USCA11 Case: 24-12347 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 5

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-12347 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus

TYRELL BRION BOUIE, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 0:23-cr-60138-AHS-2 ____________________ ____________________ No. 24-12374 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, USCA11 Case: 24-12347 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 5

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versus

ANTHONY CHRISTOPHER DIGGS, JR., Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 0:23-cr-60138-AHS-3 ____________________

Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Tyrell Bouie and Anthony Christopher Diggs, Jr. appeal their 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) convictions for brandishing a firearm in re- lation to a crime of violence, which were predicated on Hobbs Act robbery. On appeal, both appellants argue that the district court lacked jurisdiction over their § 924(c) charges because completed Hobbs Act robbery no longer qualifies as a predicate “crime of vi- olence” under § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause after the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022). We review de novo whether an offense is a qualifying crime of violence under § 924(c). See United States v. Wiley, 78 F.4th 1355, 1360 (11th Cir. 2023). And we review de novo the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court. See United States v. Gruezo, 66 F.4th 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 2023). “Federal district courts have original jurisdiction . . . of all of- fenses against the laws of the United States.” United States v. Wilson, USCA11 Case: 24-12347 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 3 of 5

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979 F.3d 889, 902 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). Ac- cordingly, “so long as the indictment charges the defendant with violating a valid federal statute as enacted in the United States Code, it alleges an offense against the laws of the United States, and, thereby, invokes the district court’s subject-matter jurisdic- tion.” Id. (quotation marks and alteration omitted). We have held that Hobbs Act robbery “clearly” qualifies as a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause, noting that it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” In re St. Fleur, 824 F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th Cir. 2016). In Taylor, the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split and held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a predicate crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause. See Tay- lor, 596 U.S. at 849-52. The Court explained that, to prove at- tempted Hobbs Act robbery, the government must show that the defendant intended to unlawfully take or obtain personal property by means of actual or threatened force and completed a “substan- tial step” toward that end. See id. at 851. But the Court noted that, while the government would have to show that the defendant took an “unequivocal” and “significant” step towards committing rob- bery, it need not show that the defendant actually used, attempted to use, or even threatened to use force, as required by § 924(c). See id. at 851-52. Therefore, the Court concluded that attempted Hobbs Act robbery was not categorically a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause. See id. at 852. In so holding, the USCA11 Case: 24-12347 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 4 of 5

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Court in Taylor rejected the “realistic probability” test set out in United States v. St. Hubert, 909 F.3d 335, 352-53 (11th Cir. 2018), as well as St. Hubert’s reasoning that, because a completed Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence, an attempted Hobbs Act robbery must qualify as well. See Taylor, 596 U.S. at 852-59 (citing St. Hubert, 909 F.3d at 352-53). In Wiley, decided after Taylor, we held that aiding and abet- ting Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence, reasoning that “Tay- lor did not disturb [our] holding that completed Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence.” Wiley, 78 F.4th at 1365. We recently con- firmed that “Taylor says nothing of the completed crime of Hobbs Act robbery and thus does not disturb [our] precedent holding that Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence.” United States v. Solomon, 136 F.4th 1310, 1318 (11th Cir. 2025). First, we rejected the conten- tion that Wiley was inapposite to convictions for completed rob- bery, explaining that “aiding and abetting a Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence because a completed Hobbs Act robbery is, itself, a crime of violence.” Id. at 1321. Second, we rejected the appel- lants’ assertion that Wiley was not controlling because their appeal raised new arguments not considered in Wiley. See id. Thus, we concluded that the appellants’ request “to avoid Wiley’s resolution of an issue, based on unraised arguments [] is foreclosed by Lambrix and does not implicate Jackson and Webster.” Id. Nevertheless, in Solomon we considered and rejected the ap- pellants’ specific arguments. See id. First, we concluded that Wiley rendered meritless the argument that Hobbs Act robbery was not USCA11 Case: 24-12347 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 5 of 5

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a crime of violence after Taylor because Taylor abrogated St. Hubert. See id. Second, we explained that, although Taylor abrogated the “realistic probability” test used in St. Hubert, that did not “advance the appellants’ cause” because we held in St. Fleur that Hobbs Act robbery “require[s] the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” Id. Third, we confirmed that the Hobbs Act stat- ute is divisible as to robbery and attempted robbery. Id. Fourth, we declined to ignore St. Fleur on the ground that it “arose in a collateral context without true adversarial briefing,” stating that the prior-panel-precedent rule still applies. See id. Fifth, we re- jected the argument that, based on our pattern jury instructions, the least culpable conduct for Hobbs Act robbery was “taking per- sonal property against the victim’s will by threatening the victim’s intangible property e.g., threat of financial harm.” Id. We ex- plained that “jury instructions are not binding law” and that cases before and after Taylor concluded that “Hobbs Act robbery cannot be accomplished without the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force.” Id. Here, the appellants’ § 924(c) arguments are foreclosed by our binding precent, including Solomon. The district court did not err in determining that completed Hobbs Act robbery remains a crime of violence after Taylor and, therefore, a valid predicate of- fense for the appellants’ § 924(c) convictions. AFFIRMED.