USCA11 Case: 24-12752 Document: 71-1 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 1 of 4

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-12752 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

CARLOS A. ALONSO CANO, as next friend of his minor daughter Jany Leidy Alonso Morejon, FE MOREJON FERNANDEZ, Plaintiffs-Appellants, ANGIE A. MOREJON, KATY A. MOREJON, Plaintiffs, JANY L. ALONSO, Interested Party-Appellant, versus

245 C&C, LLC, CFH GROUP, LLC, Defendants-Appellees. USCA11 Case: 24-12752 Document: 71-1 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 2 of 4

2 Opinion of the Court 24-12752 ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-21826-JAL ____________________

Before LUCK, LAGOA, and WILSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Plaintiffs-Appellants Carlos Alonso Cano, his wife, Fe More- jon Fernandez, and their daughter, Jany Alonso Morejon (collec- tively, Appellants), 1 appeal the district court’s order granting their trial counsel’s, Michael Dunlavy, motion to withdraw from repre- senting them on appeal. In response, Defendants-Appellees 245 C&C, LLC and CFH Group, LLC contend that Appellants lack standing to bring this claim, and alternatively, that the issue is mer- itless. We conclude that Appellants do have standing but never- theless affirm the district court’s order. We review de novo questions of appellate standing. Kim- berly Regenesis, LLC v. Lee Cnty., 64 F.4th 1253, 1258 (11th Cir. 2023) (per curiam). “To establish appellate standing, a litigant must prove that he has suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, and is likely to be re- dressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id. at 1259. In the appel- late standing context, “the primary meaning of the injury require- ment is adverseness: Only a litigant who is aggrieved by the

1 Angie Morejon and Katy Morejon, while plaintiffs below, are not parties in

the present appeal. USCA11 Case: 24-12752 Document: 71-1 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 3 of 4

24-12752 Opinion of the Court 3

judgment or order may appeal.” United States v. Amodeo, 916 F.3d 967, 971 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted). A party ap- pealing an adverse judgment against them “is enough to establish appellate standing.” Corley v. Long-Lewis, Inc., 965 F.3d 1222, 1234 (11th Cir. 2020). Insofar as redressability, the party must show that “a favorable decision from this Court would redress [their] alleged injury.” Rivers v. Guerrero, 605 U.S. 443, 451 (2025). We review a district court’s decision to allow an attorney to withdraw from representing a party for an abuse of discretion. In re Kellogg, 197 F.3d 1116, 1119 (11th Cir. 1999). A district court abuses its discretion when it “applies an incorrect legal standard, fails to follow the appropriate procedures when making the rele- vant determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erro- neous.” Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Brown, 69 F.4th 1321, 1329 (11th Cir. 2023). Under Florida Bar Rule 4-1.16, an attorney must withdraw from representing a client if representing the client “will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or law.” R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.16(a)(1). Here, Appellants have standing to challenge the district court’s order, which was averse to them and may be redressed by a favorable decision from this court. But there is no evidence in the record showing that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard, failed to follow appropriate procedures, or made a clearly erroneous finding of fact. In his motion to withdraw, Dunlavy con- tended that continuing to represent Appellants would result in a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or law, which USCA11 Case: 24-12752 Document: 71-1 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 4 of 4

4 Opinion of the Court 24-12752

requires Dunlavy to withdraw his representation under Florida rules. 2 Further, Dunlavy’s withdrawal did not materially and ad- versely affect Appellants’ case; Appellants timely filed their pro se notices of appeal and successfully filed briefs and motions before this court. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in allow- ing Dunlavy to withdraw from appellate representation. AFFIRMED.

2 Dunlavy also contended multiple reasons that are all valid for permissive

withdrawal under Florida rules, including that Appellants took actions he con- sidered imprudent and failed to substantially fulfill their obligations to him af- ter being given a reasonable warning, and if Dunlavy continued to represent Appellants, it would place a significant financial burden on him. See R. Regu- lating Fla. Bar 4-1.16(b)(1)-(4).