court.”). And despite labeling its order as “jurisdiction[al]” in part,
       the court made no ruling about whether diversity jurisdiction in
       fact existed, or whether the case “could have been originally filed
       in federal court.” Wilson, 
128 F.4th at 1260
. The record is
       otherwise inconclusive as to whether the parties are of diverse
       citizenship. See Williams, Inc., 
269 F.3d at 1320
 (“Where the
       pleading are inadequate, we may review the record to find
       evidence that diversity jurisdiction exists.”).
              Because the record is inconclusive as to whether diversity
       jurisdiction existed, we remand this case to the district court for the
       “purpose of determining the citizenships of the parties, consistent
       with this opinion.” Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v. Comcast SCH
       Holdings L.L.C., 
374 F.3d 1020, 1023
 (11th Cir. 2004). We reiterate
       that Sneed bears the burden of proving the existence of federal
       jurisdiction. See Williams, 
269 F.3d at 1319
. That means
       affirmatively showing the citizenship of the respective parties so

       or to comply with court orders. See Foudy v. Indian River Cnty. Sheriff’s Office,
       
845 F.3d 1117, 1126
 (11th Cir. 2017). But the court did not identify any author-
       ity authorizing remand as a sanction for a defendant’s failure to establish citi-
       zenship in a notice of removal, even in circumstances where the court may
       have diversity jurisdiction. And we have held that the failure to adequately
       plead citizenship is a procedural defect, which cannot support the court’s stat-
       utory sua sponte remand authority. See Wilson v. Hearos, LLC, 
128 F.4th 1254, 1260
 (11th Cir. 2025); Whole Health Chiropractic & Wellness, Inc. v. Humana Med.
       Plan, Inc., 
254 F.3d 1317, 1319
 (11th Cir. 2001).
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                  25-10569

       that the court “is satisfied that no plaintiff is a citizen of the same
       state as any defendant.” Travaglio, 
735 F.3d at 1268
. A conclusory
       allegation that the defendants do not share the plaintiff’s
       citizenship, “without setting forth the underlying facts supporting
       such an assertion, is insufficient to meet the defendant’s burden.”
       Williams, 
269 F.3d at 1319
. “If [Sneed] fails, and there is no diversity
       of citizenship, then the district court should remand the case to
       state court for want of federal jurisdiction.” Rolling Greens, 
374 F.3d at 1023
.
              VACATED AND REMANDED.


Reference

Status
Unpublished